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This thesis examines two phenomena often seen as existing on the periphery of 
terrorism research; ‘lone wolf terrorists’ and the relationship between terrorism and 
organised crime (the crime/terror nexus). The thesis contends that rather than being at 
the periphery of terrorism research when examined together both phenomena provide 
previously unexplored avenues into understanding contemporary terrorism, and should 
both be central to any examination of the potential future development of terrorism. 
 
The thesis illustrates through focussed research, case studies, and an expanding 
modelling concept that the antecedents, actions and attributes of contemporary lone 
wolf terrorists and participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships have significant 
similarities. This thesis uniquely examined the crime/terror nexus and lone wolves set 
within Rapoport’s (2003) wave theory. In doing so it draws out previously 
unacknowledged common factors across what, until now, appear wholly disparate 
terrorist campaigns.  
 
The thesis contends that consideration as to whether Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave 
is indeed still the existent driver for terrorist behaviour, or if instead we have moved 
beyond this into the age of what can be best termed a form of ‘identity terrorism’. The 
reappraisal undertaken in this thesis, placing a variety of actors under scrutiny from a 
new perspective, clearly shows that the crest of Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave may 
have passed, and terrorism appears to have moved into new uncharted waters. 
 
The thesis argues that the newly identified commonalities amongst actors present 
opportunities for counter terrorism professionals to reconsider the partitioned approach 
to dealing with adherents to what appear radically different ideologies, and instead 
focus on the individuals espousing their allegiance. The research suggests looking for 
more macro counter measures targeted on the prevalent characteristics amongst 
participants rather than tackling the apparently all important group narrative of each 








One article that contributes to this thesis for a PhD by publication, “Terrorism and 
Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?”, was drawn in part from my 
Mlitt. Dissertation at the University of St. Andrews. The article contributes to 
addressing the research question, and supports the additional research contained in the 
further publications that constitute the thesis. 
 
This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in any similar form for the 
award of a higher degree elsewhere.  
 
This thesis is 80895 words including appendices, bibliography and footnotes. This does 




From a young age I was always fascinated with organised crime and terrorism, albeit 
as a youngster purely in respect of news reporting and in fiction.  
 
On joining the police in 1994 these were areas whose reality I was immediately drawn 
to. In the culture that existed pre the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act I found 
myself in the position with two years’ service as a recruiter and handler for sources 
reporting on multi kilo drugs operations. This aptitude led to very early recruitment by 
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at a local level, and a move with 6 years’ 
service to being a detective targeting high level organised criminality. 
 
During this period I was also seconded to Special Branch, and deployed to numerous 
operations as a surveillance operative, targeting organised crime and terrorism.  
 
I took forward my first (pre police) degree in Philosophy with a MSc. in Criminal 
Justice studies, but then paused any further academic work and concentrated on my 
career. 
 
Promoted to Detective Sergeant I spent six years in the CID, on numerous Major 
Investigations including counter terrorism and organised crime. I was deployed to 
Merseyside on numerous occasions over a seven month period and during this time 
personally engaged with individuals operating at the highest levels of organised 
criminality in the United Kingdom. During this period in my service I was also directly 
involved in a live, and nationally significant, counter terrorism operation. 
 
This exposure reignited my desire to develop my wider knowledge of my field, and saw 
me complete an Mlitt in Terrorism Studies. My dissertation for this qualification drew 
together my interests in both phenomena my career had focussed on, and was published 
to significant interest. From here I gained confidence in my academic ability and had a 
real ongoing drive to learn, and then share my findings. This resulted in the publications 
contained in this thesis, but in addition wider work in relation to policing in general 
terms that has seen me published on over 30 occasions. 
 
As my knowledge and publication success grew so too did invitations to events. I have 
presented my work on a number of occasions, including on behalf of the United Nations 
Office for Drugs and Crime, the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The 
Hague and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum.  
 
I have been appointed as a member of the Global Network Against Transnational 
Organised Crime and as an Expert Fellow by the Security Privacy Identity and Trust in 
the Digital Economy Network, where I have participated as a member of a team who 
secured a £30,000 grant to research ‘Shadow Infrastructure’. 
 
My research and development have significantly impacted on my working life. I have 
formed multi local authority CONTEST and Social Cohesion groups, with my studies 
acting as foundations to their structure and principles.  
 
I am a regular invited ‘peer reviewer’ of journal submissions, book reviewer and mentor 
students (including serving police officers) while also lecturing on my chosen field at a 
number of universities on a frequent basis. 
 
Completing this PhD has been very rewarding, and I look forward to taking forward 
and sharing my research on the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime for years 
to come. Indeed, since commencing this endeavour I was approached by the editors of 
the journal Terrorism and Political Violence to contribute to a special issue on 
contemporary terrorism, and have had my article “Crime, Terror and the Danger of 
Diasporas” accepted for publication. My thesis has also been accepted as a contribution 
to the Parntership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) Snapshots 
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Chapter 1 Theoretical Underpinnings and 
Methodology 
1.1 Introduction to the Thesis 
 
This PhD research comprises seven publications, reproduced in chapters 2-5 below, 
that examine two phenomena often seen as existing on the periphery of terrorism 
research; ‘lone wolf terrorists’ and the relationship between terrorism and organised 
crime.  For the purposes of this thesis, terrorism is defined as  
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations 
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature.” (United Nations, 2004) 
 
‘Lone wolf terrorism’ is defined as “ideologically driven violence, or attempted 
violence, perpetrated by an individual who plans and executes an attack in the absence 
of collaboration (author’s italics) with other individuals or groups” (Becker, 2014, pp. 
964). 
 
 Organised crime is defined “a criminal syndicate consist(ing) of a system of loosely 
structured relationship functioning primarily because each participant is interested in 
furthering his own welfare” (Albini, 1971, pp. 288). 
 
These definitions are adopted as they provide clarity throughout this PhD when 
conceptualising the relationships that exist between the phenomena. It should be noted 
from the outset that these definitions are not universally accepted, and this chapter 
draws out the arguments that exist in respect of these contentions.  
 
The crime/terror nexus described throughout this PhD adopts the format identified by 
Makarenko (2004) in her illustrated crime-terror continuum model. This model is 
widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of research into the relationship between 



























Essentially, the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a 
line, moving down this line groups from one phenomena form alliances or utilise the 
tactics of the other; enter a ‘black hole’, where they are no longer clearly organised  
criminals or a terrorist group but instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and 
may ultimately mutate into a group categorised as being wholly transformed into one 
which fits the criteria of the other phenomena. This modelling is considered in detail at 
section 1.4.5 below. 
 
The thesis contends that rather than being at the periphery of terrorism research, 
studying the phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the crime/ terror nexus in tandem 
provides previously unexplored avenues into understanding contemporary terrorism, 
and should both be central to any examination of the potential future development of 
terrorism. 
 
The primary research aim of combining the published works is to demonstrate that 
recent activity within the two edge phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the 
relationship between terrorism and organised crime highlight that there is a conceptual 
gap in the understanding of contemporary terrorism arising from a mischaracterisation 
of terrorist motivations.   
 
In order to identify and address this conceptual gap, this thesis asks the following 
research question: 
 
 Are there commonalities between ‘Lone Wolf Terrorists’ with participants in 
Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these 
commonalities have on any classification of contemporary terrorism?  
 
This research question can be broken down into the following sub-questions: 
 
 What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a ‘lone 
wolf’ terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context than 
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 What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a Crime/ 
Terror nexus relationship, and are the actions of participants meaningful in a 
wider context than their own activity? 
 
 When the factors/motivations are examined together, are recent changes in 
‘lone wolf terrorist’ attacks and Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, sufficient 
to support the argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport’s religious 
wave?  
 
The core argument advanced in this PhD is that current knowledge and understanding 
on contemporary terrorist actors may be mischaracterised through a failure to appreciate 
the incremental changes that have occurred in terrorist motivation over time; and that 
these changes may have led to a need to reframe our understanding of terrorist 
motivation. This mischaracterisation is on the basis that much of the literature on 
terrorism identifies religious motivation as being the primary terrorist motivation. Prior 
to 9/11 the move towards religion as the primary motivation for terrorism was apparent 
(Enders and Sandler, 2000). One simply cannot ignore the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks 
Al-Qaeda, then at the crest of religiously motivated terrorism, perpetrated described by 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair as “an event like no other…. that turned the entirety 
of the world on its axis” (Dimbelby, 2020). The ongoing influence the attacks have on 
contemporary thought concerning terrorism has been, like the attacks themselves, 
without precedent. However, this thesis illustrates through a bespoke form of modelling 
that while post 9/11 there remained religious undertones to terrorism these have faded 
over time and been replaced by a new form of motivations.   
 
Contemporary scholars still hold the viewpoint that the primary terrorism motivating 
factor appears to remain religious (and within this characterisation ‘jihadist’) in nature 
(Sageman, 2018; Neve et al., 2020; White, 2020, Govier and Boutland, 2020).  In 2019, 
data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program is described as showing that worldwide 
“28 of 54 state-based conflicts involved IS, al-Qaida, or their affiliates” (Pettersson and 
Oberg, 2020, pp. 7), who the authors characterise together as ‘Jihadist Groups’ 
(Pettersson and Oberg, 2020). Whilst this characterisation and grouping of what appear 
to be ‘fellow travellers’ may be considered an accurate reflection of the manifestations 
of terrorism that were examined in each of the literary works, they fail to appreciate the 
ongoing changing nature of terrorism. 
 
In his theory Rapoport (2003) outlines terrorist waves as basis to identify and explain 
terrorist motivations by essentially mapping the occurrence of terrorism along a 
timeline and equating each classification with a particular motivation.  Rapoport begins 
in the 1880s with an ‘anarchist wave’, followed by an ‘anti-colonial wave’ in the 
1920’s, then a ‘new left’ wave in the 1960s, before turning into the ‘religious wave’ 
which, in theory, is said to still exists today. The theory contends that contemporary 
terrorism remains in the grip of this ‘religious wave’, and to the casual observer the pre-
eminence of the Islamic State (IS) 1 group in discourse on modern terrorism appears, at 
first glance, to be supportive of this position.   
                                                 
1. For a full account of the evolution of Islamic State, and the controversy over even its name of reference, including 
discussion of the alternative titles of ‘Daesh’ and ‘Islamic State in Syria and the Levant’, see Stern and Berger (2015). 
Despite finding their overall research to be of the highest quality my personal view is that as ‘Islamic State’ is the 
self-referential term applied by the group that has evolved, and currently occupies large swathes of territory in Iraq 
and Syria, then it  is the appropriate one  (for the author) to apply when writing regarding them.  
 
However, this fixation on religious motivation creates a conceptual gap by failing to 
fully deconstruct the nuanced motivation of contemporary terrorist actors. This fixed 
view appears to have continued, in part, from the extreme nature of the acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by terrorists groups and followers of IS as the successors to Al-Qaeda.   
 
This thesis recognises that the compartmentalisation of the occurrence of terrorism by 
reference to a sequence of waves may be a useful way to understand the occurrence of 
terrorism, but it is contended that this process needs to remain vigilant of the ever 
changing nature of terrorism.  This vigilance requires more than Rapoport’s (2003) 
assertion that ‘not all terrorism is the same’ by actively being alert to the changing 
dynamics in terrorism more generally but also within different manifestations of 
terrorism. This requires more than acceptance that terrorism will change over time but 
rather iterations of terrorism continually change, and such nuanced ongoing alteration 
impacts on any attempt to engage in counterterrorism. 
 
The emergence of the IS may be considered one of the biggest convergences of 
terrorism, lone wolves and organised crime. As an exemplar discussion in this thesis on 
the group provides evidence of a fundamental change in terrorist behaviours per se 
perhaps presents the most striking example of the dissipation of Rapoport’s ‘religious 
wave’, and the heralding of a new phase in the development of terrorism.  
 
Sageman (2008) provides a narrative on events, supported by an academic model 
drawing on Rapoport’s (2003) ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’ theoretical framework, 
where he identifies similar ‘ripples’ or ‘sub waves’ of Jihadi terrorist involvement. 
Essentially, he dissects Rapoport’s religious wave, and identifies sub waves of 
development within it. This thesis contends that even these sub waves have reached 
their breakwater, and evidence of this is to be found in the ever decreasing religious 
credentials of the waves participants outlined below. This dissipation is discussed in 
detail in chapter 3. Previous research, such as Bakun (2011) and Pedahzur and Perlinger 
(2011) may have been overshadow the sheer scale of the 9/11 attacks and indeed 
subsequent attacks that research naturally focused on ‘religion’ as the primary 
motivator but this fixation failed to appreciate in more recent years the changes in 
motivation. We now have to ‘update’ our thinking on terrorist motivations and be alive 
to the risk of their changing nature over time, as Rapport’s (2003) original research 
contended, so that dramatic terrorist ‘events’ do not cloud our judgment. 
 
That’s said, in considering the ‘religious’ Jewish terrorists in the 2000’s Pedahzur and 
Perlinger (2011) noted the counter culture features of participants, and their isolation 
from the mainstream. This is wholly consistent with the findings of this thesis across 
apparent terrorist actor’s motivations. However the current mischaracterisation of 
terrorist motivations is premised upon a fixation on the motivation for terrorist acts 
being religious in nature when there appears to be considerable evidence to show this 
may no longer be reflective of contemporary terrorists. The thesis demonstrates this 
mischaracterisation by examining three case studies that illustrate the similarities 
existing between lone wolf terrorists, IS participants and terrorists participating in crime 
terror nexus relationships. The degradation of attachment to a clear ‘cause’ and 
evidence of individualised motivation is apparent. Through the case studies presented 
                                                 
 
and the modelling that follows them this thesis engages with identifying, tracking and 
analysing the motivation of terrorists in a variety of manifestations of terrorism as the 
basis to argue the dissipation of the religious wave given that religion appears to have 
little to do with some manifestations of contemporary terrorism.  
 
The difficulty with the mischaracterisation on terrorist motivation is that not only does 
it impact the development of counterterrorism law and policy, it also impacts on how 
we recognise and analyse the occurrence of terrorism. If we are truly to understand 
terrorism then we need to understand the factors and motivations of terrorist actors as 
a precursor to understanding the contemporary nature of terrorism. Writing 
immediately after 9/11 Rapoport (2003) appreciated the impact of events but also wrote 
of the need to keep in mind terrorism’s ever changing nature.  The scale of 9/11 and the 
conflicts that followed appear to be having an influence in shaping an ongoing fixation 
on the continuance of his identified religious wave, as opposed to an appreciation that 
there is evidence of a potential global shift in terrorism’s driving factors.  By being 
alive to the fact that terrorism changes, we are in a stronger position to spot changes 
which can inform not only the development of counterterrorism law and policy but also 
it will help inform the analysis of terrorism. 
 
The current research paradigm considers terrorism as a largely cohesive group activity, 
with reference to Rapoport’s wave theory adopting this form of consideration. This 
thesis shows that contemporary terrorism is an activity being committed by individuals. 
Be they part of an identifiable group or not, with significant questions requiring to be 
addressed as to whether there is a religious motivation for their actions. This thesis 
addresses these questions.  
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis utilises case studies in respect of lone wolf terrorists, IS and the nexus 
between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland to illustrate the need for 
consideration of nuance when investigating the motivation of individual terrorist actors.  
 
Chapter 2 draws on the publications “The 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami - Is Rapoport’s 
‘Religious Wave’ ending?” (Gallagher, 2017) and “Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining 
Motives and Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists” (Gallagher, publication scheduled in 
2022).  
 
“The 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami - Is Rapoport’s ‘Religious Wave’ ending?” 
(Gallagher, 2017) was published by the Journal of Strategic Security, a double blind 
peer review open access journal published by the Henley-Putnam School of Strategic 
Security.   
 
This article is currently cited by 13 other authors in publications including the Journal 
of Business Continuity and Emergency Planning, Contemporary Challenges: The 
Global Crime, Justice and Security Journal and the Journal of Security Studies. 
 
In this chapter ‘lone wolf terrorists’ are considered, utilising their activities in 2016 as 
a focus for consideration, particularly set against Rapoport’s first wave, the anarchists. 
The actor’s apparent motivations are illustrated, along with the consequences of their 
actions. The findings of the case study are clear that the degree of religious motivation 
behind their activity is highly questionable, while the links to wider movements, either 
proclaimed or implied are clear. The actions of the lone wolf terrorists studied appears 
to indicate changes to terrorist behaviours well beyond the scope of the individual 
attacks. A specific instance of ‘lone wolf terrorist’ activity, dismissed by many as 
irrelevant to the wider consideration of terrorism, is considered in detail as it appears to 
crystallise the issues of the fluidity of individuality and identity that challenge the 
continuance of Rapoport’s religious wave. 
 
Chapter 3 draws on the publication “‘Criminalised’ Islamic State Veterans – A Future 
Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?” (Gallagher, 2016). 
 
This article was published by Perspectives on Terrorism, a double blind peer review 
open access journal managed by notable terrorism scholars of the Terrorism Research 
Institute. It has 8000 subscribers. 
 
This article is currently cited by 32 other authors. These publications include the 
Counter Terrorism Sentinel at the West Point Military Academy, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, the European Journal of Criminology, reporting by the Globesec 
international security think tank and the Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of 
International Studies. 
 
In this chapter the thesis moves to specific consideration of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) 
group, the ‘inspiration’ for many of the ‘lone wolf terrorists’ discussed in chapter 2. 
Here the thesis illustrates that despite the group’s title and apparent motivations the 
political territorial ambitions are in fact to the fore, and the individual motivations of 
its members who have travelled from the democracies merit far greater consideration. 
It also begins to test the paradigms described, and demonstrates the interdependence of 
terrorism on organised criminality, casting significant doubt on the ‘religious’ nature of 
the IS brand of terrorism. Consideration of the antecedents of IS participants set against 
earlier members of Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave provides strong indications of 
changes beyond the individual circumstances of each participant, with wider 
implications for consideration of changes in the background of terrorist actors.  
 
Chapter 4 draws on the publications “Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative 
Endeavours in Scotland?” (Gallagher, 2014); “Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in 
the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism 
Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?” (Gallagher, 2015); 
“Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime” (Gallagher, 
2018); and “Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity” (Gallagher, 2019).  
 
“Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?” (Gallagher, 
2014) was published by Terrorism and Political Violence, a double blind peer review 
journal of significant note in the field of terrorism studies.  
 
This article is currently cited by 7 other authors. These publications include Global 
Crime, The Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism and The Routledge Handbook 
of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism. 
 
This article was featured in the Routledge list of most influential articles on Counter 
Terrorism and was required reading on the Post Graduate International Organised 
Crime Module at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington 
University. 
 
The article received coverage on the BBC and featured in articles in the Sunday Times 
and Jane’s Intelligence Review.   
 
The article describes Scotland’s historic cultural ties to Northern Ireland, and provides 
an explanation of the influence of the recent conflict there on Scottish organised crime 
groups’ co-operation with terrorists arising from these cultural ties. The article 
thereafter illustrates subject matter expert and investigator opinions on the links 
between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, supported by interviewees through 
their access to confidential briefing material on the phenomena.   
 
“Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised 
Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit 
of Profit?” (Gallagher, 2015) takes forward the research contained in “Terrorism and 
Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?” (Gallagher, 2014), and 
models the evidence obtained alongside research on entrepreneurship. 
 
This chapter was subject to peer review. 
“Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime” (Gallagher, 
2018) which illustrates the sophisticated interdependencies that exist between both 
phenomena 
 
This article was written at the request of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism 
– The Hague. It was subject to peer review. 
 
It has been cited by 1 author, the publication featuring in the European Journal of 
Criminology.  
 
“Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity” (Gallagher, 2019) focusses on the need 
for terrorist organisations to retain legitimacy amongst their supportive population sub 
groups while accessing illicit finance to operate.  
 
This article was written at the request of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism 
– The Hague. It was subject to peer review. 
 
This chapter presents a case study considering the relationship between terrorism and 
organised crime in Scotland, a ‘support hub’ for Northern Irish related terrorism. This 
case study may appear initially as being an ad hoc selection in contrast to the previous 
case studies, but it forms an important basis to look in detail at an area apparently 
unaffected by contemporary terrorism. Uniquely it considers long established diaspora 
communities, and their ongoing role in supporting terrorist aspirations where 
apparently direct relevance to those involved is very remote. The chapter 
‘operationalises’ established theories on the nexus between terrorism and organised 
crime, providing new insight into how these relationships form and function. Links 
between the apparent motivations of terrorist participants considered in chapter 3, IS 
recruits, are discerned to be at play with participants in terrorism affecting Scotland and 
by virtue of interdependency Northern Ireland, but also numerous other apparent post 
terrorist conflict zones. A degradation of participant’s motivation is identified, with 
links to criminality exposing motivations amongst actors far removed from the original 
aims of the terrorist conflict. It accomplishes this consideration within Rapoport’s 
(2003) framework, illustrating how the actions of the actors considered assist in 
understanding the potential move beyond religious terrorism.  
 
Chapter 5 draws on the publications “The 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami - Is Rapoport’s 
‘Religious Wave’ ending?” (Gallagher, 2017), “Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-
operative Endeavours in Scotland?” (Gallagher, 2014); “Modelling Entrepreneurial 
Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting 
Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit?” (Gallagher, 
2015); and “‘Criminalised’ Islamic State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in 
Organised Crime Development?” (Gallagher, 2016) 
 
In this chapter the thesis moves into a consideration of the results from the case studies, 
and a focus is made specifically on the decision making processes of terrorists and 
organised criminals, outlining the factors that affect their decision making. This is 
achieved through modelling that builds from the influences of individuals initial 
participation through to post conflict implications. It accomplishes this with specific 
reference to the perceived entrepreneurial aspects of organised crime, using the work 
of Baumol (1990), but also expanding the scope of the individual criminal’s 
considerations of ‘profit’ beyond simply financial gain. It builds on Albini’s (1971) 
initial use of the far reaching term of ‘welfare’ in terms of criminal success to present 
a nuanced picture of influences, and potential implications of terrorist and organised 
crime interactions.  
 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis combines six pieces of the authors published work into a contiguous 
narrative and makes at least four claims of originality. These are: 
  
 Firstly,  this thesis identifies that there is are limited comparative studies  
examining the changing nature of the motivations of terrorist actors by 
conducting a study of the relationship between lone wolf terrorists and the nexus 
between terrorism and organised crime. Kaplan’s (1997) “Leaderless 
Resistance” first brought the ‘lone wolf terrorist’ concept as we know it today 
into the academic milieu for consideration. For the nexus between terrorism and 
organised crime Makarenko’s (2004) “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing 
the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism” is the 
first academic work that models the interrelationship between actors in the two 
phenomena of terrorism and organised crime. Although since these pieces of 
research were published both authors have published further extrapolations of 
their concepts, Kaplan (writing with Loow and Malkki, 2014) and Makarenko 
(writing with Mesquita, 2014), neither have fundamentally altered their initial 
suggestions. Both authors works have been studied and referenced repeatedly, 
with both pieces of scholarship being acknowledged as corner stone pieces of 
research with Kaplan (1997) attracting at time of writing 187 citations and 
Makarenko (2004) 505.  
 
While Makarenko’s work does not reference Rapoport’s wave theory, Kaplan 
(2007) has considered the possibility of the end of terrorism’s religious wave, 
and its replacement with a ‘neo tribalism undertow’ with ethnicity as its driving 
factor, however his suggestions in respect of African based terrorism 
development did not come to pass.2   
 
Although both the concepts of lone wolf terrorism and the nexus between 
terrorism and organised crime have been studied at length previously, the 
originality of this thesis is that no other author has suggested that when studies 
together  they provide a new and unique perspective on modern terrorism.  This 
unique perspective provides a way to analyse the occurrence of terrorism that 
can be utilised not only in analysing counterterrorism law and policy but also 
can help inform its development.    
  
Previous studies (as discussed below) on the links between terrorism and 
organised crime have focused almost entirely on group analysis, membership of 
groups, and activities expressed as group processes.  
 
Authors have noted that to continue functioning in any capacity as a terrorist 
group funding is a necessity (Bovenkerek and Chakra, 2006; Clarke and Lee 
2008; Stewart, 2010). The reliance in terrorism on organised crime for finance 
has been made clear by individuals such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of 
the PKK, who has stated that the organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug 
trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons (Roth and Sever, 2007). 
Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity IRA has 
established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, sharing 
smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal 
enterprises (Byrne, 2010). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity 
brokers to further their own ends, with ETA ensuring the lowering the price of 
cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with 
Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised 
crime cartels (Saviano, 2007).  
 
In addition co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling 
routes by organised criminals to terrorists. Examples of this are the Mexican 
drug cartels allowing Hezbollah to utilise its routes to smuggle persons and 
narcotics (Perri et al., 2009; Conery, 2009); D-Company providing smuggling 
routes into India to Al-Qaeda (Clarke and Lee, 2008); the Naples based Camorra 
Mafia moving Al-Qaeda operatives throughout Europe (Chepesiuk, 2007); and, 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan utilising Afghan criminal groups to move 
Heroin into Russia (Makarenko, 2004). The well documented case of the 
Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings 
(Jamieson, 2005) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-
operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans 
to drug gangs is becoming an ever more common occurrence (Cusack, 2009). 
 
The use of italics above is by way of illustrating how some researchers to date 
have written of these cartels, groups and gangs as monoliths as opposed to the 
                                                 
2 The author has discussed this with Kaplan who accepts events have not borne out his development 
theory. 
often loose associations of individuals with an, at times, cohesive (if nefarious) 
collective identity.  
 
By examining the crime/terror nexus from the standpoint of participating 
individuals rather than the groups they claim membership of (as has been the 
norm to date), or allegiance to in the case of lone wolves (by action or indicative 
deed) common factors across disparate terrorist campaigns become clearer.  
This make a contribution to knowledge by illustrating that contemporary 
terrorists such as the apparently wholly divergent examples of IS operatives 
Khalid and Ibrahim el-Bakraoi (Mendick et. al., 2016); armed and active FARC 
operatives (Olaya, 2019); the ‘far right’ motivated Ali Sonboly (Alexander et 
al., 2016); the killers of Lyra McKee in Northern Ireland (English, 2019); and 
Ethan Stables who attempted to bomb a gay pride event in London (BBC, 2018) 
have far more in common than previously thought. Their actions can be seen 
within the conceptualisation of a new or emerging wave of terrorism, and this 
presents opportunities to refocus counterterrorism on this emerging threat. 
 
 Secondly, this thesis demonstrates, to a high degree of probability, that there is 
a wholesale conceptual shift of the collective understanding of the nature of 
contemporary terrorism. The thesis argues that the implications of 
individualised terrorist motivation necessitate consideration of a move from the 
current focus on the religious motivation paradigm to a new conceptualisation 
that this thesis terms ‘identity terrorism’.  This make a significant contribution 
to knowledge by helping to characterise the occurrence of terrorism today and 
this characterisation is crucial for at least two reasons.  It is contended that the 
development of counterterrorism law and policy needs to be reflective of the 
occurrence of contemporary terrorism. If law and policy is fixated on a religious 
understanding of terrorism, it is likely that the development of counterterrorism 
law and policy will be in some ways defective in managing the threat of 
terrorism by failing to capture the occurrence of modern terrorism.  There is 
some evidence of this already in respect of this, with particularly insightful 
examples being that of Sonboly, discussed detail in chapter 2 of this thesis, and 
attacks such as that of the ‘Incel’3 initiator Alek Miassian which left 10 dead in 
Toronto, Canada (Chavez, 2018). Furthermore, the academic study of terrorism 
also needs to take into account the changes in the occurrence of terrorism in 
order to analyse it in any meaningful way.  The academic study of terrorism can 
only be accurate if it has a full appreciation of its current manifestation, and the 
ability to move focus as the actors motivations change. 
 
The thesis assists also in moving forward the dialogue beyond religious 
terrorism, and provides a reframing for both an academic and practiconer 
audience. Given the degree to which terrorism is outlined in this thesis as having 
moved beyond the ‘religious’ wave, a new argument is presented for a change 
to the description of ‘Jihadist’ terrorism, suggesting instead the adoption of the 
more accurate term of ‘Caliphites’. In chapter 2 a clear argument as to why 
adoption of this distinction demonstrates the political as opposed to religious 
motivation of these terrorist actors is provided.  
 
                                                 
3 ‘Involuntary Celibate’, an extreme misogynistic worldview. 
 Thirdly, this thesis demonstrates the significance of ‘profit’ requiring far greater 
consideration during the examination of the individual motivation of relevant 
actors.  Previous works such as Bovenkerk and Chakra, 2004; Saviano, 2007; 
Clarke and Lee 2008; Stewart, 2010; Dishman, 2001; Byrne, 2010 follow a 
common theme of terrorist groups utilising organised crime methods or working 
with organised criminals for the terrorist group’s purposes. This approach fails 
to appreciate the factors driving actors in such behaviours, instead simply 
concentrating on overt group activities. Makarenko’s (2004) own crime/terror 
continuum is based on group dynamics, not the factors and motivations 
affecting actors within the relevant groups. By acknowledging the many factors 
and influences on individual actors driving them towards terrorist behaviour, 
and that may sustain such activity in post conflict situations, we are better able 
to understand terrorist activity overall. This provides for greater understanding 
of individual terrorist motivations, the factors influencing their behaviours, 
again providing previously untapped opportunities for exploration to those 
engaged in counterterrorism. 
 
 Finally, this thesis adopts a modelling methodology in chapter five as a basis to 
understand contemporary terrorism which illustrates the factors affecting 
individual actors in this milieu as well as the potential implications. After 
extensive research, the author has not been able to find this modelling being 
used in terrorism in a similar way but advances the use of this modelling on the 
basis of professional experience.  This use of modelling makes a significant 
contribution to knowledge by illustrating the influences on contemporary 
terrorists in a manner that allows a clear understanding of how they enter 
terrorism, exit terrorism and may become dangerous organised criminals 
thereafter. It also presents the various potential forms relationships in a crime/ 
terror nexus might take, and common factors within these relevant to lone wolf 
terrorists. Through this modelling a holistic picture of contemporary terrorism 
is provided, which also will assist counterterrorism practitioners understanding 
of terrorist actors, and has the potential to assist in identifying mitigation 
measures.   
1.4 Definitional Issues for Terrorism and Organised Crime and Research Limitations  
To understand both contemporary terrorism and organised crime, it is necessary to 
discuss that neither phenomena have a universally accepted meaning. Central to the 
arguments advanced in this thesis is that the relationship between contemporary 
terrorism and organised crime cannot be truly understood without first coming to an 
appreciation of the applicability of these concepts.  There is a distinct lack of consensus 
in the literature on the definition of both concepts, but given the contentious nature of 
both, and particularly terrorism this is to be expected.  
 
Both fields have attracted the majority of their academic interest in the period since the 
1960’s, with significant interest only being applied in the last 20 years.   
 
The main area of contention in respect of defining both concepts relate whether a state 
can commit crimes or acts of terrorism (Schmid, 2004). This dispute has led to 
somewhat of a schism within academic study of both phenomena, but particularly 
within the field of terrorism studies.  There are at least two distinct schools of thought 
that have emerged; ‘traditional terrorism studies’, which focusses on non-state actors 
and their activities; and ‘critical terrorism studies’ that takes a ‘deconstructionist’ 
approach, considering terrorism as a social construct and critiquing the ‘traditional’ 
counter terrorism approach, instead focussing on the violent actions of states and their 
agents. Both fields focus on the extreme edge of politics, politically inspired violence, 
and with politics being synonymous with differing views it is perhaps to be expected 
that such opposing academic viewpoints have developed. 
 
Millington (2018) captures the issues this question presents well, when he considers the 
activities of the French Resistance in World War II. With France invaded and occupied 
between 1940 and 1944 groups of non-state actors carried out acts of sabotage, theft 
and assassination against the occupying Axis power and French collaborators. From a 
Nazi perspective, their activities were ‘terrorist’ in nature, and aligned to ‘organised 
crime’, while to the Allied powers the resistance were ‘freedom fighters’ (although not 
to all resistance members, some of whom saw themselves as terrorists). An interesting 
contrast is the Nazi deployment of a plain clothed team of German civilians trained in 
clandestine techniques to assassinate the USA appointed Chief Burgomaster of Aachen, 
the first city taken during the Allied advance into Germany (Whiting, 1972). Sageman 
(2018) recently considered this point in more contemporary terms. As a member of the 
CIA assisting the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980’s his actions, and those of his 
allies including the patriarchs of the Haqqani network were considered by the Soviet 
Union to be those of a terrorist, while for the USA he and the Haqqani’s were freedom 
fighters. Post the Soviet withdrawal and thereafter 9/11 Sageman’s erstwhile allies the 
Haqqani network (whose members actions haven’t changed dramatically but his enemy 
has as it is now the USA) are now considered to be terrorists.  
 
These disagreements play out at the highest levels, and continue to do so, as evidenced 
by the recent public disagreement amongst the leaders of NATO nations over the 
definition of what constitutes terrorism (Newswires, 2019). 
 
Perspective can be all when considering violent actions motivated by political 
considerations.  
 
These differences, both within terrorism studies and in the wider social sphere present 
a number of reasons as to why a definition has not been arrived at, a situation even 
acknowledged as problematic by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2005). To date, there have simply been too 
many competing interests with strong opinions for a consensus to be possible.  
 
For academia, further difficulties result from 80% of terrorism research historically 
being non primary source based (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), with a notable lack of 
access to individuals with first-hand experience of the phenomena or its investigation 
(Silke, 2001), coupled to a lack of access to information other than that is available in 
an open source format.  
 
1.4.1 Research Limitations 
 
It is acknowledged that there are at least six core limitations of this research.  
 
Firstly, any research conducted on terrorism is limited by the difficulty around the lack 
of agreed definitions on this subject matter. The absence of agreed definitions on key 
terms, such as terrorism or organised crime, means that this thesis is effectively having 
to identify and analyse conceptual gaps in phenomena without a shared understanding.  
This creates an obvious need for the development and presentation of specific 
definitions of these key terms.  Although there is a strong rationale presented for the 
definitional approach adopted in this thesis, it is acknowledged that the definitions 
selected may differ according to individual researchers. This is an issue that has 
perplexed at the highest level of debate for decades (von Lampe, 2004) with for instance 
the EU member states in respect of organised crime even concluding that the aim to 
reach a common definition presented too many problems, and they should pursue joint 
anti organised crime activity without one. (Van der Heijden, 1996) However, the 
definitions presented in this thesis have a firm basis in academic literature as well as 
international and domestic legal standards and as a result may be considered as offering 
an analytical lens to pursue the research question and argument.  Furthermore, they are 
reflective of the prevailing views amongst those engaged in the study of terrorism and 
organised crime.  
 
Secondly, any research into terrorism and organised crime is going to be limited by the 
nature of the subject matter. Both phenomena operate, by their nature, within a secretive 
environment for the perpetrators and investigators. This limits the analysis by 
restricting access to primary sources for research purposes. To minimise the impact of 
this limitation access to investigators was secured and a wide sample of material from 
a variety of authors across the world is utilised in this thesis to provide as informed a 
picture of both the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime as possible.    
 
The third limitation arises through the perpetrators of activity in both phenomena being   
extremely dangerous individuals, limiting access to primary sources due to safety 
concerns in respect of the researcher’s wellbeing. The researcher minimised the impact 
of this limitation through accessing participants with first-hand experience of both 
phenomena and primary data for appropriate elements of two of the case studies.  
 
The fourth limitation is in respect specifically of available information on terrorists. 
Terrorists commonly leave very little evidence of their motivations, reducing the 
opportunities to gain a full understanding of the factors driving their activities. To 
minimise the impact of this limitation the author has gathered all available open source 
reporting in respect of the 2016 sample of lone wolf terrorists at chapter 2. This has 
provided a dataset utilising all information available, and is wholly similar to evidence 
available in respect of historic terrorist actors (such as the anarchists) which has been 
deemed acceptable in terms of previous academic consideration. 
 
Fifthly, although the research overcomes a number of the previous noted shortcomings 
in terms of terrorism research, in that access to primary source material and those with 
first-hand experience has been forthcoming, this has to be caveated with the fact that 
the author may have a certain bias due to professional training and experience as a 
police officer. In the context of this thesis, and when writing the individual pieces of 
publication, the author was at all times aware of this bias which goes some distance to 
address this limitation. The author attempts at all times to approach this subject matter 
with the dispassionate and detached consideration of academia that is required.   
 
Silke (2001) points out that 97% of terrorism researcher’s use opportunity sampling, 
using research participants the researcher can get access to rather than sampling 
potential participants systematically; in this regard this thesis falls within the 97%. The 
officers interviewed were accessible to the author through his position as a police 
officer. Silke (2001) accepts that given the contentious and dangerous nature of 
terrorism research such utilisation of contacts is to be expected, from a purely practical 
point of view.  
 
The author did not however have any prior knowledge of the confidential reports that 
are referenced during this thesis, nor access to them by virtue of his occupation and 
access was afforded purely on the basis of the authors request in terms of research.   
 
Finally, it is acknowledged that there may be a methodological weaknesses relating to 
the use of ‘opportunity sampling’ as a data collection technique. However, the author 
has succeeded in accessing individuals with first-hand experience of the phenomena 
under investigation and access to primary source related material. Like him, as 
individuals involved in law enforcement they may have their own biases due to the 
nature of their work. Wherever possible triangulation of their opinions is provided from 
academic and other open source material. The thesis contends that this access, coupled 
to the authors’ awareness of potential bias and efforts to counter this, provides a 
sufficient degree of comfort that this research is new, innovative and has a credible 
evidence base for the conclusions drawn.  
 
Despite these limitations, which could be applied to almost all research into terrorism, 
it is contended that having an awareness of these limitations as well as the steps taken 
to address them, particularly access to informed research participants, leaves the 
discussion with considerable merit and are not sufficient to devalue the conclusions 
drawn. 
 
1.4.2 The Similarities between Terrorism and Organised Crime 
 
This thesis shows that both terrorism and organised crime are phenomena that share a 
number of characteristics, not only in relation to academic issues concerning their 
study, but also their operational mechanisms.  
 
The striking similarities of the operating structure of terrorists and organised criminals, 
in their style of co-operation and maintenance structures are noted by Robinson (2003) 
and Asal, Milward, and Schoon (2014).  This thesis contends that in common with 
organised international drug traffickers, modern terrorist groups are highly 
compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes.  
Sageman’s (2005) observations on the current jihadist terrorist structures directly 
correlate with the characteristics noted by Robinson (2003), Asal et al. (2014), and 
Bovenkerk and Chakra (2004). They also accept that the structural similarities are 
striking, while drawing the reader back to the ever important distinctions of their 
criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of 
terrorism. They also emphasise that this is an important distinction to maintain. 
 
For this thesis, to achieve an understanding of their similarities of these contentious 
phenomena we must first identify the framework within which in which we 
conceptualise each in turn, before turning to previous attempts to understand and model 
this interaction. 
 
1.4.3 Defining Terrorism 
 
The problems caused by a lack of definition in terrorism research are well documented 
(Silke, 2001; Schmid, 2004; Sinai, 2007).  
 
Schmid and Jongman have worked on this subject for decades, from their first edition 
in 1988, to the second almost twenty years later where they conceded that “the search 
for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on” (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, pp. 1).  
 
In the first edition research Schmid and Jongman considered 109 definitions of 
terrorism. From these they produced a potential defection where:  
 
 Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as 
instrumental targets of violence;  
 These victims share characteristics resulting in their targeting; 
 This contributes to a state of fear (terror) amongst those targeted; 
 This is considered as extra normal by observers; 
 The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the targeted group; 
 And finally, the terror immobilises the targeted group or secures demand 
compliance or attention from the observers (Schmid and Jongman, 1988) 
 
Their proposed definition was certainly comprehensive, but seen as unwieldy and still 
did not attract wholesale support. Respondents to their questionnaire raised issues over 
the symbolic nature of terrorism, not enough emphasis on motive or purpose, the lack 
of consideration of destruction of property specifically. Some respondents complained 
the definition was too broad, others that it was too narrow. These polarised opinions led 
to the authors considering whether “terrorism is a unitary concept” (Schmid and 
Jongman, 2005, pp. 11), which for many academics it is not, as per the discussion in 
respect of critical terrorism studies above in relation to the role of the state, which 
Schmid and Jongman (2005) also consider. They though see non state actors as 
generally falling into a situation where the guilt or innocence of victims is immaterial, 
while ‘state terror’ generally involves targeting of individuals or groups for specific 
reasons Schmid and Jongman (2005). Schmid and Jongman ultimately accept, after 
providing a full discussion of the objections raised above and their alternative views 
that they simply will not satisfy all commentators. In respect of the invited responses to 
Schmid’s proposed definition the two factors that attracted the most cross-academic 
support for inclusion were 83.5% of respondents agreeing that terrorism must include 
violence or force, and 65% agreed the act must be political in nature. Richardson 
(1999), a noted academic in the field of terrorism research, who noted that “the term 
terrorism is being so widely used in so many contexts to become almost meaningless” 
(Richardson, 1999, pp. 209) is very clear that “the critical feature of terrorism is the 
deliberate targeting of innocents in an effort to convey a message to another party.” 
(Richardson, 1999, pp. 209) 
 
Corner and Gill (2015) perhaps capture particularly well the divergences of opinion that 
can occur in terrorism research. They identify a false dichotomy that has emerged 
between seeing terrorists (in the 1970’s) as harbouring significant psychological flaws, 
to their being regarded as quite psychologically normal individuals, but also being 
persons participating instead in complicated (and extreme) group and social dynamics. 
They found that in 40 years of research the literature has jumped from one extreme 
position (“they are all mentally ill”) to the exact opposite (“by definition, a terrorist 
cannot be mentally ill”). We return to this issue in detail in chapter 2.  
 
Horowitz (1987) explains this divergence, writing that “no given social system has a 
monopoly on the use of political terrorism, and therefore no social system can claim 
virtue in one form of terrorism over another” (Horowitz, 1987, pp. xviii). 
 
For academia this perhaps eloquently illustrates, as with the French resistance and 
Mujahedeen examples provided above at section 1.4, the almost transitory nature of 
what is considered to be terrorism at any given time.  
 
The factors identified as most prominent in Schmid’s work, those of violence and 
political purpose, do appear to be the closest to general acceptance. Lacquer (1999) 
notes the advice to students of terrorism on the subject of a definition that has been 
“received from philosophers and theologians, psychologists and even economists” 
(Lacquer, 1999, pp. 5). He further notes that only violence, or the threat of violence, 
appears to be the common trait and sees the ever changing nature of terrorism as being 
fundamental to the issues around its defining, although in response to Schmid’s work 
he sees nothing having been obtained in terms of understanding of terrorism through 
continued focus on definitional issues.  
 
Some academics, such as Lutz and Lutz (2008) see it as essential that for an act to be 
considered as terrorism it must have been committed by an identifiable organisation. 
This is a factor this thesis considers in detail at chapter 2, and suggests such a 
conceptualisation is misplaced as it neither fits with Rapoport’s (2003) commonly 
accepted anarchist terrorist wave nor instances of contemporary terrorism subject to 
analysis in the case study considered there.  
 
The definitional issues stretch well beyond academia alone. The dispute amongst 
NATO leaders mentioned above is an excellent comparator point for considering the 
issues that arise over defining terrorism in the operational realm.  
 
Turkey and its allies disagree over the status of the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection 
Units (YPG). Turkey classifies the group (it could be argued for domestic political 
reasons) as a terrorist body, while their fellow NATO members view the YPG as allies 
in their proxy struggle against the incumbent Syrian regime.  
 
For Turkey terrorism is defined as follows: 
 
“The first criterion concerns the modus operandi: the Law stipulates that 
terrorism involves the use of coercion, violence, terror, intimidation or threats. 
The second criterion concerns the purposes for which the act is perpetrated. 
These are listed in the aforementioned article:   
-any act designed to impair the basic characteristics of the Republic, as specified 
in the Constitution, or the country's political, legal, secular and economic 
systems;   
-any act designed to violate territorial or national integrity, and any act designed 
to jeopardize the existence of the Republic of Turkey;   
-any act designed to impair or weaken government authority;   
-any act designed to destroy fundamental rights and freedoms;   
-any act designed to impair domestic and international security, public order or 
public health.   
The final criterion is that, in order to be considered as a terrorist act, the act must 
have been committed by a person or persons belonging to an organization.  
  
Terrorist offenders are defined by Article 2of Turkey’s Counter Terrorism 
Law.” 
(Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2013) 
 
For the UK the definition in law is as follows: 
 
“Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1 
(1)In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an international 
governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, 
and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious [racial] or ideological cause. 
(2)Action falls within this subsection if it— 
(a)involves serious violence against a person, 
(b)involves serious damage to property, 
(c)endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
(d)creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or 
(e)is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system. 
(3)The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the 
use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is 
satisfied. 
(4)In this section— 
(a)“action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, 
(b)a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to 
property, wherever situated, 
(c)a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other 
than the United Kingdom, and 
(d)“the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part 
of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.” (UK 
Government, 2020) 
The UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) summarise this as “Terrorism is the use or 
threat of action, both in and outside of the UK, designed to influence any international 
government organisation or to intimidate the public.  It must also be for the purpose of 
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.” (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2020a)  
 
For the United States of America terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal 
Regulations as  
 
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)” (Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 2005)  
 
While both the definitions from the USA and UK are similar, it is clear they differ 
greatly from that adopted by Turkey, which has a very wide reach into areas of state 
authority and continuation. Turkey’s modern history, and the terrorism it has faced from 
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) (Roth and Server, 2007) provide a backdrop to the 
rationale for such inclusion, however it is factors such as this and the merits, or not, of 
the PKK’s cause that bring such differences to the fore.  
 
As a starting point in terms of defining terrorism, for the purpose of this thesis it is 
suggested that the reader considers the definition of the 2004 United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1566 (United Nations, 2004), which condemned terrorist acts as: 
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations 
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature.” (United Nations, 2004) 
 
This comprehensive definition, utilised and agreed upon by many if not universally, 
appears to bridge this issues that exist in the study or terrorism, allowing as it does for 
both state and non-state activities to be considered through its framing. Similar to the 
UK and USA definitions determination of the perpetrators as being associated to a 
stipulated terrorist group for acts to be considered terrorist in nature does not feature, 
allowing for wide and flexible determination by those in the criminal justice sphere.  
 
However, in contrast to the UK and USA definitions that of the UN successfully 
removes a significant element of the ‘political’ viewpoint of the assessor of the act, as 
far as one can from such a contentious topic, through its very direct inclusion of “are 
under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”. This inclusion removes 
the judgement from an argument over the merits of cause, and instead frames it in terms 
of behaviours that are unacceptable in any civilised society, no matter the motivation 
of the perpetrator.  
 
This definition also allows application to international organisations as potential 
victims of terrorism, as opposed to solely nation states. The nature of modern terrorism, 
and attacks on Non-Governmental Organisations by terrorist non state actors 
demonstrates such inclusion has merit. 
 
As will be demonstrated later in this thesis, this comprehensive definition (in tandem 
with the referenced definitions from the UK and USA) also allows for the inclusion of 
the ‘lone wolf’ actors this thesis examines in detail and contends are of far more 
significant import than current research allows.  
 
1.4.4 Defining Organised Crime 
 
The basic premise for the existence of an organised crime group (OCG) is that they are 
a collection of individuals who 
 
“engage in many different types of economic activities, both legal and illegal. 
Their ability to enforce their rule within a specific geographic or economic area 
requires that they have the means to use force and therefore providing protection 
is an element common to all (organised crime groups) irrespective of their other 
economic activities” (Skaperdas, 2001, pp. 179) 
 
The market is which these OCG’s operate  
 
“can roughly be divided into two main categories: (a) the market of goods and 
services which are forbidden and (b) the markets of permitted goods and 
services which are offered or handled by means of law breaking” (Van Duyne, 
2004, pp. 342) 
 
Organised bands of individuals involved in actions that are commonly considered as 
organised criminality meeting Skaperdas’ (2001) criteria providing Van Duyne’s 
(2004) ‘category (a)’ services have existed since ancient times, with ‘gangs’ carrying 
out extortion and kidnappings for ransom occurring certainly as far back as the Romans 
(Tatum, 1999) and in Medieval times with the notorious ‘Assassins for Hire’ of the 
Nizaris (Bartlett, 2002). These criminal enterprises ‘professionalised’ with modernity, 
with Sicilian small scale extortion groups, such as the émigré ‘Black Hand’ whose 
members arrived in the United States at the end of the 19th Century (Dash, 2009) 
metastasising during the period of the Falsted Act’s imposed prohibition on the sale of 
alcohol (‘forbidden’ goods) into hierarchical Mafia groups, with national and 
international links (Johnson, 1962). This ‘professionalisation’, and the development of 
modern states and regulations largely saw the emergence of Van Duyne’s (2004) 
‘category b’ organised criminality, in the form of sophisticated cross border tax evasion 
and such.  
 
Scholars turned their attention to organised crime in the 1960’s, and although early 
definitions focussed on the known hierarchical organised crime type these mafia groups 
in the United States of America typified (Cressey, 1969), definitions evolved, with 
Albini providing the following: 
 
“Rather than a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of a system 
of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each 
participant is interested in furthering his own welfare”  
      (Albini, 1971, pp. 288) 
 
Albini was seen as controversial at the time, as historical experience to that date 
suggested the hierarchies of the described United States Mafia  or Chinese Triad’s 
(Newark, 2011) were the norm. In addition, the United States had just enacted (in 1970) 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO), to specifically target 
those engaged in recognisable criminal enterprises (Schneider, 2014). It envisages 
decapitation of crime groups through the use of the legislation to target leaders. 
However, ongoing research, the demise of mafia cohesion through successful law 
enforcement interdiction (Skaperdas, 2001) and policing developments have seen 
Albini’s (1971) definition now widely accepted in academic and policing circles, 
particularly through the end of the cold war and the ‘globalisation’ accompanied by 
widespread insecurity the world has experienced since.  
 
In the UK these changes have seen Organised Crime currently defined as “planned and 
co-ordinated criminal behaviour and conduct by people working together on a 
continuing basis” (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020b). However, although they focus 
on this as a working definition “there is no legal definition of serious and organised 
crime” (National Crime Agency, 2016, pp. 5). The CPS note, significantly for this 
thesis, and in tandem with Albini’s use of the term ‘welfare’ above, that in respect of 
participants “their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain” and that 
“organised crime in this and other countries recognises neither national borders nor 
national interests.” (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020b). 
 
Through this globalising effect, and reflecting Albini’s views, organised crime 
organisational dynamics are acknowledged as having changed dramatically, with the 
hierarchy of the initially identified groups such as the Sicilian mafia having transformed 
with “most organised crime groups now operating as loose networked affiliations” 
(Perri et al, 2009, pp. 27). In the UK it has been noted that 
 
“Membership of OCG’s are usually fluid, particularly among those groups 
active over longer periods. Individuals may belong to more than one group, or 
groups may network for mutual benefit if they perceive each other to be 
reputable. Outsiders are often vouched for by existing OCG members” 
(National Crime Agency, 2016, pp. 7) 
 
In Northern Europe, in particular, “legal and criminal business patterns develop 
pragmatically along trusted networks of friends and connections” (Van Duyne, 1996, 
pp. 344) while in the United States “Criminal organisations…. are best viewed as 
shifting coalitions, normally local or regional in scope.” (Schneider, 2014) 
 
Ridley notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led, in Europe, to the fundamental 
altering of old crime hierarchies as “smaller, equally ruthless organised crime groups 
have become apparent forming confederations of associations based upon ethnic and 
linguistic affinity…. (with) individual groups of criminals operating, either 
continuously or from time to time, in some form of loose association of neo-vertical 
criminal structures.” (Ridley, 2008, pp. 28) In agreement Stanislawski and Herman note 
that criminal organisations have begun to evolve from hierarchical structures with a 
small cadre of leaders at the top to more network-based groups whose functions and 
activities are more dispersed (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004). 
 
With this ‘fluidity’ there has been a gradual  acceptance that targeting apparent ‘bosses’ 
or ‘captains’ does not eliminate an organisation, as was intended through legislation 
such as RICO, where thousands have been prosecuted but others quickly step forward 
to assume loose leadership roles.  
 
1.4.5 Defining the Intersection - The Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime 
 
Given the apparent similarities between the functioning within phenomena of terrorism 
and organised crime, and the acknowledged links that often occur between each, 
previous works, such as those discussed below, have been undertaken by both 
government and academia to understand these links. Both are commonly seen as 
phenomena of great risk to a state’s safety and governance, and so only through gaining 
an understanding of this particularly potentially dangerous confluence of actors 
involved in illegal activity can it be combatted.  
 
While Makarenko’s (2004) ‘crime/ terror’ continuum illustrated at Figure 1 is 
illustrative of the relationship between the phenomena other, albeit similar, descriptions 
have been provided. Rollins, Wyler and Rosen (2010) reporting to the United States 
Congress, identify 3 areas where potential overlap between the phenomena may occur: 
 
 Through shared tactics and methods; 
 Through the process of transformation from one group to another over time; 
 Through short-term or long-term transaction based service for hire activities 
between groups. 
 
A similar consideration of this model is illustrated by Jamieson: 
 
“(A)  The self-financing of terrorist groups by typical ‘organised crime-type activities 
(B)  Pragmatic Collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for 
mutually beneficial ends 
 (C) The use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes” 
 
(Jamieson, 2005, pp. 165). 
 
In considering the starting point of Makarenko’s scale, which encompasses Jamieson’s 
Point B, Madsen (2009) examines how terrorists would conceivably purchase forged 
documents while organised crime groups would in turn perhaps purchase explosives 
from terrorists. He identifies that there may be advantages and disadvantages for both 
parties of such arrangements, with the advantages enhancing operational capabilities 
for the terrorists while the disadvantages perhaps lead to dissolution of the arrangement 
or a group moving on down Makarenko’s scale (A or C in Jamieson’s options) as 
expertise is moved ‘in house’ within a group. 
 
Makarenko’s model challenges the clear distinctions between the phenomena that 
Madsen (2009) and Jamieson (2005) retain, a position supported by the Rollins and 
Wyler (2013). Here there is an acknowledgment that globalisation, advances in 
technology, trade, the finance industry and the advent of cybercrime has led many 
organised crime and terrorist groups adapting “more readily to new market niches and 
establish(ing) more fluid alliances with external individuals and groups” (Rollins and 
Wyler, 2013, pp. 1). Their report cites the ransom and hostage plot carried out in Algeria 
in 2013 as a significant example, with Moktar Belmoktar as the plot leader being an 
illegal actor with close and long-standing links to both organised crime and Islamist 
groups. 
 
As Figure 1 makes clear, Makarenko views the relationship between terrorism and 
organised crime as being highly nuanced, and transitory. In her view, the phenomena 
of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving down this line 
when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a ‘black hole’, where 
they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but instead manifest 
a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a group 
categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the other 
phenomenon. 
 
Examples from reality demonstrating this transition within terrorist groups (Point 2 for 
Makarenko, stage A for Jamieson) are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which increasingly 
become involved in criminal activity, either or initially to fund their cause whereas 
circumstances alter they mutate into post-terrorism organisations, and who now largely 
operate as criminal organisations driven by profit (Byrne, 2009). These organisations 
have assuredly fallen into Makarenko’s ‘black hole’, her point 4, and become mutated 
organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both 
phenomena. 
 
A shift from conflict to criminality is not a new phenomenon. The first African 
American gang to emerge in the street of Los Angeles was filled with veterans of World 
War II (Valdermar, 2007). More recently, Volkov (2002) identified that a number of 
Soviet veterans from the decade lone 1979-1989 Afghan conflict became involved in 
organised crime as their country transformed in the post-Soviet era. Glenny (2008) 
notes the number of veterans of the Balkan conflicts who fill some of the upper echelons 
of European organised crime. Similarly, McDermott (2013) refers to the very same 
phenomenon following the disbanding of the paramilitary United Self Defence Force 
of Colombia (AUC), while Naim (2013) cites a similar transformation of members of 
the Mexican military into Zeta’s narco-traffickers. These authors all note how each 
organisations member’s skill sets, honed through brutal conflict, lent themselves 
particularly well to the management of other illicit activities. 
 
1.5 Rapoport’s Four Waves and Contemporary Terrorism 
 
Accepting the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 definition as a 
basis for considering terrorism, we find that it does not exclude the actions of an 
individual as being regarded as those of a terrorist. It is the Mens Rea, the perpetrators 
intent in carrying out their actions, which is of significant importance.   
 
Although the definition of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism has been debated at length, the 
definition provided by Becker (2014) arguably appears the most comprehensive, 
defining it as “ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an 
individual who plans and executes an attack in the absence of collaboration (author’s 
italics) with other individuals or groups.” (Becker, 2014, pp. 964)  Within this definition 
are 3 key elements that this thesis contends are essential to understanding lone wolf 
terrorism.  
 
The first is that it is ‘ideologically driven’, the act has a purpose beyond the act itself. 
As the thesis will show the perpetrators understanding of this motivation can be very 
questionable, however this dubiety over understanding has existed since the inception 
of modern terrorism, as will be illustrated with the consideration of Rapoport’s first 
wave, the ‘Anarchists’ that follows. The second key element is ‘violence or attempted 
violence’, as essential element of all forms of terrorism, as discussed above. The final 
key element is the absence of collaboration, which this thesis contends is fundamental 
to understanding the lone wolf as an individual actor but allows conceptualisation to be 
potentially inclusive rather than exclusive. I.E. we are referring to individuals acting 
without confederates but that does not mean they may not have common interests or 
goals, however much their intellectual counterparts may not be directly influencing 
activity. The thesis goes into some detail on this point, which is accepted as being 
contentious.  
 
Lynch (2017) appears to have captured the nub of the problem that exists for many 
when we consider lone wolf terrorism (and terrorism per se) in noting that 
 
“in an effort to understand terrorism, particularly for those individuals who 
work with the perpetrators of political violence, it is vital that we separate the 
notion of terrorism from the terrorist. Terrorism is a highly politicized term, a 
pejorative label applied unevenly across groups…. the terrorist actor must be 
understood and considered in his/her local context in conjunction with the 
entirety of their social network, personal background, ideological affiliations 
and offending history. In effect, practitioners must deal with what is in from of 
them, and not be seduced by the hysteria (understandably so) that so often 
accompanies terrorism and terrorist events.” (Lynch, 2017, pp. 80-81) 
 
The FBI foresaw this danger of this changing culture as early as 2004, with its Strategic 
Plan containing the observation that, “the most significant domestic terrorism threat 
over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist.” (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2004). As the case study of chapter 2 demonstrates these predictions 
were prescient, and to be borne out to a terrible degree in the following decade.  
 
1.5.1 Wave Theory and the Lone Wolf 
 
As discussed, Rapoport’s work on the evolution of terrorism establishes the theory that 
terrorism exists across the world in four waves since the 1880s (Rapoport, 2003).  
 
As outlined, Rapoport contends that these waves began with the Anarchist wave, which 
lasted for approximately forty years. It was followed in the 1920’s by an anti-colonial 
wave, which lasted to the 1960’s, then a new left wave which in turn faded as the 
religious wave crested, and it is this wave which, in theory, is said to still exist today. 
 
For Rapoport these waves were captured within the geopolitical tide of the times. The 
terrorist participants embraced the zeitgeist at the razor’s edge of contemporary radical 
thought. The initial anarchist wave, which is considered in more detail below, 
diminished/declined during the carnage of World War I. As the world adjusted 
following its conclusion, colonial struggles succeeded it. It took place against a 
background of significant international reorganization and technological innovation, 
which some have described as being the initial phase of globalisation. It is not surprising 
that the change in world politics that resulted led to the focus of radical political thought 
moving, and saw the focus of terrorism mirror the change. As colonial struggles 
concluded, largely successfully, and radical politics moved on to the new left, so too 
did terrorist motivations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, bastion of Communism and 
backer of many leftist terrorist sponsor nations, contributed significantly to the demise 
of the new left wave and the rise of the religious wave. So too did the unforeseen 
consequences of democratic nations support provided to the Mujahedeen’s struggle 
with the Soviet’s in Afghanistan. 
 
It was from Afghanistan, and the 9/11 plotters who found safe haven there, that a 
general disregard for lone wolves emanated.  
 
“After 9/11 lone wolf terrorism suddenly seemed like a distraction from more 
serious threats… Security services built up organograms of terrorist groups. 
Analysts focused on individual terrorists only insofar as they were connected to 
bigger entities. Personal relations – particularly friendships based on shared 
ambitions and battlefield experiences, as well as tribal or familial links – were 
mistaken for institutional ones, formally connecting individuals to organisations 
and placing them under a chain of command.” (Burke, 2017) 
 
The ‘War on Terror’ was framed around combatting organisations such as Al-Qaeda, 
not individual actors and consequently counter terrorism became focussed on 
organisational defeat in this war. Arguably, military conceptualisation of a collective 
‘enemy’ took central stage rather than a law enforcement perspective of an ‘offender’, 
often tackled on an individual basis whether part of a grouping of offenders or not. 
 
However, if we instead step back from this arguably militaristic conceptualisation and 
instead return to the history of terrorism, we find that in the past it was more the norm 
to readily accept that the actions of an individual can be regarded as acts of terrorism. 
This was the case in Rapoport’s first wave of the anarchists, where the world come to 
consider acts of terror as propaganda by deed. 
 
There have been lone individuals, not substantive groups, throughout history who have 
carried out acts of politically inspired violence, one of the most notable perhaps being 
Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of US President William McKinley in 1901.  The 
unfortunate President McKinley was not alone in being a targeted United States 
President, either before or since. Attacks on United States President’s that followed, 
and their similarities but ultimately substantial motivational differences, provide further 
examples of interest to the thesis. 
 
Lee Harvey Oswald is perhaps the most controversial ‘lone wolf’ actor of the last 
seventy years. Speculation of Oswald’s status as a sole actor continues to rage today, 
with many documents relating to the investigation of his assassination of President John 
F. Kennedy only recently being released, and some still withheld (Harnden, 2017). In 
1981 an attempt on the life of another US President, Ronald Reagan, was perpetrated 
by John Hinckley Junior. President Reagan was wounded, but survived. 
 
What differs about these three ultra-high profile assailants beyond anything else is their 
motive. It is interesting to contrast these three instances to begin to question when lone 
wolf action steps into terrorism. 
 
Czolgosz is widely accepted by academics and historians as being part of a very loose 
anarchist wave of terrorism that lasted between 1880’s and 1910’s (Rapoport, 2003). A 
crumpled newspaper found in the assassin’s pocket covering the story of King 
Umberto’s murder by another ‘anarchist terrorist’ is utilised as an indicator for his wider 
politically fuelled anarchist inspired motivation (Burleigh, 2008). 
 
The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and instead sitting 
down in restaurant then stabbing a fellow diner (who turned out to be Serbian 
ambassador) and the assassination of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria are seen, with the 
murder of King Umberto of Italy and President McKinley, as examples of anarchist 
terrorism, but with accepted weak ties between the perpetrators, and their apparent 
shared ‘anarchist cause’ being the link between them (Bell, 1987). 
 
Each of these anarchist actions did though have one element in common. They are all 
reasonably construed as extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely 
understood, or agreed, that goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The 
perpetrators had virtually no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they 
were perceived to be acting to achieve a common goal, it is extremely questionable as 
to whether the perpetrators had a shared understanding of a common purpose. 
 
It may have been the case that for the general public “improved telegraphy and 
successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from 
the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that 
the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of 
sinister objectives across Europe or North America” (Burleigh, 2008, pp. 21) but 
Burleigh (2008) cautions that evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was 
limited. 
 
Jensen (2009) shares Burleigh’s caution around any significant degree of anarchist 
cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist’s actions notoriety, casualties from 
their actions were relatively light. During the period between 1880 and 1914, they killed 
160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had succeeded though in the 
objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant that others, such as 
Czolgosz, at least knew of the likely level of international coverage their actions would 
bring. The anti-colonial wave, and that of the new left, saw acts of such individual terror 
decrease dramatically. Terrorist actions were coordinated and group led. Indeed, 
between January 1, 1968 and May 1, 2007 there were only 72 acts of lone wolf 
terrorism, a mean of 1.84 per year (Spaaij, 2010). 
 
However, of particular note it was during this period, Louis Beam, the right wing writer, 
published ‘Leaderless Resistance’, to which Kaplan (1997) drew initial academic 
attention. Beam called in 1983 (published in 1992) for individual autonomous action 
against the United States Federal Government. This ‘call to arms’ fell largely on deaf 
ears amongst those in the far right he sought to agitate at the time. However, it was from 
this call ultimately that the lone wolf term has been coined. It is not a difficult mental 
adjustment to retrospectively term the actions of the anarchists described above in such 
a manner. 
 
Oswald, best described as a ‘misfit and sociopath’, would have been in no doubt as to 
the significance of the actions he was undertaking, and their world-wide implications. 
His time as a very odd Marxist in the US Marines, and then in the Soviet Union, have 
given rise to all form of conspiracy theories as to his direction and orders. However 
recent coverage suggests it was far more likely that any agency such as the KGB who 
may have been attempting to utilise his services for wider goals would have eventually 
realized his fragile mental state meant he was an individual who could not have been 
controlled (Harden, 2017). Oswald’s actions occurred against the backdrop of the 
worldwide leftist inspired wave of terrorism, which Rapoport (2003) illustrates as 
taking place between the 1960’s and 1980’s.  
 
The shooting of President Reagan differs greatly from the actions undertaken by 
Czolgosz and Oswald. With both Czolgosz and Oswald their motivations have been 
examined, and with historical enquiry and hindsight, placed within a conceptualization 
of the wider political struggles of their time, with terrorist acts at the razor’s edge of 
extreme anarchist and new left political activity respectively. What is of fundamental 
difference with Hinckley Jr. from the other two Presidential attackers is that his 
motivation, which has been examined at length, stemmed from an obsession with the 
actress Jodie Foster and his intent was to in some perverse way draw her attention to 
him. Hinckley Jr. had suffered significant mental health issues prior to carrying out the 
shooting (Associated Press, 2016). This thesis contends that Czolgosz and Oswald’s 
actions can be construed as terrorist in nature, while Hinckley Jr.’s is not. Motivation 
is key.  
 
Discussion often turns to failing mental health as an explanation for a significant 
amount of lone wolf activity, and consequent attempts to bracket together Czolgosz, 
Oswald, Hinckley Jr. and individuals such as Stephen Paddock, of infamy for the 
shooting in Las Vegas which killed 58 and injured 500 (Levenson, 2017). 
 
This view appears fundamentally flawed as it fails to grasp the central concepts at work 
in respect of lone wolf terrorist inspired activity. Czolgosz and Oswald’s actions have 
been determined to have fallen within the sphere of influence of the wider political 
struggles of their times, with motive intimated from these. Paddock has been found to 
have no discernible motive whatsoever, although plenty of issues. 
 
A paradigm shift in how we conceptualise lone wolf terrorist activity and the role of 
mental health may be necessary, and this thesis addresses this. Paddock may have had 
difficulties in terms of his mental wellbeing, however his actions had no apparent 
political meaning or inspiration. In this thesis the author seeks to address the necessity 
of a paradigm shift in the concept of terrorism (including in particular ‘terrorism 
inspired’ acts) and mental health. Without this we are likely doomed to see ever 
increasing numbers of terrorist inspired outrages committed by those acting alone. 
1.6 Methodology 
The thesis follows the ‘pragmatic’ approach originating with Peirce’s conception and 
developed by other philosophers such as James, Schiller and Dewey to the position 
where a pragmatic approach outlines a “position which lays emphasis on results as a 
test of satisfactoriness” (Uromson and Ree, 1991, pp. 257). In this thesis, the pragmatic 
approach addresses the research question by adopting a practical approach to the ‘social 
affairs’ (terrorism and organised crime) under investigation (Burch, 2018). It does so 
with an acknowledgement of the research limitations above at section 1.4.   
 
The thesis utilises a mixed methodological approach, this being  
 
“the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration.” (Johnson et al., 2007, pp. 123) 
 
This definition was arrived at by Johnson et al. following a technique similar to that of 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) described at section 1.4.3, where Johnson et al. similarly 
analysed definitions, in their case 19 of mixed methodological approaches, identified 
the common characteristics of breadth and/or corroboration, and drew together what 
they perceived to be the best encompassing definition. They did so while 
acknowledging that “definitions can and will usually change over time as the approach 
or ‘research paradigm’ continues to grow” (Johnson et al., pp.112), a feature their field 
has in common with both terrorism and organised crime, as described above. This 
works for this thesis as it allows for case studies informed by confidential reporting, 
and practitioner opinions, to be considered alongside  a case study using content 
analysis allowing a true ‘rich picture’ to emerge where differing methodologies 
combine to produce a compelling answer to the research question posed.   
 
The evidence gathered in the thesis comprises of a case study and survey methodology 
as the basis to address the research question identified earlier in this chapter in breadth 
and depth. Through this approach the thesis contains an appropriate degree of 
triangulation of evidence, “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon” (Denzin, 1978, pp. 291) thereby avoiding any inherent difficulties that 
might arise from adopting a ‘paradigm’ stance of utilising only quantitative or 
qualitative methods that results in ‘inappropriate certainty’ that may come from a single 
method approach (Robson, 2002).  
   
A case methodology involves either the examination of many units or cases where they 
look for general patterns in the mass of numbers, or selects a few key cases to illustrate 
an issue, with both methods being utilised over one time period or across time periods 
(Neumann, 2007). It allows for research of complex issues, testing causality, and has 
utility in that it can be applied across a variety of academic disciplines (Harrison et al., 
2017), through aggregated research where ‘all’ of the potential sources within a data 
set are considered, or ‘intensive’, where only one subject is studied in depth to provide 
tentative ideas about a social phenomenon. The main weakness of case studies is 
identified as being that “some observed and measured data may afterwards prove to be 
irrelevant, while some relevant properties are erroneously left out in the initial 
modelling.” (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 20).  
 
Swanborn’s (2010) approach is an acceptance of this weakness, which he argues should 
be mitigated against through a thorough research basis, commenting that “we do not 
make any scientific progress if we keep thinking in terms of ‘we must observe the 
whole’, instead of thinking in terms of properties or variables.” (Swanborn, 2010, pp. 
20) 
 
This main weakness is accompanied by a perceived secondary weakness in the form of 
the potential bias of the investigator(s) in data selection (mitigation of this potential 
limitation for this thesis is discussed in detail at section 1.4.). 
 
The study of ‘lone wolf terrorism’ lent itself particularly well to examining every case 
over a set time period ‘aggregated case study work’, in the researcher’s determination 
one year, 2016. This allowed for contrast with a relevant time periods set within 
Rapoport’s (2003) general wave theory to illustrate similarities and divergence. It also 
provided the opportunity for an ‘intensive’ case study of one identifiable example of 
particular import, to expand the tentative ideas about the social phenomena of ‘lone 
wolf terrorist’ changes that appeared to be emerging. 
 
While this provides an excellent oversight of particular aspects of the instances of ‘lone 
wolf terrorism’ in question, it is reliant upon the information made available in the 
public domain. Such information is, as discussed above, constrained by the ‘secretive’ 
nature of terrorism investigation and provision of information to the public; particularly 
where prosecutions do not result due to the death of the perpetrator as can often be the 
case with ‘lone wolf terrorists’. Through adopting the case study methodology all 
potential cases of lone wolf terrorist activity were gathered and subject to analysis. By 
applying the definition of terrorism from 2004 United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1566 definition described at section 1.4.3 to these cases they could be 
included or excluded from the data set.  
 
To compliment this case methodology, a variety of interview formats were adopted 
relevant to the subjects utilised. The use of interviews is acknowledged as a flexible 
and adaptable way of finding things out that can provide rich and illuminating material 
(Robson, 2002) that allows for nuance and, in this thesis, professional judgement and 
experience of the participants to be gathered.  
 
For the interviews, “an important data gathering technique involving verbal 
communication between the researcher and the participant…commonly used in survey 
designs and in exploratory and descriptive studies” (Fox, 2009, pp. 4) a variety of 
methods were used.  
 
Given the difficulties around researching both the phenomena of terrorism and 
organised crime, as discussed, such material is unusual. Unstructured, semi structured 
and a fully structured survey were utilised for different aspects of the case study as 
appropriate to the subject group, and nature of the discussions being facilitated. 
 
In designing all three approaches the author took account of Bell’s (1987) 
recommendation that one starts with straightforward questions to put subjects at ease, 
and gain their full participation in the process.  
 
The author is an experienced interviewer, comfortable in commencing conversation on 
a variety of topics and thereby putting subjects as ease; an essential quality in 
conducting any face to face research interview (Singleton and Straits, 2012) 
 
Open ended questions were utilised were possible in order that the subjects can “express 
(their) thoughts freely, spontaneously and in (their) own language” (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1981, pp. 243)  
 
Individual interviews were used exclusively for the discussion of the confidential 
reporting, as  
 
“they are appropriate where we may expect a variety of different stories to be 
told concerning a setting or context, and where we are interested to learn about 
this variety. They are also appropriate where the topic to be discussed is 
sensitive” (Fox, 2009, pp. 8).  
 
This approach also applied to a number of the general interviews.  
 
To gain the participation of the subjects in more junior positions engaged in relevant 
investigations on a daily basis provided the ‘group story’ (Morgan, 1988), and also 
afforded an opportunity for the subjects to be confident in expressing their observations 
on this sensitive subject matter while accompanied by their peers.  
 
The common errors in interviews occur through deviation from written instructions; 
rephrasing questions; recording errors and interpretation errors (Fox, 2009). As the 
author conducted the interviews personally the first two common errors were avoided 
through the use of the drafted question set where appropriate. Recording errors were 
mitigated through the use of a recording device, with the participant’s written 
permission, which was later utilised for transcription purposes. Where participants did 
not agree to recordings being made comprehensive notes were taken, which were 
checked for accuracy with the participants. Interpretation errors were mitigated as far 
as possible by clarifying answers with all participants on interview conclusions. 
 
For the survey to achieve maximum participation Youngman’s (1982) 
recommendations were utilised: explicit purpose, question spacing, text size, consistent 
layout, clear differentiation between instructions and questions and space for coding, 
with a limited question set as “excessive size can only reduce response rates” 
(Youngman, 1982, pp. 22).  
 
In summary, the study utilises empirical methods (Watkins and Burton, 2017) of 
content analysis (Robson, 2002), Delphi principles (Brown, 1968) and purposive 
sampling in an endeavour to address the research question within the widely accepted 
conceptual framework of Rapoport’s (2003) wave theory of terrorist development.  
 
The Case Study on Lone Wolf terrorists relies on content analysis, using as its basis 
open source reporting from 2016. From this year the details of every potential lone wolf 
attack were gathered, providing a basis for comparison and analysis of factors of note 
pertaining to the actors involved.  
 
The Case Study on IS participants utilises initial Delphi method principles to provide a 
starting point of credible opinion on potential behaviours utilising recently retired 
subject matter experts. The sample were consulted by the author through a 
questionnaire, distributed via email. 
 
The researcher was satisfied that consulting with the expert group by means of a 
questionnaire rather than establishing a focus group would embrace the principle of 
Delphi (Brown, 1968) in avoiding the psychological factors associated with group 
work. Given also the hypothetical nature of the request to the participants where the 
researcher was relying on their background to provide general expertise in the field 
rather than exposure to particular cases or incidents, it was felt that obtaining consensus 
would be inappropriate, and a second round of contact was therefore not undertaken. 
This conforms to Wouldenberg’s (1991) reservations on the questionable value of 
consensus when dealing with expert groups, and its dangers that group pressure may be 
resulting in conformity.  
  
The Case Study on terrorism and organised crime in Scotland is “an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 1994).  
 
As discussed above, gaining access to anyone involved in such activities within the 
scope of the ‘initial nexus’ between terrorism and organised crime would be extremely 
difficult. By virtue of both activities nature their participants, terrorists and organised 
criminals, are secretive. A lack of prosecutions also necessarily entails a lack of 
individuals in custody and potentially accessible to a research project, notwithstanding 
security issues over access to the convicted. The safety of any researcher has also to be 
considered. 
 
With all of this in mind purposive sampling (Neumann, 2007), where the researcher 
selects their own sample for the enquiry being conducted, was determined as the most 
practical and effective means of conducting qualitative research in this subject area. 
Access to Scottish based senior intelligence officers, analysts and investigators was 
available to the researcher, all of whom could be interviewed or participate in focus 
groups.  
 
By utilising all three approaches a rich picture emerges, combining factual evidence 
gathered within set parameters with the opinions of professionals engaged in the field, 
supported by confidential reporting they have access to. These two pillars provide a 
strong basis for evidence based consideration of current theoretical modelling that 
exists in respect of both phenomena.  
 
Perhaps most tellingly from the review conducted, the connections between terrorism 
and organised crime described in the current literature are almost exclusively 
organisational. There is little consideration of the individual actors involved in these 
relationships, or the factors determining the participant’s decision making. 
 
A rather perverse mirror imaging occurs in respect of lone wolves, where consideration 
is all about the individual, and not on their potential role within Terrorism per se, and 
particularly within Rapoport’s framework. There has been little work on the effect the 
actions of these lone terrorist actors have on terrorist groups, and vice versa. This thesis 
contends there has been a far more symbiotic relationship than has previously been 
acknowledged and that motivation forms a central part to understanding the occurrence 
of terrorism. 
 
To address this apparent significant gap in academic work to date it is necessary to 
identify areas within the potential connections between the phenomena or the wider 
milieu of Terrorist activity that would benefit from a level of research appropriate to 
this thesis. 
 
An area within the potential connections between terrorism and organised crime that 
was viewed as particularly lending itself to this level of research was the initial 
amalgam of the crime/ terror nexus, the point of ‘first contact’. For Makarenko (2004) 
this is point one on the ‘Crime Terror Continuum’, for Jamieson (2005), point B of his 
model, where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties. For ease and clarity, 
these two separately described points of intersection will be collectively referred to in 
this thesis as the ‘initial nexus’. 
 
Information regarding the functioning of such a relationship, beyond the existence of 
the relationship itself, is scarce. It does not appear that it has been a primary area of 
research focus and when incidences may occur, they would be likely known primarily 
to law enforcement bodies, which may retain the information for obvious operational 
benefit. It is certainly the case that there are few prosecutions resulting from such 
relationships, although the earlier referenced United States Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) interdiction of a Mali based al-Qaeda operative highlights law enforcement 
activity in the area (Sherwell, 2010). 
 
Chapter 2 Case Study: Lone Wolves  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is formed from the following publications: 
 “The 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami - Is Rapoport’s ‘Religious Wave’ ending?” 
(Gallagher, 2017) which provided consideration of the development of the lone wolf 
concept and illustrated the scale of lone wolf activity in 2016 through a year focussed 
case study. 
“Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining Motives and Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists” 
(Gallagher, publication scheduled in 2022), which takes the forward the work in “The 
2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami - Is Rapoport’s ‘Religious Wave’ ending?” (Gallagher, 
2017) using further examples, and examines the significant differences that exist 
between a lone actor multiple victim killer and a terrorist lone wolf. 
 
  
2.2 “The Lone Wolf Tsunami: Is Rapoport’s Religious 
Wave Ending?”, Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, 




“While no one can predict the future course of terrorism with confidence, the history 
of terrorism counsels us to think broadly but at the same time exercise caution.” 
(Jenkins, 1999, pp. x) 
 
Jenkins words above provide a good touchstone when considering potential 
developments in terrorism, particularly given the era defining events of 9/11 that 
followed two short years after they were written, the consequences of which continue 
to overshadow world events today. However, it is from this basis that I intend to 
approach this article. I ask that the reader considers recent publications both in 
academia and from law enforcement that indicate that terrorism may again be entering 
a new phase; a wave with striking historic echoes in terms of the modus operandi of 
participants, but on a wholly different scale, and with driving factors far removed from 
those of the past. The scope of this article limits discussion specifically to the lone wolf 
manifestation of terrorist action; however, extrapolation to wider consideration of 
terrorism’s manifestations could be undertaken in future. In addition, it is through 
consideration of participants in terrorist groups that, to a degree, shines a light on what 
is happening amongst their lone wolf fellow travellers. 
 
Individualised Terrorism 
To begin this consideration we must first determine whether terrorism can be an 
individual act. The study of terrorism is bedevilled by the inability of all interested 
parties, for a host of reasons, to arrive at an agreed definition (Schmid, 2004).  However, 
for the purpose of this article I ask that the reader considers the definition of the 2004 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned terrorist acts as: 
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations 
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature.” (United Nations, 2004) 
 
The definition does not exclude the actions of an individual as being regarded as those 
of a terrorist. It is the Mens Rea, the perpetrators intent in carrying out their actions, 
which is of significant import. Lone wolf terrorism’s definition has been debated at 
length, but that provided by Becker appears the most persuasive, defining it as 
“ideologically driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an individual who 
plans and executes an attack in the absence of collaboration (italics mine) with other 
individuals or groups.” (Becker, 2014, pp. 964)   
 
The FBI was alert to its potential contemporary consequential impact as early as 2004, 
with its Strategic Plan containing the observation that, “The most significant domestic 
terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist.” 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004) As the FBI predicted, there were many 
instances of lone wolf terrorism in the years that followed, both in the United States, 
and in other Western Nations. The most infamous until 2016 remained the actions of 
Andreas Behring Breivik, who on July 22 2011 detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway 
then undertook a shooting spree at a Labor Youth summer camp, killing 77 in total; 
Breivik was inspired by anti-Islamic far right rhetoric, sighting much of this in a self-
published manifesto immediately prior to his actions (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014). 
 
Wave Theory and the Lone Wolf 
David Rapoport’s (2003) seminal work on the evolution of terrorism establishes the 
theory that terrorism has rolled across the world in four waves since the 1880’s. 
Rapoport outlines these waves as beginning with the Anarchist wave, which lasted for 
approximately forty years. It was followed in the 1920’s by an Anti-colonial wave, 
which lasted to the 1960’s, then a New left wave which in turn faded as the Religious 
wave crested, and it is this wave which, in theory, is said to still exists today. 
 
For Rapoport these waves were captured within the geo political tide of the times. The 
terrorist participants embraced the zeitgeist at the razor’s edge of contemporary radical 
thought. The initial Anarchist wave, which I consider in more detail below, petered out 
during the carnage of the First World War. As the world adjusted following its 
conclusion, colonial struggles succeeded it. It took place against a background of 
significant international reorganization and technological innovation, which some have 
described as being the initial phase of globalization. It is not surprising that the change 
in world politics that resulted led to the focus of radical political thought moving, and 
saw the focus of terrorism mirror the change. As colonial struggles concluded, largely 
successfully, and radical politics moved on to the New left, so too did terrorist 
motivations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, bastion of Communism and backer of 
many leftist terrorist sponsor nations, contributed significantly to the demise of the New 
left wave and the rise of the Religious wave. So too did the unforeseen consequences 
of western support provided to the Mujahedeen’s struggle with the Soviet’s in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Accepting then that the actions of an individual can be regarded as acts of terrorism it 
is worthwhile to turn to Rapoport’s first wave that of the anarchists, to consider acts of 
terror that came to be regarded as propaganda by deed. A number of incidents of 
individual action are regarded as having wholly political motivations. Examples include 
 
 The 1881 shooting of a stranger by Emile Florion after he could not find 
republican politician Leon Gambetta 
 The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and 
instead sitting down in restaurant and stabbing a fellow diner (who turned 
out to be Serbian ambassador) 
 The assassinations of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, King Umberto of Italy 
and President McKinley are examples of anarchist terrorism yet there are 
weak links between the perpetrators (Bell, D.H., 1987) 
 
In the case of McKinley’s assassin, Leon Czolgosz, the crumpled newspaper found in 
the assassin’s pocket covering the story of King Umberto’s murder suggested his wider 
motivation.  
 
Each of these anarchist actions did though have one element in common. They were 
extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely understood, or agreed, that 
goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The perpetrators had virtually 
no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they were perceived to be acting 
to achieve a common goal, it is highly debatable as to whether the perpetrators had a 
shared understanding of a common purpose. 
 
It may have been the case that for the general public “improved telegraphy and 
successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from 
the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that 
the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of 
sinister objectives across Europe or North.. America” but Burleigh (2008) cautions that 
evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was limited. 
 
Jensen (2009) shares Burleigh’s caution around any significant degree of anarchist 
cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist’s actions notoriety, casualties from 
their actions were relatively light. During the period between 1880 and 1914, they killed 
160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had succeeded though in the 
objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant that others, such as 
Czolgosz, at least knew of the likely level of international coverage their actions would 
bring. The Anti-colonial wave, and that of the New left, saw acts of such individual 
terror decrease dramatically. Terrorist actions were coordinated and group led. Indeed, 
between January 1, 1968 and May 1, 2007 there were only 72 acts of lone wolf 
terrorism, a mean of 1.84 per year (Spaaij, 2010). 
 
However, of particular note it was during this period, Louis Beam, the right wing writer, 
published ‘Leaderless Resistance’, to which Kaplan (1997) drew initial academic 
attention. Beam called in 1983 (published in 1992) for individual autonomous action 
against the United States Federal Government. This ‘call to arms’ fell largely on deaf 
ears amongst those in the far right he sought to agitate at the time. However, it was from 
this call ultimately that the lone wolf term has been coined. It is not a difficult mental 
adjustment to retrospectively term the actions of the anarchists described above in such 
a manner. 
 
The Dissipation of the Religious Wave 
Each of Rapoport’s waves had its formation, its crest, and its breakwater. I believe that 
the Religious Wave may be entering its ‘breakwater’ phase. We may be seeing a giving 
way to perhaps a new and even more dangerous wave. This wave appears to contain a 
particularly modern twist within its manifestation, The Terror of the Individual. This 
article demonstrates the need to employ a degree of delineation between the lone wolf 
terrorism that occurred during the religious wave and The Terror of the Individual. 
Recent developments indicate an evolution beyond what has previously been seen as 
lone wolf religious inspired terrorism.  
 
Initially, it is necessary to consider Rapoport’s fourth religious wave in detail. In terms 
of terrorist organizations it is essential we identify the factors that evidence its 
graduated dissipation, and that we are moving into a period of change. This is 
manifesting itself most noticeably amongst those on the edges of, or wholly unaffiliated 
to, groups; the lone wolves. 
 
It is work by Marc Sageman (2008) that initially subdivided the fourth wave that has 
existed since the 1980’s, identifying sub-waves of Jihadi terrorist devolvement within 
the Religious wave. So far Sageman, and his successors, have identified an inspirational 
first sub-wave. Members of this initial sub-wave brought the cause of a worldview that 
there is an international oppressed Muslim community. This message succeeded in 
drawing religiously inspired foreigners to join the Mujahedeen and participate, or assist, 
in the conflict in Afghanistan following the invasion by the Soviet Union. This first 
sub-wave includes the original members of Al-Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden.  
 
The second sub-wave was constituted by elite Middle Eastern origin expatriates who 
attended Western Universities and then, following contact with first wave members and 
supporters, became involved in the conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir; 
or self-staring operations such as 9/11. Sageman (2004) previously identified that these 
members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle class, educated young men 
from caring and religious families, the large majority were married, many with children 
and no hardened criminals detected amongst their ranks. The third sub-wave of home-
grown Jihadists emerged in the wake of the Iraq War and was largely sought out by a 
variety of inspirers to encourage participation. Richard Reed, the infamous failed shoe 
bomber serves as a good example and is of a different background to the self-starters 
of the second wave.  
 
Those currently becoming involved in jihadist activities, for Rik Coolsaet (2016) the 
fourth sub-wave, have backgrounds far removed from the pioneers of Al Qaeda. The 
largely middle class/intellectual credentials of second wave jihadists have been 
replaced with recruits drawn from “immigrant gangs (that mix) jihadism with gangsta 
criminality” (Burke, 2015, pp. 207). Van San’s (2015) study of 35 Belgian and Dutch 
foreign fighters for IS found that half were converts to Islam, all aged between 18 and 
30, and none holding a University education (Van San, 2015). 
 
What is of particular note is that after each of the sub-waves there is a noticeable decline 
of ‘religiosity’ of the participants. As ‘jihadist terrorism’ has evolved the level of 
individual religious scholarship and background amongst participants has decreased. 
This is a development not missed by the analysts of Europol, who see the current 
situation as being perhaps best described as an ‘extremist social trend’ rather than 
radicalization in terms of the involvement of the religion of Islam as a motivating factor 
(Europol, 2016). Belgian Anti-terrorist Police Superintendent Alain Grignard sums up 
the current situation as that “previously we were mostly dealing with radical Islamists, 
individuals radicalized toward violence by extremist interpretation of Islam but now 
we’re increasingly dealing with what are best described as ‘Islamized Radicals’.” 
(Cruickshank, 2015)   
 
Meanwhile, French anti-terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic illustrates the profile of fourth 
wave participants as consisting of ‘ninety percent…who leave do it for personal 
reasons: they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not 
fit in society...Religion is not the engine of this movement and that’s precisely its 
strength (italics mine)’(Coolsaet, 2016). These observations are of potentially massive 
significance. Can it be argued that the fourth sub-wave is indeed a core part of 
Rapoport’s religious wave? Instead should it perhaps now be acknowledged that we 
are, as with earlier wave dissipations moving to the ‘breakwater’ of the Religious wave? 
The decrease in ‘Religiosity’ appears indicative of a wider change. The ‘extremist 
social trend’ is far wider than jihadism alone. It appears that at least the Western world 
is now progressing into terrorism’s fifth wave, and that this wave is starting to see a 
tsunami of attacks perpetrated by individuals, mirroring changes in terrorist groups’ 
antecedents. Taking Becker’s definition of a lone wolf as one that can be accepted and 
applied the mean of 1.84 attacks per year noted by Spaaij above has been shattered in 
2016. 
 
Known lone wolf Terrorist Attacks in 2016 
In Germany, there are numerous examples to consider:  
 
 Ali Sonboloy, the Munich shooter lured youths to a Munich shopping Mall 
to obtain free burgers, having made increasingly vitriolic posts on social 
media against migrant communities, and ultimately altering his profile on 
one platform to a photograph of Anders Breivik (Alexander et. al., 2016).  
 There are the Reichsburgers, individuals who refuse to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the state and drive vehicles into traffic police officers, set fire 
to the homes of asylum seekers, and shoot police officers carrying out 
evictions and confiscations (Pancevski, 2016). 
 The 17-year-old Afghan asylum seeker who attacked fellow passengers on 
a train while armed with an axe and a knife (Lyman, 2016).  
 The 27-year-old Syrian refugee who detonated a bomb at a wine bar in 
Ansbach, killing only himself, but wounding 15 civilians, and was later 
found to have recorded a message on his mobile telephone pledging his 
allegiance the Islamic State (Palazzo, 2016).  
 A 27-year-old mentally disturbed German national who stabbed 4 at Grafing 
Train Station while shouting “Allah Akbar.” (Dearden, 2016)  
 The 53 year old female Muslim convert who attacked police with knives in 
Mulwhile crying “Allah Akbar,” and who had the flags of the Islamic State 
in her home though no other ties to the group.(News Agency, 2016)  
 The Tunisian asylum seeker who ploughed a truck into a Berlin Christmas 
market, with responsibility later claimed by IS, but only a recorded pledge 
from the attacker indicating any significant degree of contact (Simon et. al., 
2016) 
 
In Belgium, the following examples present: 
 
 Two police officers were attacked by man wielding a machete and shouting 
“Allah Akbar” in the Belgian city of Charleroi (Dearden and Foster, 2016).   
 On October 5 2016, three police officers were attacked by a man wielding a 





 Mohammed Lakouaiej-Bouhal, a Tunisian national who held French residency, 
hired a lorry, armed with a pistol, fake pistol, grenade and replica assault rifles 
then ploughed into crowds of fireworks onlookers during Bastille day 
celebrations in Nice. He died in a shootout with police. IS claimed responsibility 
for the attack (Rubbin and Breeden, 2017). 
 A 29 Year Old French Citizen of Tunisian Descent, unemployed for several 
years, utilised a motor vehicle to twice ram a group of 4 soldiers guarding a 
Mosque. Stated he wanted to kill troops and ‘Jihadist’ propaganda was found 
on his home computer (Al Jazeera, 2016).   
 Larossi Abballa, 25, a French Citizen of Moroccan Descent, with previous 
prison history and association to terrorist groups stabbed two police officers to 
death, entered their home, and live streamed an 11 minute video on the IS news 
agency Amaq, before police intervention. In the video he urged Muslims in 
France to target police officers, prison guards, journalists, politicians and 
mayors for attacks. He said he was heeding a call by IS spokesman Abu 
Mohammed al-Adnani. IS claimed responsibility for the attack (BBC, 
14/06/2016).  
 Sallah Ali, homeless, aged 20 of Moroccan origin, while wearing a fake suicide 
vest attacked police officers with a meat cleaver, while shouting “Allahu 
Akhbar”. He was shot dead by police, after injuring one officer. He was carrying 
an ISIS flag, and a statement of intent was found on his body pledging allegiance 
to IS, claiming he was avenging coalition incursions in Syria. The attack took 
place on the anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack, in which 12 died and 11 
were injured (The Journal, 2016). 
 
In the United States, examples include 
 
 Dylann Roof attacked a church service after publishing a white supremacist 
manifesto (Alexander, 2016).  
 On January 7, 2016, in West Philadelphia, in the late evening, a gunman shot 
Philadelphia police officer Jesse Hartnett, who was driving a marked police car. 
Hartnett survived, despite being shot multiple times in the left arm. He was able 
to get out of his car to shoot the fleeing suspect, Edward Archer. Later in the 
hospital, Archer claimed that he pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) 
(Berman, 2016).  
 Forty-nine people were killed when a lone-wolf gunman entered the Pulse gay 
nightclub. Hostages were taken and the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, was shot 
dead by local specialist police units in an attempt to storm the building. The FBI 
classified the attack as an act of "domestic terrorism" motivated by "Islamic 
leanings."(Ellis et. al., 2016)  
 Ahmad Khan Rahami set pipe bombs and a pressure cooker bomb in New Jersey 
and Manhattan (Associated Press in New York, 2016). 
 Abdul Razak Ali Artan rammed his car into a group of students at the Ohio State 
University. Artan then proceeded to stab several others with a knife, with the 
Islamic State claiming responsibility for the attack.(Williams et. al., 2016)  
 
In Australia:  
 
 A 59-year-old dog walker was attacked by a knife wielding Muslim man, 
suffering from Schizophrenia crying “Allah Akbar” in suburban Sydney. He 
was later found to have self-identified with the Islamic State, and have made 
social media posts in respect of previous international lone wolf incidents 
.(Olding, 2016) 
 A 29-year-old French citizen killed a 21-year-old female British backpacker 
while shouting “Allah Akbar.” One British man was critically injured, an 
Australian man suffered non-life-threatening injuries, and the attacker also 
killed a dog (Chen, 2016). 
 
In the UK: 
 
 Thomas Mair shot and stabbed to death the Member of Parliament Jo Cox in the 
days preceding the EU Referendum, crying ‘Britain First’ as he did so.( Casciani and 
De Simone, 2016) 
 A 66-year-old man, stabbed four women outside a supermarket in Hampton, while 
shouting Arabic Terms and referencing the previous murder by Islamists of British 
Soldier Lee Rigby (Quinn and Gayle, 2016). 
 
The diversity of causes outlined above is obvious. While many attacks appear linked to 
jihadism open source reporting indicates that the religiosity of the attackers undertaking 
them is highly suspect. The far right attacks have no ‘religious’ overtones whatsoever.  
 
While the anarchists killed 160 and injured 500 over approximately a 34 year wave, in 
2016 lone wolves involved in the incidents above have, by tallying open source 
reporting, killed and injured similar numbers in one year (171 and 780 respectively ). 
Lethality apart (and the availability of automatic weapons to today’s actor is 
acknowledged), the comparison in respect of methodology and target selection between 
current lone wolves and those of the anarchist past are striking. Where they diverge is 
that the anarchists sought to gain publicity for their actions, and draw attention to the 
cause through targeting significant public individuals. Such targeting today, although it 
would likely similarly attract massive public attention, is not undertaken, nor is it 
necessary to gain worldwide media exposure. Today’s voracious 24 News cycle ensures 
that, in the West, all acts of terrorism receive significant coverage: the international 
nature of the referencing of the articles above is testament to this.  
 
In line with the work of Berntzen and Sandberg (2014)  I see from the open source 
reporting of these incidences of lone wolf terrorism actions where there may have been 
reference to wider terrorist groups or ideologies, particularly the prevalence of pledges 
of allegiance to Islamic State, but no collaboration (in keeping with Becker’s definition 
above). The actors are instead acting independently based on rhetoric embedded in 
wider social movements. Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) reference the myriad of factors 
that drive independent actors including way of thinking, rationale, motivation, but also 
psychology, social factors, political opportunities, existential attractions, and plain old 
excitement. They note in respect of Breivik that “his ideology, world view, and 
narratives emerged from a large, sometimes radical, and relatively new anti-Islamic 
social movement. It is thus impossible to understand the Norwegian terrorist attacks 
without seeing how their rationale was embedded in anti-Islamic rhetoric.” (Berntzen 
and Sandberg, 2014,) 
 
Lone wolf terrorism had previously been seen as exception to social movement theory. 
In common with many academic authors I view this classification as incorrect. I find 
myself in agreement with Kaplan et. al. , who write that “lone wolves, however lonely 
they seem to be, are much part of a larger community of likeminded actors.” (Kaplan, 
Loow and Malkki, 2014) For Kaplan et. al. (2014) the internet is a key enabler in driving 
these individuals to develop their ideas into action, through interaction with likeminded 
individuals they have no direct contact with. Aiken (2016) captures this well in 
describing individual’s online presences as bolder, less inhibited, and judgement 
impaired. It is Naim (2013) who captures though that it is not the internet alone that is 
at work in driving radical behaviours. There are far wider societal changes at work, to 
which the internet is simply a contributory factor, to a degree a catalyst. The wider 
changes in society, which he describes as the ‘More and Mobility’ revolutions have had 
the effect of “vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access 
to resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and 
inexpensively than ever before.” (Naim, 2013, pp. 65) 
 
A former Al-Qaeda member, Jesse Morton, in considering the attraction of terrorism 
per se articulates the motivation of members as not being a reaction to foreign policy 
but instead “a pre-existing anger and animosity, whether it is to do with child abuse or 
trauma, a lack of integration and assimilation, or socio-economic grievances. The 
foreign policy grievance is simply something that allows them to release tensions held 
deep within them” (Stanford, 2016). 
 
This observation ties in well with identified notions of extreme thrill seeking 
(Pazzanese, 2015). This is coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past-
perceived misdeeds, identified amongst contemporary terrorists (Watts, 2016). 
 
In returning to Naim (2013), he sees within the Mentality revolution the politics of the 
individual with a grievance. Individuals can now access twisted ideologies that were 
previously inaccessible, creating on many occasions a bespoke ideology tied to their 
own particular grievances and foibles. They may not fully understand this ideology, but 
can latch onto in ways never possible before. The significant societal changes Naim 
highlights echo the conditions that Burleigh (2008) describes as at work during the 
Anarchist wave, as illustrated above. For increased telegraphy, see perhaps the spread 
of the internet, in turn for successive newspaper cycles see the spread of live 24-hour 
news coverage on a plethora of platforms. 
 
The tie to mental health in respect of recent developments cannot be understated. It is 
estimated that approximately 30 percent of lone actors have mental health issues 
(Gardner, 2016). The problem with properly assessing the scale of this aspects impact 
on terrorism is that the vast majority of incidents that would fit a lone wolf definition 
are not defined or prosecuted as acts of terrorism. Often, although not exclusively 
(Mair, the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox being a prime example) this is due to 
attribution to the mental health of the perpetrator.  
 
Spaaij (2010), writing at a time when he saw no evidence of the lethality of lone wolf 
terrorism being on the increase, examined the cases of five lone wolf terrorists at length. 
He found they all suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude, with 3 of the 5 
diagnosed with personality disorders and 4 of the 5 experiencing severe depression 
during their lives. He also noted that lone wolf terrorists create their own ideologies 
that combine personal frustration, and aversion with broader political, social, or 
religious aims.  
 
In the United Kingdom alone killings by those deemed to have mental health issues 
have climbed by 92 percent, with 423 people killed by mental health patients in the last 
7 years (Hudson, 2016).  
 
Fiona Petty (2016) describes killings by the mentally ill as an unintended consequence 
of more liberal mental health treatment regimes. In respect of terrorism and killings by 
those she describes as ‘lonely wolves,’ she sees such individuals as not having ‘slipped 
through the net’, but instead suggests that resources and treatment are so scarce that 
there is no net to slip through. Such self-evident truths are not, in her view, “popular or 
comfortable in western civilized society.” (Petty, 2016) In engaging with Islamic State 
and other radical viewpoints online “the lonely can find solace in internet sites offering 
self-esteem, a reason for living and above all rewards they can only dream of… our 
values and belief systems cannot understand this rationale but we need to stop bleating 
about their ideology being so abhorrent and tackle the issue that it has indeed been so 
successful.” (Petty, 2016) 
 
Bhui et al. (2014) see a spiral at play here. Their ground-breaking study into depression 
and sympathy for violent protest and terrorism showed a direct correlation between 
weakened social cohesion, depression, and support for extreme views. It also identified 
a self-perpetuating pattern, with increased violence and terrorist acts leading to 
increased breakdown of social capital, depression, and higher sympathy for extreme 
acts.  
 
Gardner (2016) notes the observation from British Secret Service contacts that those 
suffering from mental health difficulties are likely to be screened out by established 
terrorist groups. The prevalence of those at liberty in Western societies, coupled to their 
obvious part in the incidents listed above cannot be dismissed. Mental illness is not a 
full explanation for the rise in lone wolf cases, however it has to be acknowledged as a 
contributory factor. Following Bhui et al.’s argument of a potential spiral at play it may 
become of ever-increasing relevance, particularly seen against the context of the 
increase in killings as a whole by those suffering mental health difficulties.  
 
This is not to say the influence of groups on individuals is a one-way street. “Death to 
traitors, freedom for Britain,” echoes of the phrases Thomas Mair shouted when 
appearing in court charged with murdering the British MP Jo Cox have appeared as tag 
lines on the Google listing for National Action, a (recently proscribed terrorist) 
organization in the United Kingdom (Gadher, 2016).  
 
This interrelationship between lone wolves and established groups should be seen as 
symbiotic. Lone wolves carry out acts linked, however indirectly to a terrorist groups 
cause and perhaps motivated by it, which the group then claims as its own and appeals 
for more similar lone actors to come forward. Terrorist groups may not have wanted a 
lone wolf as a member (should they ever have attempted to join, which many won’t 
have) but they appear only too keen to take kudos from their actions, no matter how 
indirect their role in inspiring them may have been. IS provides perfect illustration. 
 
So what of the future?  
Accepting there has been some form of sea change in behaviours, and that as Europol 
note and the 2016 examples above suggest, these appear to be being carried out by those 
at the extreme of a social trend rather than terrorism by individuals pursuing religious 
goals leads one to question what is actually going on. 
 
Kaplan and Costa (2015) consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of New 
Tribalism, an undertow within Rapoport’s fourth wave, where adherents of terrorist 
groups members have common bonds of kinship or shared history/ideals and aim to 
establish a lost (or mythical) Golden Age. For Kaplan and Costa IS are exemplars of 
this phenomena, with their drive to re-establish the Caliphate. The bonds of kinship 
here and shared history/ideals do not need to be physical, as Speckhard illustrates with 
her interviews of jihadists showing a shared fictive kinship in defence of a global 
population of those ascribing to the Muslim faith (Speckhard, 2012).  
 
IS continues to lose territory and it may well be that as time progresses their adherents 
and successors become more aligned to the notion of the Caliphate per se and statehood 
for those with common cause now exiled, as opposed to the religiosity alone of the 
groups doctrine. Such a move would certainly fit with the decrease in the religiosity of 
IS members. Notably, as the Religiosity of the participants in Jihadist terrorism has 
decreased the number of lone wolves who find themselves able to describe themselves 
as fellow travellers, and ascribe allegiance, has risen.  
 
Recent political changes (Brexit, the election of President Trump, the ascendance of far 
right political parties in Austria, France, and the Netherlands) indicate an increase in 
populism right across the Western world. The possibility of a backlash as the newly 
elected change policy direction, and introduce measures at odds with the consensus 
which has largely existed (for the West) since the end of the Cold War cannot be 
discounted. The likelihood of such a backlash sits well with Ekblom’s notion of co-
evolutionary developments in terrorism, counter terrorism and the politics of the 
extreme, where significant change in direction by one party is atypically met by a 
counter reaction, sometimes more violent and impactive than that which it has been 
engendered by, from those in opposition (Ekblom, 2015).  
 
We need to remember Jenkins words from the start of this article, and it may well be 
neither of the issues that draw terrorist support. What seems evident is that individuals 
are going to be acting in a far more independent manner, and that whatever their cause 
The Terror of the Individual is a pervasive threat that must be addressed.  
 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates that there is evidence that the religious wave identified by 
Rapoport is drawing to a close, and that actors with extreme social agendas are 
emerging who it has not, as yet, been possible to properly frame the geo political context 
their actions fit within. 
 
These emerging actors have much in common with those of Rapoport’s first wave, the 
Anarchists, however their lethality appears significantly greater so far than all lone 
wolves who have gone before. Indeed, only time will tell if we are going to experience 
a new wave, or if instead we are about to witness a loop, with the next phase of terrorist 
actions continuing to mirror, to a degree, their anarchist ancestors.  
 
In terms of policy implications the author strongly believes that a focus should be given 
to the emerging tactics of lone wolves to identify everyday weapons of mass destruction 
(such as the use of trucks and such), and become proactive in instigating mitigating 
measures. At present law enforcement agencies are simply reacting to the relatively 
simple innovations lone wolves are undertaking. There is an obvious need to gain 
greater understanding of the symbiotic and enabling relationship that appears to exist 
between terrorist groups and ‘lone wolves’, no matter the degree of collaboration.  
 
Finally, there has to be an unequivocal acceptance that mental health is a factor in lone 
wolf terrorism, and that the actions of those who are ill need to be seen as those of a 
terrorist when appropriate. Only through this acceptance will a true picture of the 
terrorist threat that is faced be possible, and will there be the possibility for international 
progress in identifying treatment and preventative measures for those who are ill. If not, 
we may well face a descent into the spiral identified by Bhui, which will see the actions 
of lone wolves grow exponentially. The author accepts that such a change in tack will 
require a considerable refocusing of resource in a number of disciplines, including but 
not limited to, social work, mental health, counterterrorism, and criminal justice. 
However, the prevalence of mental health issues amongst terrorist participants cannot 
be ignored, and moving this dialogue into a more mainstream acceptance of the issue 
is the only way progress can be made.  
 
2.3 “Lone Wolf Terrorists: Examining Motives and 
Methods of Stand Alone Terrorists”, within Dunbar, E. 




This chapter considers the concept of ‘Individualised Terrorism’, arguing for greater 
attention to be paid to individuals undertaking terrorist attacks rather than solely 
concentrating on terrorist groups. Using the Anarchist’s for comparison purposes the 
chapter highlights the resonance of current ‘lone wolf’ activity with the disparate and 
very loosely linked collective that constituted their historical counterparts.   
 
The chapter draws attention to the geographical spread of recent attacks, the disparate 
causes of participants, and identifies factors contributing to the ongoing changes to 
terrorisms dynamics, including the role of the internet and the mental health of the lone 
wolf terrorist. 
 
The chapter concludes by suggesting the increased incidence of lone wolf terrorism is 
likely to continue, and recommends greater alignment between police, psychiatry and 
social work in an effort to identify the triggers that can evidence the likelihood of highly 




There is a great deal of consternation presently around acts of terrorism, mental health 
and mass casualty events. Identifying what constitutes an act of terrorism can be 
difficult, and controversial. This is not helped by the lack of an agreed definition of a 
terrorist act. 4  The most comprehensive definition appears to be that of the 2004 United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned terrorist acts as: 
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations 
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature.”5 (United Nations, 2004) 
 
                                                 
4    For discussion of this debate in detail see Alex P. Schmid  (ed.), “Statistics on Terrorism: 
The Challenge of Measuring Trends in Global Terrorism “Forum on Crime and Society, 4 , no. 
1  and 2 (2004), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Forum/V05-81059_EBOOK.pdf  
5    United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566, 2004, available at: 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1566-2004-on-
threats-to-international-peace-and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/ 
The definition clearly does not exclude the actions of an individual as being regarded 
as those of a terrorist. It is the Mens Rea, the perpetrators intent in carrying out their 
actions, which is of the most significant import. Nowhere is this truer than when we 
consider lone wolf terrorism, a phenomena whose definition has been debated at length. 
That provided by Becker appears the most persuasive, defining it as “ideologically 
driven violence, or attempted violence, perpetrated by an individual who plans and 
executes an attack in the absence of collaboration (italics mine) with other individuals 
or groups.”6 (Becker, 2014, pp. 964)   
 
Orla Lynch (2017) has recently perfectly captured the nub of the problem that exists for 
many when we look at lone wolf terrorism (and terrorism per se) in noting that 
 
“In an effort to understand terrorism, particularly for those individuals who 
work with the perpetrators of political violence, it is vital that we separate the 
notion of terrorism from the terrorist. Terrorism is a highly politicized term, a 
pejorative label applied unevenly across groups…. the terrorist actor must be 
understood and considered in his/her local context in conjunction with the 
entirety of their social network, personal background, ideological affiliations 
and offending history. In effect, practitioners must deal with what is in front of 
them, and not be seduced by the hysteria (understandably so) that so often 
accompanies terrorism and terrorist events” (Lynch, 2017, pp. 79 - 80) 
 
Significant conceptual issues within the study of terrorism have contributed to these 
difficulties. Corner and Gill (2015) consider these in some detail, identifying a false 
dichotomy that has emerged in academia and beyond between seeing terrorists (in the 
1970’s) as harbouring significant psychological flaws, to their being regarded as quite 
psychologically normal individuals, but also being persons participating instead in 
complicated (and extreme) group and social dynamics. They found that in 40 years of 
research ‘the literature has jumped from one extreme position (“they are all mentally 
ill”) to the exact opposite (“by definition, a terrorist cannot be mentally ill”). This 
chapter supports their research finding that those with mental health difficulties can 
certainly be involved in terrorist behaviour, however not perhaps within the rigid 
concepts that are currently applied. Such concepts need to be challenged. 
 
Presidents and Anarchists 
 
There have been lone individuals throughout history who have carried out acts of 
politically inspired violence. One of the most notable is Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of 
US President William McKinley in 1901.  The unfortunate President McKinley was not 
alone in being a targeted United States President, either before or since. Lee Harvey 
Oswald is perhaps the most controversial ‘lone wolf’ actor of the last seventy years. 
Speculation of Oswald’s status as a sole actor continues to rage today, with many 
documents relating to the investigation of his assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy only recently being released, and some still withheld (Harden, 2017). In 1981 
an attempt on the life of another US President, Ronald Reagan, was perpetrated by John 
Hinckley Junior. President Reagan was wounded, but survived.  
                                                 
6    For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of defining lone wolf terrorism see Ramon  
Spaaij and Mark S. Hamm, “Key  Issues and Research Agendas in Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , 38, no. 3 (2015): 167 -178. Doi: 
10.1080/1057610X.2014.986979. 
 
What differs about these three ultra-high profile assailants beyond anything else is their 
motive. It is interesting to contrast these three instances to begin to question when lone 
actions step into lone wolf terrorism. 
 
Czolgosz is widely accepted by academics and historians as being part of a very loose 
anarchist wave of terrorism that lasted between 1880’s and 1910’s (Rapoport, 2003).  
A crumpled newspaper found in the assassin’s pocket covering the story of King 
Umberto’s murder by another ‘anarchist terrorist’ is utilized as an indicator for his 
wider politically fuelled anarchist inspired motivation (Burleigh, 2008). 
 
The inability of Cobbler Leon Leuathier to make a functioning bomb and instead sitting 
down in restaurant then stabbing a fellow diner (who turned out to be Serbian 
ambassador) and the assassination of Elizabeth, Empress of Austria are seen, with the 
murder of King Umberto of Italy and President McKinley, as examples of anarchist 
terrorism, but with accepted weak ties between the perpetrators, and their apparent 
shared anarchist cause’ being the link between them (Bell, 1987). 
 
Each of these anarchist actions did though have one element in common. They are all 
reasonably construed as extreme acts to drive forward a political goal. How widely 
understood, or agreed, that goal was amongst the perpetrators is highly debatable. The 
perpetrators had virtually no interaction. Additionally, although in wider society they 
were perceived to be acting to achieve a common goal, it is extremely questionable as 
to whether the perpetrators had a shared understanding of a common purpose. 
 
It may have been the case that for the general public “improved telegraphy and 
successive newspaper editions updating the cycle of atrocity, arrest, trial, speeches from 
the dock, imprisonment or execution meant (they) could quite justifiably conclude that 
the activities of the bomb-throwing maniacs were being coordinated on behalf of 
sinister objectives across Europe or North.. America” (Burleigh, 2008, pp. 21) but 
Burleigh (2008) cautions that evidence suggests any real degree of co-ordination was 
limited.7  
 
Jensen shares Burleigh’s caution around any significant degree of anarchist 
cooperation. He also notes that despite the anarchist’s actions notoriety, casualties from 
their actions was relatively light (Jensen, 2009). During the period between 1880 and 
1914, they killed 160 and injured 500. These largely uncoordinated actions had 
succeeded though in the objective of sowing terror. The new means of publicity meant 
that those amongst their number, such as Czolgosz, knew of the likely level of 
international coverage their actions would bring. 
 
Oswald, best described as a ‘misfit and sociopath’, would have been in no doubt as to 
the significance of the actions he was undertaking, and the world-wide implications. 
His time as a very odd Marxist in the US Marines, and thereafter in the Soviet Union, 
have given rise to all form of conspiracy theories as to his direction and orders. However 
recent coverage suggests it was far more likely that any agency such as the KGB who 
may have been attempting to utilize his services for wider goals would have eventually 
                                                 
7     Michael Burleigh, Blood and Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism  (London: Harper 
Collins, 2008), 79. 
realized his fragile mental state meant he was an individual who could not have been 
controlled (Harnden, 2017). Oswald’s actions occurred against the backdrop of a 
worldwide leftist inspired wave of terrorism, which David Rapoport (2003), in his 
seminal work on Terrorism’s waves, has illustrated as taking place between the 1960’s 
and 1980’s. 
 
The shooting of President Reagan differs greatly from the actions undertaken by 
Czolgosz and Oswald. With both Czolgosz and Oswald their motivations have been 
examined, and with historical enquiry and hindsight, placed within a conceptualization 
of the wider political struggles of their time, with terrorist acts at the razor’s edge of 
extreme anarchist and new left political activity respectively. What is of fundamental 
difference with Hinckley Jr. from the other two Presidential attackers is that his 
motivation, which has been examined at length, stemmed from an obsession with the 
actress Jodie Foster and his intent was to in some perverse way draw her attention to 
him. Hinckley Jr. had suffered significant mental health issues prior to carrying out the 
shooting (Associated Press, 2016). 
 
Discussion often turns to failing mental health as an explanation for a significant 
amount of lone wolf activity, and consequent attempts to bracket Czolgosz, Oswald, 
Hinckley Jr. and individuals such as Stephen Paddock, of recent infamy for the shooting 
in Las Vegas which killed 58 and injured 500, together (Levenson, 2017). The author 
believes this is fundamentally wrong, and fails to grasp the central concepts at work in 
respect of terrorist inspired lone wolf activity. Czolgosz and Oswald’s actions have 
been determined to have fallen within the sphere of influence of the wider political 
struggles of their times, with motive intimated from these. Paddock has been found to 
have no discernible motive whatsoever, although plenty of issues.  
 
A reset of how we conceptualize lone wolf terrorist activity and the role of mental health 
is necessary. Paddock may have had difficulties in this area; however his actions had 
no apparent political meaning or inspiration. Sageman (2017) has recently contended 
that the same applies to lone wolf suffering from mental disorders, and that their actions 
have no further group meaning. In this chapter the author seeks to challenge this view, 
demonstrating clearly the differences between individuals such as Paddock and those 
engaged in lone wolf terrorist activity, which certainly does influence terrorist group 
behaviours. To address this there will be a necessary of a paradigm shift in the concept 
of terrorism (including particularly terrorism inspired acts) and mental health, but one 
far removed from the stereotyped 'sadistic madman' favoured in the 1970's Corner and 
Gill (2015) allude to as having then existed. Reality is far more nuanced. Without this 
change in outlook and understanding we are likely doomed to see ever increasing 
numbers of terrorist inspired outrages committed by those acting alone. 
 
Understanding Where We Are Now 
 
Between 1968 and 2007 there were 72 acts of what we now consider to be ‘lone wolf’ 
terrorism.8 The vast majority of terrorist attacks during this period were committed by 
                                                 
8  Spaaij, R. (2010). The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: An assessment. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism. 33, 854-870. Specifically within this article see discussion of the RAND-MIPT 
Terrorist Knowledge Base. The database contains information on attacks that have occurred 
in the United Kingdom, Germany , France, Spain, Italy, Poland, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, Czech Republic, Portugal, Russia, Canada, United States and Australia.  
groups whose members largely acted in concert, with identifiable aims.  These ranged 
from the extreme left politics of Badder Meinhoff or the startling atrocities of Al Qaeda 
and its call to Jihad, most obviously evidenced by the 9/11 Hijackers.  
 
However, towards the end of the period the FBI (2004) had already foreseen significant 
likely changes in modus operandi of those involved in political violence. As early as 
2004 its Strategic Plan contained the observation that, “The most significant domestic 
terrorism threat over the next five years will be the lone actor or lone wolf terrorist.” 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004)9  
 
As the FBI predicted, there were many instances of lone wolf terrorism in the years that 
followed, both in the United States, and in other Western Nations. The most infamous 
atrocity until 2016 remained the actions of Andreas Behring Breivik, who on July 22 
2011 detonated a car bomb in Oslo, Norway then undertook a shooting spree at a Labor 
Youth summer camp, killing 77 in total. 
 
Breivik was inspired by anti-Islamic far right rhetoric, sighting much of this in a self-
published manifesto immediately prior to his actions (Berntzen, L.E., & Sandberg, S., 
2014).  Breivik’s actions heralded an unprecedented rise in lone wolf activity, which 
rose to a recent crescendo in 2016 when more than 20 attacks resulted in 171 people 
killed and 780 injured in ‘lone wolf’ incidents (Gallagher, 2017). Accepting the 
availability today of automatic weapons, the sheer volume of attacks and lethality is 
still startling. The variety of causes apparently driving the attacks has been 
unprecedented, from the Reichsburgers in Germany (individuals who refuse to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the state and drive vehicles into traffic police officers, 
set fire to the homes of asylum seekers, and shoot police officers carrying out evictions 
and confiscations)10 to the agent of carnage claiming Islamic State (IS) allegiance who 
drove his stolen truck into tourists in Nice (BBC, Nice attacks: What we know about 
the Bastille Day killings, 2016). 
 
The year 2017 has been just as grim with the west, with some examples of terrorist 
related lone wolf activity perpetrated being: 
 
 French policeman Xavier Jugele was shot dead, and 2 colleagues injured on 
the famous Champs Elysees in Paris by a Kalashnikov wielding Frenchman 
of Muslim descent although who had never been seen at his local Mosque, 
who had numerous convictions for violence. A note defending Islamic State 
was found near his body (Henely, 2017). 
 A Polish Born ‘Britain First’ supporter giving Nazi Salutes, stating he 
wanted to ‘Kill Muslims’, shouting ‘White Power’ and driving his motor 
vehicle over an Asian restaurateur. When arrested he was found in 
possession of ‘Britain First’ flyers and Nazi memorabilia. He suffers from 
depression (Roberts, 2017). 
                                                 
9    Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009,” (Washington D.C.: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004), available at: http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/fbi-
strategic-plan-2004-2009/p14808. 
1 0  Bojan Pancevski, “Rise of ‘new Reich army’ sparks alarm in Germany”, The Sunday Times, 
October 30 2016,available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rise-of-new-reich-army-
sparks-alarm-in-germany-xmd7jc9b7 
 A Bangladeshi born resident of New York attempted to carry out a suicide 
bombing on the underground trains in Manhattan. He pledged allegiance to 
the Islamic State, posting on Facebook ‘Trump you failed to protect your 
nation’ (Baker, A., & Weiser, B., 2017). 
 Adrian Russell Ajao, a Muslim convert also known as Khalid Masood, hired 
a car in Birmingham and drove to Westminster Bridge, mowing down 
members of the public and after crashing his vehicle ran from it armed with 
knives murdering police officer Keith Palmer who was guarding the UK 
parliament, before Ajao was fatally shot by police. He killed 5, and injured 
50. Ajao had an extensive record of petty criminality BBC (07/04/2017)  
 A Palestinian Asylum seeker ran amok in a Hamburg supermarket, shouting 
‘Allahu Akhbar’ as he stabbed people with a knife he had grabbed in the 
store, killing 1 and injuring 6. He told police afterwards it as an Islamic 
terror attack; however police had doubts over this as he psychologically ill. 
He had earlier been investigated for potential extremist beliefs, but it was 
concluded that he suffered from a psychological illness and should receive 
treatment. He never got any (Huggler, 2017). 
 A 17 year old white (non-Muslim) teenager from the small Welsh town of 
Rhondda Cynon Taff, with no known connection to any extremist 
organization, changed his Instagram profile picture to the flag of Islamic 
State then armed himself with a hammer and a kitchen knife while planning 
to carry out a lone attack at a Justin Bieber concert in Cardiff. He had written 
a martyrdom letter, but was caught by police before he could see through 
his plan (BBC ,27/11/2017)  
 In Stockholm a failed asylum seeker who expressed sympathies with IS 
stole a lorry and drove it into members of the public, killing 4 (Euronews, 
2017).  
 Darren Osbourne, a 47 year old resident of Cardiff, drove to the Finsbury 
Park Mosque in London (famous as a previous hot bed of radical activity) 
and thereafter ran over a crowd of worshipers, killing 1 and injuring 11. He 
was heard to shout ‘I want to kill all Muslims!’ He had a history of mental 
illness, and in the weeks prior to the attack he had attempted suicide and 
asked to be placed within a mental health facility (Ward et. al., 2017). 
 Republican Senator Steve Scalise was shot along with 4 others at a Baseball 
event just outside Washington, by James Hodgkinson, who was killed by 
police. Hodgkinson had posted Anti Republican and Anti Trump messages 
on Social Media (Allen, 2017). 
 An Armenian male who wanted to avenge Islamist linked attacks in Paris 
attempted to drive his 4x4 vehicle into a crowd of Mosque goers in the city, 
but was thwarted by barriers. (AFP, 2017) 
 A 25 year old local man, Andrew Schneck, was found and arrested while 
planting explosives in Houston against a 112 year old statue of a 
Confederate officer, Lieutenant Dick Dowling. Schneck’s stated motive was 
that ‘He didn’t like the guy’ (Barned-Smith et. al., 2017).  
 Ethan Stables, a 19 year old man was found in possession of explosives for 
the purposes of terrorism, and is to stand trial for undertaking 
reconnaissance on a Gay Pride Evening in a local pub (BBC, 08/12/2017).  
 Using 2 hire vehicles a Somali asylum seeker ran over and stabbed a police 
officer in Edmonton, then mounted a second attack where he drove his 
vehicle into 4 members of the public. An IS flag was found in one of the 
vehicles (Associated Press, 2017). 
 
These are only some of the examples of lone wolf terrorist activity in 2017, but the 
group act as an excellent indicator of the diversity of locations, actors and causes 
involved in this phenomenon across the West. Open source indications from the 
authorities involved are that all of these individuals acted alone, with some having 
documented mental health issues. Their causes range from the extreme right to the 
extreme left, by way of examples of allegiance to the aims of IS and Homophobia.  
 
However, gaining a true picture of lone wolf activity is extremely difficult. Not all of 
the examples above have been termed terrorist incidents. This results from a failure, 
particularly on the part of authorities, to accept and move on from significant 
conceptual problems around terrorist inspired activity.  This is perhaps best highlighted 
in an unusual case from 2016, which it is worth considering in detail. 
 
Ali Sonboly – The Identity Terrorist  
 
Ali Sonboly, the son of 1990’s Iranian refugees to Germany, and had undergone 2 
months inpatient psychiatric treatment in 2015, suffered from depression and was being 
treated as an outpatient (BBC, 24/07/2016).  Sonboly was described as a bullied loner 
by a classmate. He was 18 when he armed himself with a Glock pistol, obtained via the 
dark web, and carried out a shooting at a Munich shopping centre on July 22 2016 that 
left 9 dead and 27 injured. 
 
The dead, were lured to a McDonald’s in the centre through a hacked Facebook account 
post with the promise of a free meal, and appeared to have been targeted for their non-
indigenous German ethnicity. When challenged during the attack by a local resident, 
who threw a beer bottle and shouted “Fucking Foreigners”, Sonboly shouted back at 
him ‘I am German!’ Sonboly shot himself prior to capture by the police. He had not 
been on any intelligence service’s database prior to the attack.  
 
Munich Chief of Police Hubertus Andrae pointed out that the attack occurred on the 
fifth anniversary of Breivik’s far right inspired Norwegian lone wolf atrocity, and 
informed the media of material in Sonboly’s possession making the connection between 
the two incidents to him “obvious” (Shuster, 2016). This is supported further from 
information provided by his classmates, who stated that Sonboly had changed his 
WhatsApp messaging service profile picture to that of Breivik.  
 
However Andrae ruled out the act was one of terrorism, as there was no political motive 
(Nagesh, 2016). It is also interesting to note that in the confusion of the original 
incident, when it was thought that Sonboly had been shouting “Allahu Akbar” during 
his shooting spree (it now is almost certain he hadn’t been) Andre stated ‘Even if he 
would have said this, it would not automatically indicate anything. Not everyone who 
uses this saying, which is now famous around the world, is automatically linked to ISIS’ 
(Shuster, 2016). 
 
This was in furtherance of comments made by German Interior Minister Thomas de 
Maiziere in relation to another attack in Germany during 2016 where an axman on a 
train attacked fellow passengers shouting “Allahu Akbar”, and was later found to have 
made a suicide video where he pledged allegiance to IS, and vowed to kill non-
believers. De Maiziere saw such an attack as inhabiting a ‘grey area between a rampage 
and terrorism, that is was an Amoklauf (running amok) as there was no clear political 
motive (Shuster, 2016). 
 
A further note in respect of Sonboly’s antecedents is that during 2015 he visited the site 
of a 2009 German mass shooting event, taking photographs, and there was a book on 
mass shootings found in his home. 
 
Speaking after the shooting the then newly appointed UK Foreign Secretary (now Prime 
Minister) Boris Johnson said ‘If, as seems very likely, this is another terrorist incident, 
then I think it proves once again that we have a global phenomenon and a global 
sickness that we have to tackle both at the source – in the areas where the cancer is 
incubated in the Middle East – and also of course around the world. We have to ask 
ourselves, what is going on? How is the switch being thrown in the minds of these 
people?’(Wintour, 2016). 
 
When it was ascertained that the attack was not IS inspired Johnson was castigated for 
his comments by opposition party Members of the UK Parliament.  
 
A neighbour of the Sonboly family said after the attack said ‘I don’t think we should 
go crazy over it. This could happen anywhere’ (Schmidt, 2016). 
 
Sonboly’s Attack as a Rosetta stone for the Lone Wolf Issue Faced Today 
 
Let us return briefly to the case of Czolgosz for some historical context. Scholars today 
widely accept his actions to have been part of the ‘Anarchist Wave’ that swept the world 
prior to World War I. And how is his motivation discerned? From his choice of victim, 
and a crumpled piece of paper referencing a similar action. 
 
We have almost a century of hindsight by which to conceptualize and frame Czolgosz’s 
actions. We do not have this degree of detachment with which to judge Sonboly and his 
2017 peer group identified above, however by deconstructing their actions we can 
hopefully go some way to achieving this. 
 
Let us consider the evidence: 
 
 Sonboly chose to carry out his action on the anniversary of Breivik’s far 
right inspired attack. 
 Sonboly selected a young ethnically diverse group to send his hacked 
Facebook post to, and bring into the target area for his attack. 
 Sonboly altered his WhatsApp profile image to that of Breivik prior to the 
attack. 
 When challenged about his antecedents Sonboly shouted ‘I am German!’ 
 Sonboly suffered from mental illness so severe he had been hospitalized, 
and had ongoing issues with depression. 
 
When mirrored to Czolgosz’s accepted ‘evidence’ of anarchist involvement, the similar 
‘evidence’ of association to wider motivation of the part of Sonboly looks persuasive, 
but to what terrorist group is Sonboly aligning himself as a lone wolf? Doesn’t his own 
status as the son of Iranian refugees logically cut him off from alignment to the far 
right? There are direct parallels to the white non-Muslim IS supporting 17 year old from 
Rhondda Cynon Taff referenced above, who for reasons known only to himself has 
chosen this very odd alignment. It is in these considerations that we need to work in 
tandem with Lynch’s contention, i.e. we need to concentrate on the terrorist, not their 
chosen ‘brand’ of terrorism or their apparent illogical decisions on alignment.  
 
We are currently experiencing a world-wide alteration of individual and national world 
views. In line with the work of Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) the open source reporting 
of these incidences of lone wolf terrorism actions where there may have been reference 
to wider terrorist groups or ideologies, particularly the prevalence of pledges of 
allegiance to Islamic State shows no collaboration, in keeping with Becker’s definition 
above. The actors are instead acting independently through their choices, and their 
actions, based on rhetoric embedded in existing wider social movements they have 
chosen to embrace. 
 
It is the author’s contention that both Andrae and De Maiziere are wrong in their belief 
that the chant of ‘Allaua Akhbar’ is irrelevant, and that the actions of the axe wielding 
assailant are Amoklauf, actors running amok with no political motive. Such actors are 
expressing the ‘battle cry’ of their chosen vehicle to commit acts of terror and very 
explicitly stating their allegiance. 
 
Is Islamic State Really a 'Religious Terrorism’ Based Organization? 
 
Given the current prevalence of lone wolves displaying allegiance to IS it seems only 
proper to give this group, and its adherents, a further degree of consideration. The 
actions of Islamic State and its removed ‘lone wolf’ adherents are wholly political. The 
very name of the organization, which contains the term ‘State’, makes its political 
intentions of nation building clear. It spent it’s time governing areas of Syria and Iraq 
attempting, with limited success, to ‘nation build’, even if the nation it was attempting 
to build bore little resemblance to modern societies we know today. Simply put, the 
individuals carrying out attacks invoking how great their God is have not been 
consumed by Religious Fervour alone.  
 
The main draw is in fact an abstract ideal of a Caliphate, a utopia where they have come 
to believe they could hold in high regard. This all too easy to accept fantasy represents 
the lost golden age when the Middle and Near East were the prominent world powers. 
The decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire and the brutal regimes that followed held 
such nostalgia in check through their imposed personality cults, such as those of Sadat, 
Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein and the Assad hegemony. As these have ebbed, or been 
destroyed, by the interventions of the west or the Arab spring the natural counter 
narrative from history of the Caliphate has risen, through its adoption by Islamic State 
to be the dominant political agenda at the razors edge of thought for actors from or with 
ties and sympathies towards those in the region.   
 
The actors we have seen, like the anarchists, likely do not properly understand the geo 
politics of their actions, and certainly not the religion they purport to be acting on behalf 
of. But they do understand they are aligning themselves to a radical movement, atoning 
(perversely) for past misdeeds or casting themselves as heroes, a status they would 
never attain legitimately in the societies where they reside. 
 
We cannot escape the ties to Islam that exist, as there has been no separation between 
faith and state as occurred hundreds of years ago in the West, but instead see this 
relationship and narrative as a serious ancillary issue to the main goal sought. Such a 
focus brings into stark relief the difference between the vast majority of Western 
Muslims and these extremists. While the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the 
west simply want to live in the societies they call home while observing their religion, 
the extremists seek significant political change, using their association to religion as a 
convenient explanation and excuse for their actions. The association to Islam provides 
a supposed higher purpose, and one that suffer from mental health issues or other 
extreme self-esteem problems seem to find all too easy to immerse themselves within. 
 
If we accept this is the case then surely it is not a major intellectual hurdle to be 
overcome in applying the term ‘Caliphites’ to these terrorists we face. This seems far 
more appropriate than ‘Radical Islamists’.  
 
Lone Wolf Driving Factors – Individualised Terrorism 
 
The same factors for the ‘Caliphites’ apply equally to those on the far right and left as 
we have identified above. The list of attackers from 2017 does not include well-adjusted 
successful individuals who are functioning without difficulty in western societies. It is 
a collection of those on the fringes, those who through their own actions, mental health 
or circumstances as the very small number of refugees who cannot adapt find 
themselves excluded from mainstream society.  
 
Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) reference the myriad of factors that drive independent 
actors including way of thinking, rationale, motivation, but also psychology, social 
factors, political opportunities, existential attractions, and plain old excitement. They 
note in respect of Breivik that “his ideology, world view, and narratives emerged from 
a large, sometimes radical, and relatively new anti-Islamic social movement. It is thus 
impossible to understand the Norwegian terrorist attacks without seeing how their 
rationale was embedded in anti-Islamic rhetoric.” (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014, pp. 
772) Lone wolf terrorism had previously been seen as exception to social movement 
theory. In common with many recent academic authors the evidence presented in this 
chapter tends to suggest this classification as incorrect. Instead it appears agreement 
with Kaplan et al. is more warranted, when they write that “lone wolves, however lonely 
they seem to be, are much part of a larger community of likeminded actors” (Kaplan, 
Loow & Malkkie, 2014, pp. 4). For Kaplan et al. the internet is a key enabler in driving 
these individuals to develop their ideas into action, through interaction with likeminded 
individuals they have no direct contact with. Aiken (2016) captures this well in 
describing individual’s online presences as being bolder, less inhibited, and judgment 
impaired.  
 
Kaplan and Costa consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of New Tribalism, 
where adherents of terrorist groups members have common bonds of kinship or shared 
history/ideals and aim to establish a lost (or mythical) Golden Age. For Kaplan and 
Costa (2015) IS are exemplars of this phenomena, with their drive to re-establish the 
Caliphate. The bonds of kinship here and shared history/ideals do not need to be 
physical, as Speckhard illustrates with her interviews of jihadists showing a shared 
fictive kinship in defence of a global population of those ascribing to the Muslim faith 
(Speckhard, 2012).  
 
What more significant allegiance can a participant in the early 21st century internet age 
make than alter their profile image to that to the cause to which they ascribe? There is 
no obvious bitter irony in Sonboly’s choice of Breivik as his ‘face to the world’ being 
expressed through the WhatsApp messenger service. In line with the other evidence 
above it seems all to close, and perhaps far more telling, form of statement of common 
purpose than Crozgyn’s crumpled paper. In writing of Palestinian youths revolting 
against Israeli settlements Ehrenreich writes of one activist who has changed his 
Facebook profile picture to the roadway where 2 of his friends were shot dead by 
security forces. He is making a bold statement via the means available to him, social 
media, of his viewpoint (Ehrenreich, 2016). 
 
It is Naim (2013) who captures though that it is not the internet alone that is at work in 
driving radical behaviours. There are far wider societal changes at work, to which the 
internet is simply a contributory factor, to a degree a catalyst. The wider changes in 
society, which he describes as the ‘More and Mobility’ revolutions have had the effect 
of “vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to 
resources and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and 
inexpensively than ever before” (pp. 65). 
 
A former Al-Qaeda member, Jesse Morton, in considering the attraction of terrorism 
per se articulates the motivation of members as not being a reaction to foreign policy 
but instead “a pre-existing anger and animosity, whether it is to do with child abuse or 
trauma, a lack of integration and assimilation, or socio-economic grievances. The 
foreign policy grievance is simply something that allows them to release tensions held 
deep within them.” (Stanford, 2016, para 9). 
 
This observation ties in well with identified notions of extreme thrill seeking 
(Pazzanese, 2015). This is coupled to a form of (perverse) redemption for past-
perceived misdeeds, identified amongst contemporary terrorists (Watts, 2016), and 
again fits perfectly with Lynch’s contention of analysing the terrorist rather than their 
chosen cause.  
 
This is where Boris Johnson, UK Foreign Secretary, is actually completely right when 
he described Sonboly’s actions as part a ‘global phenomenon’ and asks the wholly 
legitimate questions ‘What is going on? How is the switch being thrown in the minds 
of these people?’ 
 
Naim perhaps captures this brilliantly is his conceptualization of the Mentality 
revolution, which encompasses the politics of the individual with a grievance. 
Individuals can now access twisted ideologies that were previously inaccessible, 
creating on many occasions a bespoke ideology tied to their own particular grievances 
and foibles. They may not fully understand this ideology, which explains the dichotomy 
around Sonboly’s allegiance and that of the 17 year old of Rhondda Cynon Taff, but 
can latch onto in ways never possible before. The significant societal changes Naim 
highlights echo the conditions that Burleigh describes as at work during the Anarchist 
wave, as illustrated above. For increased telegraphy, see perhaps the spread of the 
internet, in turn for successive newspaper cycles see the spread of live 24-hour news 
coverage on a plethora of platforms. 
 
The tie to mental health in respect of recent developments cannot be understated. It is 
estimated that approximately 30 percent of lone actors have mental health issues 
(Gardner, 2016). With Sonboly and Osborne (mentioned above who undertook the 
Finsbury Park Mosque attack) we have from open source reporting the extent of mental 
health difficulties experienced by these actors. The problem with properly assessing the 
scale of this aspects impact on terrorism is that the vast majority of incidents that would 
fit a lone wolf definition are not defined or prosecuted as acts of terrorism. Often, 
although not exclusively (Mair, the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox in 2016 being a 
prime example) this is due to attribution to the mental health of the perpetrator.  
 
Spaaij, writing in 2010 at a time when he saw no evidence of the lethality of lone wolf 
terrorism being on the increase, examined the cases of five lone wolf terrorists at length. 
He found they all suffered from a variable degree of social ineptitude, with 3 of the 5 
diagnosed with personality disorders and 4 of the 5 experiencing severe depression 
during their lives. He also noted that lone wolf terrorists create their own ideologies 
that combine personal frustration, and aversion with broader political, social, or 
religious aims.  
 
In the United Kingdom alone killings by those deemed to have mental health issues 
have climbed by 92 percent, with 423 people killed by mental health patients in the last 
7 years (Hudson, 2016). Fiona Petty (2016) describes killings by the mentally ill as an 
unintended consequence of more liberal mental health treatment regimes. In respect of 
terrorism and killings by those she describes as ‘lonely wolves,’ she sees such 
individuals as not having ‘slipped through the net’, but instead suggests that resources 
and treatment are so scarce that there is no net to slip through. Such self-evident truths 
are not, in her view, “popular or comfortable in western civilized society.” (Petty, 2016) 
In engaging with Islamic State and other radical viewpoints online “the lonely can find 
solace in internet sites offering self-esteem, a reason for living and above all rewards 
they can only dream of… our values and belief systems cannot understand this rationale 
but we need to stop bleating about their ideology being so abhorrent and tackle the issue 
that it has indeed been so successful” (Petty, 2016). 
 
Bhui et al. (2014) see a spiral at play here. Their ground-breaking study into depression 
and sympathy for violent protest and terrorism showed a direct correlation between 
weakened social cohesion, depression, and support for extreme views. It also identified 
a self-perpetuating pattern, with increased violence and terrorist acts leading to 
increased breakdown of social capital, depression, and higher sympathy for extreme 
acts.  
 
In December 2017 the Archbishop of Canterbury, the UK’s most senior clergyman, 
drew stark attention to this weakening social cohesion, stating that ‘We live in a country 
where an overarching story, which is the framework for explaining life, has more or 
less disappeared. We have a world of unguided and competing narratives, where the 
only common factor is the inviolability of personal choice, which means that…. 
Confidence in any personal sense of ultimate values has vanished’11 
                                                 
1 1  Oliv ia Rudgard, “Schools ‘fail to fight extremism’”, Sunday Telegraph, December 12 2017  
 
It is perhaps not surprising then that with a seismic shift in values that the most 
vulnerable in society are finding themselves seeking extreme ways in which to act out 
the unfettered viewpoints they have reached. Viewpoints that were until recent times 
the norm have been found to be wholly socially unacceptable.  
 
A good touchstone is perhaps the area of LGBT rights and politics. Felix Ngole, a post 
graduate social work student had placed posts on his personal Facebook account 
quoting biblical excerpts identifying homosexuality as sinful. He found himself off of 
his course, and losing a judicial appeal, when it was judged that he could hold these 
opinions in private but due to his intended profession was not allowed to express them 
in public (Grierson, 2017). By contract in the UK state funded Action for Trans Health, 
which has provided advice to parliamentary enquiries on transgender issues has called 
for the abolition of legal gender, and end to birth certificates and in respect of police 
participation in a Gay Pride event posted on its website that ‘the only good 10,000 cops 
is 10,000 dead cops’ (Gilligan, 2017). 
 
Without questioning in any way the efficacy of either point of view (and there are no 
doubt significant issues around such extreme views being tolerated) it is clear to see 
that the atmosphere for debate is charged, and that the role of the internet identified by 
Aikman is at play. When the mental health of those experiencing these extreme views 
is precarious it becomes easier to grasp how they can be easily tipped into ‘inspired’ 
terrorist action.  
 
This perhaps captures perfectly the situation in Houston, with the attempted statue 
destruction referenced above. The long deceased Lt. Dick Dowling had a street in 
Houston named after him, in addition to his statue. This was recently changed from 
Dowling to Emancipation Avenue. There is no middle ground in such a move; there is 
a wholly sharp move from one long established and apparently largely uncontested 
norm to a new, currently socially acceptable norm with no transition debate.  
 
Such radical changes (for right or wrong) were arguably at the root of the rioting in 
Charlottesville in 2017, which saw the far right and Antifa face off leaving one dead 
and many injured. It is not difficult to see how Schneck, in carrying out his action, 
became aligned to the wider now FBI terrorist designated Antifa goals of eradicating 
the countries perceived glorification of its Confederate past. 
 
In Norway the head of their national police force, Janne Kristiansen, acknowledged that 
even the Stasi in the surveillance heavy days of East Germany could have stopped 
Breivik (Meyer, 2013), there needs to be an acknowledgement that more needs to be 
done. In Denmark there has been a more ready acceptance of the influence of mental 
health over terrorism related behaviour, seeing the enhancement of an already 
established legislated police, social services and psychiatric (PSP) information sharing 
service (Sestoft et al. 2017). Here a descent into radicalization towards terrorist 
behaviour is seen and accepted as one more potential outcome of mental health 
difficulties. There is no taboo or bamboo wall separating services, and the mystique of 
‘terrorism’, that for many cloaks it in some special status, is removed. Once again, we 
are looking at the terrorist, not terrorism. There is nothing mysterious or glamorous 
about those in the 2017 list of lone wolf participants above.  
 
In acknowledging this, and ensuring there is legislated information sharing, the Danes 
are far ahead of many of their Western counterparts. This is far removed from the tactics 
of East Germany’s infamous Stasi, and far more like the actions of a supportive and 
sensible 21st century democracy acknowledging a new, reasonably low level threat, it 
faces. The Danes are working in tandem with the findings of Corner and Gill, whose 
study into lone wolf terrorists found clearly that ‘the empirical evidence suggests 
mental health professionals may have a role in preventing lone actor terrorist attacks’ 
(Corner and Gill, 2015, p. 10). 
 
The 2017 incidents above were carried out by those acting alone, rather than those who 
are acting in direct concert with others. An explanation of this can be found in Gardner’s 
noting of the observation from British Secret Service contacts that those suffering from 
mental health difficulties are likely to be screened out by established terrorist groups 
(Gardner, 2016). (It has been speculated on that similar screening may have been behind 
Oswald’s ejection from the USSR) The prevalence of those at liberty in Western 
societies suffering from often extreme mental illness, coupled to their obvious part in 
the incidents listed above cannot be dismissed. Mental illness is not a full explanation 
for the rise in lone wolf cases; however it has to be acknowledged as a contributory 
factor. Following Bhui et al.’s argument of a potential spiral at play it may become of 
ever-increasing relevance, particularly seen against the context of the increase in 
killings as a whole by those suffering mental health difficulties.  
 
This is not to say the influence of groups on individuals is a one-way street. “Death to 
traitors, freedom for Britain,” echoes of the phrases Thomas Mair shouted when 
appearing in court charged with murdering the British MP Jo Cox have appeared as tag 
lines on the Google listing for National Action, a (recently proscribed terrorist) 
organization in the United Kingdom (Gadher, 2016).  
 
This interrelationship between lone wolves and established groups should be seen as 
symbiotic. Lone wolves carry out acts linked, however indirectly to a terrorist groups 
cause and perhaps motivated by it, which the group then claims as its own and appeals 
for more similar lone actors to come forward. Terrorist groups may not have wanted a 
lone wolf as a member (should they ever have attempted to join, which many won’t 
have) but they appear only too keen to take kudos from their actions, no matter how 
indirect their role in inspiring them may have been. IS provides perfect illustration. 
 
Analogous to this, and a worrying herald of things to come, might just be the apparently 
senseless acts of an increasing number of youths in Palestine.  
 
“Something new was happening. Fully half of the alleged attackers killed in October 
(2016) were under twenty years old. All but one was under thirty…. Knowing that it 
would almost certainly mean their deaths, young Palestinians were acting alone or in 
pairs, striking out at Israeli soldiers with the limited means available to them: kitchen 
knives, scissors, screwdrivers. Sometimes they tried to hit them with cars….There 
existed no movement for them to join, armed or unarmed, no viable collective response 
to a situation….even the Israeli intelligence services admitted the attacks were 
spontaneous and uncoordinated” (Ehrenreich, 2016, pp. 364-365). 
 
One youth prior to their attack which left 2 dead posted on Facebook, “I ask that the 
political parties do not claim responsibility for my attack. My death was for my nation 
and not for you” (Ehrenreich, 2016, p. 365). 
 
The attacks are spontaneous, the attackers self-starters. They are making what they 
perceive to be rational choices to act based on the (grim) individual world view they 
have formed. And they are using social media as their means of proclaiming their 
driving rationale. 
 
Those on the fringes of our societies are acting, and it appears that those in these fringes 
are increasing. Significant difficulties with lone wolves may lie ahead, and the FBI’s 




The neighbour of the Sonboly family said after the attack said ‘This could happen 
anywhere.’ 12 From the examples above they appear to be right. Part of preserving 
societies in the face of terrorism though involves preserving what your core principles 
are, in defying the actions that are trying to change the function of your society to the 
extreme viewpoint of the terrorist. Consequently, Janne Kristiansen was right in the 
aftermath of Breivik’s attack to caution against any move towards an Orwellian 
surveillance society to counter the threat faced, which although alarming is a far way 
removed from an existential threat to the continued functioning of western democracies. 
The lone wolves, despite their media impact, remain small in number. So too do 
individuals such as Paddock, the Las Vegas shooter. However while the actions of 
Paddock are an apparently inexplicable aberration in modern western society those 
acting in a similar vein inspired by terrorism are not. Paddock’s actions are not part of 
a wider cause, contributing to an extreme political outlook’s influence and notoriety. 
The actions of the lone wolves outlined above no doubt are. The fact that we are still 
referencing the unaligned and generally unconnected anarchists today, a hundred years 
after the height of their terror, is testament to this.  
 
Acknowledging that society has changed dramatically, and that those on its fringes 
(particularly whose with mental health issues) are having difficulty in accepting new 
norms and are part of a ‘blowback’, however questionable their understanding of their 
role, would be a massive step forward. When they see a terrorist cause, and can read of 
its beliefs and actions it is not difficult to conceptualize how they can see alignment as 
in some way beneficial, as a means to escape the marginalization they find themselves 
within. Their individualised ‘enrolment’ provides them with Kaplan’s ‘fictive kinship’, 
a membership of elite they could not otherwise obtain. The fact that they will see the 
actions of other similar lone wolves lionized by groups, as is the current situation, can 
only enhance this symbiotic relationship. 
 
Denmark, with its PSP approach seems to have embraced this necessary 
acknowledgement through legislated inter agency co-operations between law 
enforcement, social work and psychiatry. This seems a very sensible step. 
 
                                                 
1 2  Janek Schmidt, “Munich shooting: killer was bullied teen loner obsessed with mass 
murder”, 2016 
The low tech tactics adopted by the lone wolf actors above illustrate that we cannot 
‘design out’ this problem. Kitchen knives are not going to become unavailable. The 
need is to address the circumstances that are giving rise to extreme action, rather than 
the extreme action that is being taken. Similarly, the utilization of social media by the 
lone wolves above, and their use of the internet to gain (some form) of insight to causes 
they align themselves to cannot be understated. We live with a variety of individuals 
who are being inspired to action by terrorism they see occurring, and the causes 
espoused, no matter whether the actor was the intended recipient of the ‘message’ being 
delivered to inspire or not. 
 
Authorities need to build some form of assessment around this. If an individual is 
utilizing the image of a terrorist as their face to the world, as Sonboly did soon after 
visiting the sight of mass shootings as a tourist, we need to be in a position to react and 
question such activity. The ‘How’ of these remains to be seen, however the problem 
needs to be addressed. If we apply a 20th century analogy, were a resident of a western 
city last century to have put a poster of a known terrorist in their front window there is 
little doubt the police would have started to ask questions of this. Is a profile picture on 
social media today so different? 
 
IS remains the biggest current inspiration for lone wolf actors. The adoption of 
‘Caliphites’ proposed above may not capture every nuance of the goals of IS inspired 
terrorists, but the degree to which they understand their common goals (in tandem with 
their anarchist predecessors) is questionable. The use of ‘Caliphites’ provides the ability 
for all to draw a clear distinction between the enemy we face, and the peace loving 
Muslim populations at large, who simply want to live in their countries as they are, 
adhere to their religion, and exist in harmony with their neighbours. Our Muslim 
population face the current threat IS and it’s like pose as much as anyone else (as 
casualties at many incidents show), and it helps no one to continue to fail to draw clear 
lines of delineation. The ‘Caliphites’, like the Anarchists before them, seek radical 
political change through the establishment of Nations. Using this term would assist in 
identifying those who are aligned to the problem, as opposed to the general population 
at large.  
 
Recent political changes (Brexit, the election of President Trump, the ascendance of far 
right political parties in Austria, France, and the Netherlands) indicate an increase in 
populism across the Western world. The possibility of a backlash as the newly elected 
change policy direction, and introduce measures at odds with the consensus which has 
largely existed (for the West) since the end of the Cold War cannot be discounted. The 
likelihood of such a backlash sits well with Ekblom’s (2015) notion of co-evolutionary 
developments in terrorism, counter terrorism and the politics of the extreme, where 
significant change in direction by one party is atypically met by a counter reaction, 
sometimes more violent and impactive than that which it has been engendered by, from 
those in opposition. The LGBT situation outlined in this chapter perhaps captures this 
perfectly. 
 
Societies change, adapt and develop. This is how human interactions evolve. However, 
the more radical change the more radical the potential counter reactions the change may 
engender. Globalisation has led to unparalleled change for the modern western world. 
We live in an era of unforeseeable individual choice, and technological advancement 
where social media has become incredibly important – particularly although not 
exclusively to the young. If we do not look more closely at those on the fringes, those 
most reluctant or unable to embrace these changes, we are doomed to see an ever 
increasing individualised counter reaction until we do.  
 
  
Chapter 3 Case Study: Terrorism, 
Organised Crime and the Islamic State 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is formed from the publication “‘Criminalised’ Islamic State Veterans – A 
Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development?” (Gallagher, 2016) which 
illustrated the evidence of terrorist degradation and the potential dangers inherent in 





3.2 “‘Criminalised’ Islamic State Veterans – A Future 
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This article seeks to address the question of the probability of criminalised western 
Islamic State (IS) veterans returning from conflict in the Middle East and becoming 
involved again in serious crime in the west, with an enhanced skill set acquired during 
there IS participation. 
 
‘Islamic State’[1] is the latest evolution of Tawid wa al-Jihad, the group founded by 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that first came to prominence during the insurgency in Iraq 
following the US invasion of the country in 2003. It is a radical Islamist group currently 
in control of large swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria. Islamic State (IS) are 
widely acknowledged as a terrorist group, and have been designated as such by 
Governments across the West. They utilise mass execution, religious persecution and 
hostage taking to further their goals, in addition to a sophisticated propaganda machine 
serviced through use of the internet, and wider media. Their aim is the ongoing 
governance of a Caliphate, with a single religious and political leadership 
encompassing lands previously held under perceived similar governance into the late 
Middle Ages.  
 
The movement of actors from the West into this newly established ‘Caliphate’ as active 
participants in its activities is new, and follows the establishment of strong indigenous 
Muslim communities in the West, a consequence of the migration of peoples over the 
intervening centuries, particularly post the Second World War, to service the need for 
additional workers for low skilled jobs; an aspect that has seen population divergence 
far removed from western states of the medieval past. The actors who move between 
these worlds, the Muslim diaspora in the West and the self-styled ‘Caliphate’, those 
regarded as ‘radicalised’ toward jihad, and specifically those with a criminal 
background, are the subject of consideration in this article.  
 
A description of the Crime/Terror Nexus is provided with illustrative examples. The 
article then moves on to consider previous jihadist participants backgrounds, utilising 
Sageman’s wave position for theoretical context. The focus thereafter is on the largely 
Islamic State inspired ‘fourth wave’ of jihadi participants, and consideration of the 
veracity of the religious credentials sighted as the basis for the ‘call to action’ 
participants experience. The article then considers the potential implications to 
organised crime behaviours in origin countries should ‘jihadists’ with previous criminal 
experience return to their communities with an enhanced criminal ‘skill set’. This 
consideration is supported with the findings from a consultation conducted with a group 
of relevant recently retired professionals.  
 
The article concludes with analysis of the research outlined, and suggests practical 
policy considerations for the future.  
 
Terrorism and Organised Crime – Links and Similarities 
 
The period following the collapse of the Soviet Union saw the advent of the phenomena 
of ‘globalisation’ and the situation developing where for ‘a myriad (of) criminal, 
terrorist, or otherwise malevolent state actors… frontiers are irrelevant and 
governments are an increasingly ineffective hindrance that they attack, undermine, or 
ignore’. [2]  
 
These changes have led to increased opportunities for interaction between illegal actors 
and groups that were in many cases impossible previously, with ever increasing ease of 
transportation and communication assisting this process, coupled to terrorist groups 
embarking on increasing forays into criminal activity to self-finance.  
 
Examples of terrorism’s overall reliance on organised crime for finance has been made 
clear.  Examples of the, at times, symbiotic relationship include the Continuity IRA’s 
relationship with Eastern European sex traffickers, [3]; ETA at one time ensuring the 
lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through 
contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania 
organised crime cartels [4].; and Hezbollah’s use of Mexican Drug Cartel’s smuggling 
routes [5]. 
 
The strikingly similar operating structures of terrorist and organised crime groups have 
previously been noted by both Robinson [6] and Asal et. al. [7], who found that 
organised international drug traffickers have much in common with modern terrorist 
groups. The membership of groups operating within both phenomena is highly 
compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes to 
adapt to altered circumstances beyond their control.  They will also be opportunistic, 
and seek out new connections for benefits beyond the immediate goals of their groups.  
 
In terms of definition Bovenkerek and Chakra [8] caution that the phenomena of 
terrorism and organised crime are very distinct, accepting that although structural 
similarities are obvious, the ever important distinctions of their criminal purpose of 
organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of terrorism are important 
distinction to maintain.  
 
On an intellectual level terrorism and organised crime have previously been perceived 
as having little in common ‘since the former is based on ideological, religious or 
political principles, while the latter on profit motives’ [9].  
 
Jamieson [10] agrees that both phenomena need to be seen as distinct concepts, while 
the authors acknowledge that either phenomenon can utilise the methods and tactics of 
the other, and do. For Madsen, in analysing groups it is important to remain focussed 
on motivation, as ‘the intent for specific acts committed by two groups might overlap, 
their motivations do not’ [11]. As Dishman also observes, ‘simply put, drug barons and 
revolutionary leaders do not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit 
kidnappings or extort local businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or 
alter the political landscape in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may 
also employ terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution 
and make money’ [12]. 
 
Makarenko’s crime terror continuum model [13], is the cornerstone of research into the 
relationship between terrorism and organised crime, and challenges the clear 
distinctions between the phenomena that many others make. She sees the relationship 
between the two as far more nuanced, and transitory.  
 
The phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving 
down this line when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a ‘black 
hole’, where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but 
instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a 
group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the 
other phenomena.  
 
Example of this are terrorist groups such as FARC and the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA), who have increasingly became involved in criminal activity, initially to 
fund their cause however as circumstances altered they mutated into post-terrorism 
organisations, who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit [14]. 
These organisations have fallen into Makarenko’s ‘black hole’, becoming mutated 
organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both 
phenomena. Excellent examples of organised crime’s move to the use of terror tactics 
for political are the earlier mentioned Camorra adoption of the bombing tactics of the 
ELN, and the ‘Red Commando’ of Brazil embracing terror tactics purportedly 
supported by radical socialist ideology in furtherance of illicit gain  [15].  
 
In terms of movement from conflict to criminality Glenny [16] noted the number of 
veterans of the Balkan conflicts who fill the upper echelons of Eastern European 
organised crime. Similarly McDermott [17] writes of the very same phenomena 
following the disbandment of the paramilitary United Self Defence Force of Colombia 
(AUC), while Naim sights the similar transformation of members of the Mexican 
military into the Zetas narco-traffickers [18]. These authors all note how each 
organisations member’s skill sets, honed through brutal conflict, lent themselves 
particularly well to the management of all that is illicit. 
 
Organised Criminal involvement with AQ 
 
To understand the current level of criminal co-operation IS are undertaking it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of the recent history of ‘Jihadi Terrorism’. Marc 
Sageman [19] provides a narrative on events, supported by an academic model drawing 
on David Rappaport’s seminal ‘Four Waves of Terrorism’ theoretical framework [20], 
where he identifies similar waves of Jihadi terrorist involvement.  
 
The ‘inspirational’ first wave, who brought the cause of a world view of an international 
oppressed Muslim community to the fore were the religiously inspired foreigners drawn 
to join Mujahedeen and participate or assist in the conflict in Afghanistan following the 
invasion by the Soviet Union. This wave includes the original members of Al-Qaeda, 
such as Osama Bin Laden.  
 
The second wave was constituted by ‘elite’ Middle Eastern origin expatriates who 
attended Western Universities and then, following contact with first wave members and 
supporters, became involved in the conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir; 
or self-staring operations such as 9/11. 
 
Sageman’s previously identified that these ‘members of the global Salafi jihad were 
generally middle class, educated young men from caring and religious families’, the 
large majority were married, many with children and no ‘hardened’ criminals detected 
amongst their ranks; and few with connections to petty crime. [21]. 
 
Good examples of such wave participants, beyond Mohammed Attah and the 9/11 
conspirators, are for instance the ‘Glasgow Airport’ attackers, Khafeel Ahmed who was 
a PhD educated Engineer, while Bilal Abdullah was a Medical Doctor. Both Ahmed 
and Abdullah had travelled to the west, been educated and lived in the UK without 
obvious issue. 
 
The ‘third wave’ of home grown Jihadists emerged in the wake of the Iraq War and 
were largely sought out by a variety of ‘inspirers’ to encourage participation. Richard 
Reed, the infamous failed ‘shoe bomber’ serves as a good example. Reed is perhaps the 
archetypal criminal convert to Islam of this period (he served three years in prison for 
a string of burglaries prior to conversion) [22], recruited and utilised by Jihadist 
leadership. Reed is of a very different background to the self-starters of the second 
wave.  
 
Police opinion in respect of these ‘third wave’ jihadists like Reed was that although a 
small proportion had a background in minor criminality, such ties were quickly cut by 
participants, and seen as to be expunged from their sphere of social interactions [23]. 
 
This is not to say Al Qaeda and its contemporaries did not participate in criminal 
activities, at this time nor have (ex) criminals amongst their ranks. They did. There are 
many examples of participation in criminality. On the international scale, when Al 
Qaeda’s front organisations they channelled donations from wealthy supporters through 
were designated by international bodies as financiers of terrorism they became involved 
with international drug dealing networks [24]. At the operational level South African 
organised crime groups are known to have supplied forged documents to Al Qaeda 
members [25]. 
 
However, following Makarenko’s scale, being a terrorist who utilises criminality to 
further their political ends (point 2) is far removed from being a terrorist who embraces 
crime for their own gain (point 4).  
 
The recruitment of Reed, and similar individuals [26], showed perhaps a dilution of the 
requirements and expectations for participation in the struggle. The need or expectation 
of a solid understanding of the religious authorised drivers was waning, and while the 
rhetoric of the call to conflict continued to contain the semblance of that which had 
inspired the mujahedeen of the first wave, the depth of understanding amongst those 
taking up arms was reducing.  
 
Of particular note in relation to these three ‘waves’ is that after each there is a noticeable 
decline of ‘religiosity’ of the participants. As ‘jihadist terrorism’ the level of individual 
religious scholarship and background amongst participants has decreased. This is a 
development not missed by the analysts of  Europol [27], who see the current situation 
as being perhaps best described as an ‘extremist social trend’ rather than ‘radicalisation’ 
in terms of the involvement of Islam as a motivating factor.  
 
‘The Fourth Wave’ – The ‘Criminal’ Jihadists 
 
Those now becoming involved in jihadist activities have backgrounds far removed from 
the ‘pioneers’ of Al Qaeda. The largely ‘middle class/ intellectual’ credentials of 
‘second wave’ jihadists have been replaced with recruits drawn from “immigrant gangs 
(that mix) jihadism with gangsta criminality” [28]. Van San’s (2015) study of 35 
Belgian and Dutch foreign fighters for IS found that half were converts to Islam, all 
aged between 18 and 30, and none holding a University education [29]. 
 
Similarly to the breeding ground for organised crime described above, Sageman has 
found that ‘in relation to modern terrorism, expatriate communities are the recruiting 
ground of the current jihad against the west, the influence of friendship, kinship, shared 
isolation through expatriate experience has led to ‘seventy percent of the terrorists 
join(ing) the jihad as expatriates’ [30]. 
 
In extending Sageman’s model, Rik Coolsaet [31] sees the ‘fourth wave’ of the jihad 
as being upon us and consisting of those who are reacting to the success of the 
establishment of Islamic State, with the ‘third wave’’ reaction to the post Iraq war 
conflict having now largely run its course.  
 
Belgian Anti-terrorist Police Superintendent Alain Grignard sums up the current 
situation as that “previously we were mostly dealing with ‘radical islamists’ – 
individuals radicalized toward violence by extremist interpretation of Islam – but now 
we’re increasingly dealing with what are best described as ‘Islamized Radicals’” [32].  
 
Indeed, Watts illustrates this well noting that “ISIS has turned al Qaeda’s recruitment 
pattern on its head- to spectacular effect…. Unlike al Qaeda, which heavily screened 
members to weed out potential spies or those with criminal pasts ISIS, at least at its 
height in 2015, took in any foreigners that volunteers, giving the disenfranchised a new 
home, purpose and direction.” [33] 
 
Such a situation is summed up in a manner that might be regarded as comic were its 
context not so serious, in the behaviour of jihadists Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed 
Ahmed who purchased copies of ‘Islam for Dummies’ and ‘The Koran for Dummies’ 
before their departure to Syria to join an al-Qaeda off shoot in Syria in 2013 [34]. They 
had returned to the UK from their ‘adventure’ by the following year, and are now both 
serving 13 year prison sentences. 
 
French anti-terrorism Judge Marc Trevidic illustrates the profile of ‘fourth wave’ 
participants as consisting of ‘ninety percent… who leave do it for personal reasons: 
they are looking for a fight, or for adventure, or revenge, because they do not fit in 
society...Religion is not the engine of this movement and that’s precisely its 
strength.’[35]. 
 
In drilling into this ‘ninety percent’ A UK Special Branch source was recently quoted 
as stating that ‘the so-called jihad in Iraq and Syria has been particularly inviting to 
some young British Muslims who are already involved in violent crime in this country’ 
[36], with Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley explicitly stating 
that IS are seeking to recruit from criminal elements [37], and that ‘young people who 
were getting drawn into gang crime, particularly those with troubled histories, are now 
turning to (IS)’ [38]. Such a path, in a case of petty criminal behaviour, was that taken 
by Mashdur Choudhury a petty fraudster who travelled to Syria with friends from 
Portsmouth to join IS [39] and Jafar Turay, wanted ex-gang member of Willesden, 
north-west London who remains in Syria [40]. It is also a path followed by Ebrahim B. 
(so named under German privacy laws), a member of IS, who in considering his 
reasoning for membership stated that ‘If I had been picked up by a rocker gang in 
Jamaica of by Hell’s Angels in America or something, I would have gone along with 
it.’ [41] and Abdelhamid Abaaoud, presumed leader of the French and Belgian IS 
inspired attacks of 2015, who described himself as a ‘Terrorism Tourist’ with selfies 
taken of his activities on his mobile phone [42]. 
 
Enrolment in IS by westernised, disaffected and disillusioned Muslim diaspora youth 
fits very well with the new paradigm of the ‘More, Mentality and Mobility’ revolution 
identified by Moises Naim [43], and the loose and fragile transmission of ideology, 
methods and allegiances that he has identified as at large across globalised modern 
societies.  
 
There is much individualised ‘enrolment’ for those in the West, where they seek 
involvement through largely self, or small peer group, ‘concept’ immersion, rather than 
cultural involvement. The equivalent of Bloody Sunday, oft seen as PIRAs most 
effective recruiting sergeant, is not happening on the doorstep of western diaspora 
Muslim youths, and generally those around them are far removed from the 
consequences of the wars currently engulfing the Middle East. Their immersion in this 
conflict comes from some through their associations, be these friends or family, but for 
others the evening news, from their viewing of YouTube videos and Facebook posts 
such as the coverage of the violence inflicted on Sunni protestors at Hawijah in 2013 
[44]; and ultimately perhaps from an imam’s pronouncements sympathetic to the 
jihadist cause at a mosque they may attend, or from the attentions of ‘influencers’ such 
as Zhalid Zerkani [45] in Belgium or Edis Bosnic [46] in Bosnia, who seek to identify 
and guide the curious towards IS participation .  
 
Weggemans, Bakker and Grol [47] note the particular speed five Dutch individuals in 
their study of the radicalisation phenomena appeared to move from ‘normal’ to 
‘radicalised’, and form their intention to participate in jihad. The biographies of the 
youths show a background in petty crime, with participants from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds across a number of what could reasonably be regarded as ‘bad 
neighbourhoods’. This same factor is noted by Higgins [48], when he writes the two 
dozen young men who have gone to fight for IS from the ‘grimy’ Molebeek district of 
Brussels, where there were blurred lines between criminality and jihadi violence, 
directly echoing Sageman’s findings discussed above.  
 
Consequently, in the case of those radicalised in such a manner, it would perhaps be 
more appropriate to consider a variant of Makarenko’s scale, applied on an individual 
basis, rather than looking at group dynamics. That is, seeing the journey towards 
terrorism of those edging toward it at a physical distance from the conflict as a personal 
rather than cultural conceptual path, or as individualised on the part of IS ‘recruiters’, 
where they specifically target individuals with such backgrounds.  
 
There are good examples such consideration. One individual who embarked on a 
personal journey to IS was Aine Davis, who went from being a London drug dealer to 
a Syrian based jihadist, “like dozens of others” [49]. Davis had access to criminal 
firearms and drug supply networks in the UK, as his previous convictions show.  Then 
we have Suhaib Majeed, provided online ‘tuition’ via the internet by IS members in 
Syria to conduct action in the UK , supported by converts to Islam, Nathan Cuffey and 
Nyall Hamlett, who were able to utilise their network to obtain a number of firearms to 
mount operations [50]. 
 
The motivation for such individuals wanting to join IS remains to be considered. Jurgen 
Todenhofer, who famously travelled the Islamic State and has seen the ‘governance’ 
conducted by IS first hand, perhaps captures this perfectly in his observation that “they 
(foreign fighters for IS) are people who were unimportant in the West and now told 
they are in an apocalyptic last battle between good and evil – heroes in Nike trainers 
and Jack Wolfskin boots…posing with their brutality and talking openly and proudly 
about a religious cleansing if they had the power.” [51]  
 
This observation ties in well with notions of extreme thrill seeking [52] coupled to a 
form of (perverse) redemption for past perceived misdeeds, and the ability to create a 
new identity at odds with that they held in the west [53]. While many Islamic State 
volunteers appear motivated by a desire to combat the Assad Regime’s brutality or a 
desire to participate on theological grounds, there are many IS defectors who have gone 
as far as articulating their motivations as material gain and adventure [54], their past 
criminality demonstrating “a predisposition for nefarious activity and violent conduct 
prior to heading out for jihad in Syria and Iraq.” [55] 
 
Opinion on the Effects of IS Participation 
 
Current publicly articulated western Government and security thinking is largely 
focussed on the consequences of Davis and his ilk returning to the UK and committing 
acts of terrorism, rather than considerations of their possible re-integration in an 
‘enhanced manner’ to the world of crime. 
 
Returning to the work of Weggemans, et al. radicalisation in respect of the current 
Syrian jihad appears to be very quick and unusually so in terms of past transformations 
of those who become involved in international terrorism. The question inevitably 
presents as to whether the desire to participate, when confronted with the harsh realities 
of conflict, will wear off just as quick as it arose?  
 
The act of joining with IS will mean that on their return to their country of origin 
participants will, if detected, be incarcerated, the recent imprisonment of the brothers 
Hamza and Mohommod Nawaz who returned from Syria [56] serving as an telling 
example.  
 
The imprisoned, or those who return and escape detention (but are likely to be ever 
mindful of the possibility of detection), are hardly likely to find themselves enticing 
prospects for employers, with a previous background in criminality already serving as 
a dissuading factor. Their participation in jihad will stay with them, and other than those 
with funds and sympathy for their cause, or a few charitable institutions that may assist 
prospects look bleak. So, what could a former drug dealer possibly do with their new 
found skills in the use of firearms and explosives, coupled with experience of the 
management of illicit commodity routes, possibly do to earn a crust? The answer, of a 
return to crime with a potentially ‘enhanced’ reputation and relevant skill set, when 
framed thus, does appear a logical proposition. This is not to say that all those who were 
involved in criminality and have embarked on jihad will return as enhanced organised 
criminals. Many will no doubt likely try to support their cause through more peaceful 
means, some may embark on terrorism in their home state, such as Khalid and Ibrahim 
el-Bakraoi, both former armed robbers prior to their involvement with IS who 
participated in the Belgian terror attacks of March 2016 [57] some may slip into 
obscurity; however, it does seem glaringly obvious that the possibility exists that some, 
if not a lot, of returning ex organised criminals will return to their previous peccadillo.  
 
These motivations are likely, in some part similar to that of the earlier mentioned Reed. 
What differs is that Reed was, at the time, unusual. His background is now strikingly 
similar to the plethora of IS foreign recruits. It is perhaps best then to view that what 
has changed between Al Qaeda and IS is quite simply that there has been progress, that 
IS have learned from the efforts of Al Qaeda and developed the areas where they 
experienced success, with the ‘fourth wave’ seeing the targeting and embracing of those 
with dubious backgrounds in criminality. The recruitment of those with a criminal past, 
whatever their current motivation, appears to be succeeding for them so far.  
 
Testing hypotheses in respect of IS members is an extremely difficult endeavour. IS, 
by their nature, do not present an easy subject for academic enquiry and, for obvious 
operational reasons, law enforcement and security bodies are inevitably reluctant to 
share intelligence they hold. 
 
Expert Opinion on IS Veteran Criminality 
 
To provide a starting point of credible opinion on potential behaviours eight recently 
retired senior detectives and two senior analytical staff who had recently left the field 
of law enforcement, all with a background in the investigation of organised crime and 
many with a shared background in counter terrorism, were consulted through a 
questionnaire, distributed via email [58]. The aim of this consultation was to gather 
their views on organised criminals engagement and relationship with IS.  
 
Contact with respondents no longer working in the field avoided a host of issues in 
terms of confidentiality of operationally sensitive information, however their recent 
employment ensured that their views could be regarded as a credible source of expert 
opinion. While engagement with those involved in organised crime may have proved 
extremely illuminating in terms of the potential impact of Islamic State veterans such a 
piece of research was deemed beyond the scope of this initial article considering the 
phenomena. Further work in this regard would no doubt be merited. 
 
The respondents presented significant comment of note. 
 
They were divided on whether individuals with a background in organised crime would 
become involved in criminal activity should they travel to join IS in the Middle East, 
with six believing they would. Respondent QH was keen to point out that crimes 
committed would be to the benefit of IS as opposed to being for personal gain due to 
personal danger, while respondent QE disagreeing believing that organised criminals 
who travel would likely continue to exploit opportunities for personal gain.  
 
Of the six respondents who believed that organised criminals would remain involved 
in criminal activity while with IS all believed they would seek to expand their criminal 
networks. Respondent QA cited “recent conflicts in the Balkans, Chechnya and 
Afghanistan prov(ing) this case” and respondent QD pointing out that such behaviour 
will be in IS interests to ensure the maintenance of their funding streams. Respondent 
QC believes that “the associated risk here is high. I would anticipate those engaging in 
other criminality e.g. human trafficking/ black market firearms, will establish criminal 
networks particularly to assist with smuggling routes back to the UK and other EU 
markets.” 
 
Seven respondents thought it likely that individuals with an organised criminality 
background would become disillusioned with IS activities, with a number of 
respondents sighting such individual’s almost intrinsic desire for personal gain being 
over ridden by the need to fund IS activities and frustrations this will ultimately 
engender.  
 
Eight respondents believed that if an organised criminal travelled to the Middle East to 
become involved in IS activity and later returned to their country of origin they would 
return to organised criminal activity. The respondents were particularly clear on this, 
using terms of either ‘highly likely’ or ‘inevitable’ to describe their belief in this regard.  
 
The 10 respondents were unanimous that exposure to IS activity in the Middle East 
would make an organised criminal a more dangerous individual on return to their 
country of origin. In particular QB believed “there would be a tendency to be more 
violent, ruthless and confident”; QC was of the opinion they “may use their ‘skills’ and 
new contacts to further (their) criminal career; QD thought that “their drive, 
determination to succeed and levels of violence will increase”; QE provided that “If 
working with IS has been successful and profitable they are very likely to maintain 
those links and build upon their successes on their return; QF sees such individuals as 
being “enhanced by new contacts, associates and knowledge of commodities, routes 
and opportunities”; QG believes that such individuals will be ‘more robust, more 
resilient and more ruthless”; and QH stated that “As well as being more ruthless (they 
will be) more surveillance aware and will have the ability to construct weapons and 
firearms. They will also be more adept at making themselves less subject to intelligence 
development. In short they will be more dangerous and effective”.  
 
Seven respondents saw returning organised criminals reputation, and those of any 
organised crime groups, as likely to be significantly affected by their IS participation. 
Notoriety, criminal kudos and the general ‘connectedness’ of the individual were all 
thought to be likely to enhanced with the intimidatory qualities of groups containing 
such individuals as members increased significantly.  
 
Participant QB did caution that Organised Crime Group (OCG’s) may be very wary of 
any adverse attention and/or publicity returnees may bring and QE pointed out that the 
standing of such an OCG would likely suffer in the eyes of the general public.  
 
Participant QG pointed out that although their standing may rise in their OCG those 
with whom they ‘trade’ may view groups with such members as “highly dangerous, 
highly unpredictable and not to be trusted….(with) their motivation towards power and 
wealth (being) replaced by motivation to terrorist aims”.  
 
In concluding their thoughts on the subject participant QI provided the following “I 
would be very surprised if established (my italics) organised criminals left their 
lucrative business to sign up to fight for their cause. That’s not to say they wouldn’t but 




The founder of IS, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a career criminal with no theological 
training [59]. It is perhaps unsurprising that the organisation has sought to capitalise 
from the outset on the skills a background in criminality brings.  
 
The views of the respondents above are supported by similar previous research, and as 
Pantucci and Dawson [60] note in relation to returning IS veterans with a criminal past 
their access to networks will make obtaining weapons far easier. The worsening 
involvement in organised crime of those individuals involved with IS who lose their 
thirst for the ‘cause’ appears a real, and all too dangerous, possibility.  
 
Not only will such returning ex-jihadists likely have access to international criminal 
networks beyond their previous reach, their experiences will have led to enhancement, 
in terms of their contacts, methodology, reach and, very importantly, a major 
commodity for all involved in organised crime, their reputation [61]. 
 
The new contacts and methods criminals embarking as ‘would be’ jihadis encounter 
commence even before they reach Syria. Men like Mohammed Abu Mustafa have been 
smuggling goods from Turkey into Syria for years; now his commodity, and that of his 
peers, is people [62]. Mustafa is one of the many organised criminals operating on the 
Turkish/ Syrian border involved is getting IS’s new recruits in theatre; and to these 
recruits he is an obvious link into serious criminality. Mustafa’s embracing of multi 
commodity endeavour, his branching out into people smuggling, is nothing new. A 
good parallel example of such criminal entrepreneurship being that following the 
Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 many Hong Kong based organised criminals 
happily got involved in smuggling dissidents out of mainland China, rather than their 
usual trade in more standard illicit commodities [63].  
 
It is a given that the trade of Mustafa and his ilk can flow both ways across borders, and 
that commodity traffickers can move people, weapons or goods with likely equal skill. 
Contact with men such as him could prove an invaluable starting point for disillusioned 
IS participants seeking new friends with whom to enhance their previous illicit 
networks.  
Movement through Turkey, the international hub for the Heroin trade [64] will no doubt 
present many tempting opportunities and future networks for exploration to these 
perhaps reluctant jihadists whether with Mustafa, or his peers. Such networks, and the 
knowledge of how to utilise them, will be part of the enhanced skill set. 
The work of Gill et al. [65] on PIRA is of particular note for potential comparison 
purposes with IS development. They found that while one would expect PIRA members 
to have close associations going forward with those they were in close geographic 
proximity to, this was not the case. It was shared skill sets that led to continuing and 
ongoing associations across terrorist cells. That is, those involved with drugs or 
kidnapping associated with others involved in similar crimes, rather than where 
associations through proximity would be expected. Were this to be repeated in terms of 
IS participants an enhanced skill set of criminality and new ‘contacts in these fields 
present significant potential areas for concern, with a massive risk of new crime 
networks or enhancement of those that currently exist as the new skills and actors are 
introduced.  Perhaps a telling example of this type of behaviour to provide illustration 
would be to remain with PIRA and look to their ‘franchising’ of bomb making skills to 
the FARC, post the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland [66].  
 
Participation as a jihadist, whether an individual turns their back on the cause or not, 
provides an individual with enhancement to one commodity massively important in the 
circles of organised crime; as stated above, that of their reputation. 
 
The benefits are twofold. Mustafa, the people trafficker referenced above, and his 
compatriots, will have little to fear in terms of law enforcement entrapment through 
trading with jihadists, repenting or otherwise. They will be safe in the knowledge that 
no law enforcement body is going to allow their agents to be involved in the extreme 
behaviours of IS, and so in trading with an individual who has been involved in such 
the typical need for ‘referencing’, where criminals keenly establish the bona fides of 
their business partners before engagement, becomes redundant.  
 
The second benefit comes in terms of the ‘kudos’ in the right circles of having 
participated in IS’s jihad. Criminals thrive on their reputational enhancement achieved 
through association with notoriety, James “Whitey” Bulger a Boston based organised 
criminal and long-time associate of PIRA being a prime example [67]. Those known as 
decapitators and to have been involved in kidnappings where millions are extorted from 
national Governments [68] will no doubt be respected and feared in organised criminal 
circles should they return, in tandem with views previously expressed by senior 
detectives in relation to ‘terrorist kudos’ [69].  
 
The cachet of association with a group such as IS in these circles is clear. The recent 
claims of affiliation to IS by a German kidnapper and ‘Lizard Squad’ [70], a notorious 
hackers group involved in denial of service attacks, illustrate this perfectly. When one 
appreciates the consternation and concern these hackers have caused by their claimed 
association, it is not difficult at all to extrapolate this into the actual level of fear and 
respect known  association to a group such as this will induce in the relatively closed 
circles of the world organised criminals operate within. This applies equally between 
an individual who had participated in IS being part of an organised crime group and his 
relationship with its other members; along with the cachet a group having such 
members would experience amongst other organised crime groups who it interacted 
with, or were indeed its rivals. Fear is a common currency amongst those involved in 
organised crime; fear of retribution for welching on a deal or ripping associates off over 
an illicit deal often prevents such occurring and extreme violence is employed when 
necessary to maintain this level of intimidation [71]. The ‘fear’ of participants that 
would result from participation in the more extreme elements of IS behaviours is not 
difficult to imagine. This is not in any way to say that those currently involved in 
organised crime and shrinking violets when it comes to extreme violence. Instead, the 
potential participation of IS veterans simply brings a new dynamic to an already 




The comments from AC Rowley of the Metropolitan Police Service, and those of a 
Special Branch source of the targeting of criminals by IS chime well with the research 
of Sageman and Perri, that participants are typically drawn from the same Diaspora 
communities. Their views are supported by the Weggemans et al study, the findings of 
Higgins, and a number of cases, that of Aine Davis being a prime example.  
 
The majority of the questionnaire participants believe, as do I on the basis of the 
research presented, that organised criminals recruited from the West to participate in 
the IS jihad will become involved in criminality while in the Middle East.  
 
The views of participant QA in respect of post conflict criminal activity echo the 
referenced findings of Glenny, McDermott and Naim, in that the participants in a 
violent struggle who support this through criminal activity have a strong propensity to 
continue the criminal activity once the struggle is over. The ‘transferable skills’ make 
this transition seem extremely plausible.  
 
The participant’s views also chime with those of Draper in terms of likely OCG 
participant disillusionment. Accepting that it at the time of writing it does not appear 
an easy proposition to ‘resign’ from IS such may well become a possibility as the 
conflict enters new phases and departure from the conflict zone may accelerate 
considerably should the offensive against IS prove successful.  
 
The unanimous view amongst the experts of the increased danger potential returnees 
present should not in any way be overlooked. This observation, coupled with the 
outlined research, is perhaps the most important point raised in this article. Returning 
OCG members will likely have far greater skills and capacities that whence they left, 
and this may present serious future challenges to western law enforcement agencies.  
 
I find myself in agreement with participant QI that it is likely that it will be OCG ‘foot 
soldiers’ who find themselves seduced by the lure of IS. I do not however think that 
this in any way mitigates the potential risk these individuals may pose in future. If one 
accepts that it is the young OCG members travelling (and returning) these individuals 
will likely have long criminal careers ahead, careers very different in terms of reach 
and capability from those of the fellow OCG members they left behind. These 
individuals will be returning with enhanced reputations in criminal circles, knowledge 
of international illicit distribution networks and tradecraft tested in the crucible of 
intense conflict. It may well be the case as participant QG points out that other 
indigenous OCGs may be wary of these returnees. From the research presented they 
likely would have good cause to be so, but this may well not be enough not to ‘do 
business’.  
 
It may be a number of years before it becomes clear if these IS veterans will indeed 
become re-involved in organised criminality; what appears clear though is that the 
potential seems very likely and the implications may be significant. 
 
Illustrating the Issue 
 
The research and discussion outlined above points to the need to provide an illustration 
of how the transformation of an individual might occur, building on Makarenko’s work 
in terms of terrorist groups. Figure 2, the ‘Radicalisation to Criminalisation’ cycle 
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The model illustrates the potential journeys of individuals becoming involved in IS 
activities, in particular those with a background in serious crime however with 
refinement it could equally applied to those who have no such previous history. 
 
The model shows the individual as a potential participant in organised crime activity, 
and with potential criminal associations. 
 
The move to point A demonstrates the path of radicalisation, as the individual moves 
from their participation in indigenous crime to instead their involvement in overseas IS 
activity.  
 
From this juncture the individual potentially moves to point B, criminal activities in 
support of IS, in tandem organisationally for IS as it has moved along Makarenko’s 
scale illustrated at the earlier figure 2, so now the individual similarly moves. Given 
their previous bent towards criminality (as discussed earlier) there is a strong possibility 
that a previous skill set will result in associations with actors of similar history. To 
illustrate this perhaps think of an organised criminal with pre jihad experience of 
extortion. Following the theories outlined above there is every likelihood that post 
radicalisation and arrival with IS they will strike up, or be driven towards, association 
with similar characters involved in this activity in support of IS and find themselves as 
participants.  
 
There is every likelihood some will remain at either point A or point B, willing 
participants in IS activities and remain in their territories undertaking these. 
 
However, for the disillusioned, and those able to negotiate their exit from (or perhaps 
escape) from IS there is point C, with three apparent potential outcomes. The first, a 
return to the country of origin and wholesale disengagement, both from IS and there 
previous life of crime. The second possibility is that of incarceration. Although 
significant prison sentences await those returning from Syria having participated with 
IS, essentially coming home and being caught, these prison terms will end. At this 
juncture the individual will either become wholly disengaged, or instead move into 
option 3, that of re-engagement in organised crime. 
 
Option 3 is particularly concerning. It suggests a return to previous activity; with the 
experience and reputation enhancement resulting from IS participation that may carry 
massive negative connotations in general society but kudos of exceptional worth and 
operational value in the world of organised crime. One can also easily imagine those 
finding themselves incarcerated seeing a return to crime as a positive option on release, 
their criminal reputation enhanced through IS participation likely carrying significant 
reputational advantage while incarcerated that they can then capitalise on when they 
move back into external criminal society. 
 
One can also easily see that for those without prior organised crime connections there 
experience in IS will likely have provided them with this, from their trafficking into the 
conflict onwards and if it is not there enhanced skill base that draws them to this field 
on their return it may well be a period of incarceration with its likely consequence of a 
realisation through association with their fellow prisoners that they have a valuable skill 




This paper seeks to draw attention to the parallels of other terrorist conflicts that have 
occurred to the current situation with IS, and illustrate the potential dangers of 
returnees. It is of particular note that the experts contacted for opinion on the issue of 
IS returnees were unanimous in respect of the danger of these individuals in terms of 
participation in organised crime. The potential impact on conventional organised crime 
in western democracies of IS returnees should not be underestimated, and any impact 
they might have on this sub culture surely merits close monitoring. As indicated above, 
engagement with organised criminals in respect of the potential impact of IS veterans 
would likely prove extremely illuminating in gauging their potential impact in this area; 
this engagement should of course be accompanied by monitoring of organised crime 
development in the years ahead to ascertain if IS veterans do indeed become 
(re)involved in serious criminality. 
 
The model that has been provided, Radicalisation to Re-criminalisation, seeks to 
individualise the path from criminal to terrorist, enhancing the previous work of 
Makarenko on the Crime-Terror Continuum. It illustrates the key points in this journey 
and that there is the obvious potential for disengagement. If organised criminals who 
participate in IS are allowed to return unchecked, and un-shepherded, it is difficult to 
imagine a situation where they would not slip into their past associations and utilise 
their new skill sets and contacts. Although it would be nigh on impossible to influence 
those who return in such circumstances undetected the same cannot be said of those 
who are detected and incarcerated. For them there are two areas that must be addressed. 
Ensuring they do not slip back into their IS ideology and inflict attacks on their country 
of origin is one, and that which is rightly receiving significant attention; however of 
equal import is ensuring that they do not leave prison with their burnished credentials 
and enhanced skill set to return to the world of crime to cause significantly greater 
misery and despair than before they left. Impact can be made on this potential outcome, 
and it would appear incumbent on law enforcement and penal agencies to ensure such 
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Chapter 4 Case Study – Terrorism and 
Organised Crime in an Environment 
Peripheral to Conflict: Scotland 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is formed from the following publications:  
 
Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 
2014) which describes Scotland’s historic cultural ties to Northern Ireland, and provides 
an explanation of the influence of the recent conflict there on Scottish organised crime 
groups co-operation with terrorists arising from these cultural ties. The article thereafter 
illustrates subject matter expert and investigator opinions on the links between 
terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, supported by interviewees through their 
access to confidential briefing material on the phenomena.   
 
Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised 
Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit 
of Profit? (Gallagher, 2015) which takes forward the research contained in Terrorism 
and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 2014), and 
models the evidence obtained alongside research on entrepreneurship. 
 
Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime (Gallagher, 
2018) which illustrates the sophisticated interdependencies that exist between both 
phenomena 
 
Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity (Gallagher, 2019) which focusses on the 
need for terrorist organisations to retain legitimacy amongst their supportive population 
sub groups while accessing illicit finance to operate.  
 
  
4.2 “Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative 
Endeavours in Scotland?”, Terrorism and Political 




Terrorism and Organised Crime are phenomena that share a number of characteristics, 
both in relation to academic issues concerning their study and also their operational 
mechanisms. Academically, the same definitional issues that haunt the field of terrorism 
research bedevil work on organised crime. The problems caused by a lack of definition 
in terrorism research are well documented (1). Similar issues are also considered at 
length in relation to organised crime (2), where familiar difficulties regarding the 
achievement of a consensus, such as competing interests, are cited.  
An ‘initial nexus’ between terrorists and organised criminals, could be said to exist 
where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties (3), with illegal actors from 
the distinct phenomena co-operating to further their own ends through mutual 
endeavour. Indeed, terrorist groups see the utilisation of established criminal networks 
for their purposes as being ‘cost effective’ (4). Means by which such ‘cost effective’ 
co-operation could be achieved are potentially the provision of specialist services,  an 
examples being forged or falsified documents, such as passports (5); accountancy; legal 
advice (6); access to corrupt officials (7); people trafficking/ smuggling (8); and, even 
arms that may also be provided (9).  
Such provision was recently illustrated through cases where it was suspected dissident 
republicans bought weapons from arms supplying organised criminals in south east 
Europe (10) and an informant reporting, following the closure of the Reichstag in 
Berlin, that jihadists already in Germany had sourced to attack on the Reichstag from 
Balkan organised criminal groups(11).  
The well documented case of the Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to 
carry out car bombings (12) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way 
co-operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to 
drug gangs is becoming an ever more common occurrence (13). 
 
Although small, an ‘initial nexus’ of co-operation between organised criminals and 
terrorists exists in Scotland. This initial nexus relates primarily to Irish related terrorism 
but there are a very few known connections to international terrorism. The nature of the 
connections to those involved in Irish related terrorism appears to be social and criminal 
in nature. 
 
The initial nexus in Scotland primarily exists amongst two sub cultures, these being the 
pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists. Seventeenth century emigration to Ireland from 
Scotland through the ‘Ulster Plantation’ formed a protestant émigré society there, 
which has retained close ties with a similar sub culture in Scotland. The obvious 
recurring travel between locations to participate in Orange Order Parades is a good 
indicator of this continuing bond amongst the communities. Nineteenth century 
immigration to Scotland formed a large Roman Catholic expatriate community, 
primarily in the west coast of Scotland, where their cultural and religious differences 
saw them forming a distinct ghetto community.  
 
Both the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists are minority groups within Scotland 
and although they may not fit current definitions of ethnic minority groups in the typical 
parameter of ‘race’, they are both distinct sub cultures within wider Scottish society. 
Both produce SOCGs and individuals who become involved in Irish related terrorist 
activity. It is therefore not surprising that the initial nexus has been found here. 
Individuals involved in either form of activity share common lineage, schooling, culture 
and associations. 
 
The potential causes of such co-operation, coupled to the changing nature of Scotland’s 
population through mass immigration and any potential implications that might arise 
from this, make the country an interesting one to research the phenomena of an ‘initial 
nexus’ within. 
 
Co-operation between Terrorists and Organised Criminals 
 
Although early definitions of organised crime in the 1960’s focussed on the known 
hierarchical organised crime type, the form of loose network structure emerged as 
atypical (14), and is generally accepted as the norm. The move to network structures is 
acknowledged as having been accelerated through the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the ever increasing pace of globalisation, an excellent example of this movement being 
highlighted through the Russian origin Solntsevskaya crime group (15).  
 
Terrorism’s reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals 
such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK, who has stated that the 
organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of 
weapons (16). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity 
IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, 
sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal 
enterprises (17). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity brokers to further 
their own ends, with ETA ensuring the lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing 
commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange 
for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels (18).  
 
The operating structure of terrorists and organised criminal groups are acknowledged 
as being strikingly similar (19), although the distinction of purpose (profit vs. political 
change) continues to be a point of emphasis.  
 
Co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised 
criminals to terrorists (20). Attempts to establish further co-operative routes have also 
been subject to law enforcement interdiction as Mali origin Al-Qaeda operatives 
discovered when engaging with individuals they thought represented FARC, but were 
in fact agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (21).  
 
Makarenko’s (22) model illustrates where these forms of co-operation can in fact lead 
to a form of metamorphosis, and is illustrated thus: 
 
 



















Where terrorist groups such as FARC and PIRA, increasingly become involved in 
criminal activity, either or initially to fund their cause whereas circumstances alter they 
mutate into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal 
organisations driven by profit (23). These organisations have fallen into Makarenko’s 
‘black hole’, her point 4, and become mutated organisations, no longer serving their 
original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. An excellent examples of 
organised crime’s move to the use of terror tactics for political purpose are the bombing 
tactics of the ELN in furthering the purposes of the Medellin Cartel (24), and the similar 
bombing tactics adopted in the past by the Sicilian mafia (25). 
 
An agenda of radical political change may well lead to significant altering of the norms 
of a state’s functioning, to the detriment of the profit of an organised crime enterprise. 
Terrorist activity in a well-functioning state will bring with it considerable additional 
law enforcement attention, attention that could, through investigative endeavour, 
become focussed on those co-operating with the terrorist group. This is a considerable 
risk factor for any organised criminal embarking on co-operation. Organised crime in 
any society functions with some form of law enforcement consideration on the part of 
the criminals, be that from carefully planned avoidance, as noted by Albini (26) in 
relation to ‘successful’ Scottish organised criminals, to parasitic co-operative assistance 
through corruption. Where an organised crime group functions away from protection 
provided through state corruption any contact with law enforcement can prove 
devastating. However, were the activities of the terrorist group likely to adversely affect 
law enforcement agencies abilities to function this may prove beneficial to the 
organised crime group both in hiding their involvement in the interaction but also in 
terms of assisting their core functioning. Similarly, knowledge of a terrorists groups 
activities may become a very useful bargaining tool with law enforcement should an 
organised crime group’s core functioning be compromised; a tactic of holding 
intelligence on confederates for ‘get out of jail’ purposes has been utilised by organised 
criminals for some time, as noted in  Albini’s study. In addition, many organised 
criminals can be quite “dull” and despite the illicit nature of the commodity in which 
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criminals might become involved in any way with terrorists is highly questionable. Just 
as no terrorist group is identical, neither is any organised crime group.  
 
Jamieson (28) sees co-operative endeavours as inevitable given the specialisations 
available to both groups, but overall see such co-operations as wholly pragmatic and 
only likely to last as long as there is a tangible benefit outweighing risk to both sides in 
the arrangement. Clarke and Lee (29) go further, seeing these partnerships as becoming 
indissoluble and insightfully question how long Makarenko’s scale will hold true, with 
the conflagration between what once would have been regarded as distinct groupings 
on such a scale becoming ever closer.  
 
An interesting quote in respect of the interaction, reported to have been made by a senior 
mafia figure in relation to what level of co-operation his organisation would provide to 
terrorists is that “The Mafia will help whoever can pay” (30). Also of substantial interest 
is the suggestion that “British criminal gangs… have admitted terrorist organisations 
(including PIRA), flushed with cash, into their substantial black markets.” (31)  
 
Putting all matters outlined into a conceivable scale of potential co-operation is 
difficult; however, when one considers that a UK Metropolitan Police Spokesman from 
the Counter Terrorist Command as saying that two thirds of the organised crime groups 
in the UK have an involvement with terrorism, this presents a massive potential target 
group (32).  
 
Exploring the ‘Initial Nexus’ in Scotland 
 
Point 1 of Makarenko’s Crime Terror Continuum illustrates where first co-operation 
can occur between actors in either phenomena, the ‘initial nexus’ between terrorists and 
organised criminals, where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties. 
Information regarding the functioning of such a relationship, beyond the existence of 
the relationship itself, is scarce. It does not appear that it has been a primary area of 
research focus and when incidences may occur they would be likely known primarily 
to law enforcement bodies, which may retain the information for obvious operational 
benefit. It is certainly the case that there are few prosecutions resulting from such 
relationships, although the United States DEA interdiction of Mali based al-Qaeda 
operative’s highlights law enforcement activity in the area (33). 
 
Subject Matter Expert Interviews 
 
To gain an insight into the current ‘initial nexus’ in Scotland arrangements were made 
for interviews to be conducted with senior staff from Scottish law enforcement bodies, 
handling intelligence regarding serious and organised crime and in addition those with 
a similar responsibility concerning counter terrorism (34). 
 
During the interviews opinions, based on confidential research and intelligence reports, 





Participants reported that in terms of structure Serious Organised Crime Groups 
(SOCGs) are often perceived to be hierarchical. IA (senior intelligence officer) believed 
that this was sometimes the case often when there are familial or social bonds within 
the group. However, IA further stated that most SOCGs would best be described as a 
network and are very fluid in their apparent membership and operating tactics. 
Members of SOCGs often come and go, at one time being involved in serious disputes 
and then shortly thereafter participating together in large scale drug purchases. Non-
indigenous (non-UK originating) groups have very different and varied structures and 
operating tactics. They are very difficult for law enforcement to penetrate and this is 
particularly the case where membership of groups is transient in a given geographic 
area. 
 
IA believes that terrorist networks with links to Scotland are very structured and would 
have the potential to access documentation (such as illegitimate passports) through 
corruption in state officials rather than through approaches to Scottish based SOCGs. 
 
Known Interactions  
 
In relation to terrorism the police’s knowledge is greater in respect of Irish related 
terrorism as this is where, historically, the police have been successful. The subject 
matter experts agreed that the perceived crossover of SOCG with terrorist nominals of 
interest is assessed to be fairly small in Scotland but this needs to be seen as indicative 
in the context of available intelligence. The nexus between SOCG and terrorism 
remains minimal in the context of current threats. The assessment of the cross over’s 
that have been identified are that they are mainly social in nature, not terrorist related.  
 
IA reported that individuals have been identified with connections to known 
commodity routes. These individuals were suspected of involvement in drugs 
importation and also had associations to terrorist investigations. However, the assessed 
connection was not of a terrorist nature. 
 
IA also reported that there was a known case of an individual within a SOCG being 
offered a criminal commodity by individuals who were suspected sympathisers of an 
Asian based terrorist group.  
 
Collectively, the participants stated that the vast majority of cross over between SOCG 
and terrorist nominals is in relation to Irish related terrorism. Within this cross over by 
far the largest proportion of cross over related to Loyalist terrorism. There are 
significant Scottish links to Northern Ireland and this is particularly the case with the 
west coast. The overall figures for cross over though do indicate nominals of interest 
across Scotland’s central belt. Investigations show that individuals involved in Irish 
related terrorism have clear links to criminality, although it has not been shown that 
these activities have direct links to their terrorist activities. It is suspected these 
activities may be purely for personal gain. Historically, there are loyalist connections 
to organised crime in Scotland. Weaponry and drugs have gone from the mainland UK 
to Ireland, from criminal associates not connected to terrorism.  
 
Overall, participants were firmly of the opinion that loyalist terrorism is completely 
immersed in criminality. Typically, they are involved in counterfeiting, drugs, illegal 
alcohol and cigarette movement and distribution. They are not as well organised as 
Republican terrorists. Participants believed that their methods and composition meant 
they were more predisposed to have links to organised crime groups and are known to 
have made extensive use of criminal associates in the past. 
 
IG (senior analyst focussing on terrorism) reported that recent analysis has shown 
minimal links between republican related terrorism and organised crime in Scotland; 
however participants felt that this was due to a recent refocusing onto the issue given 
an upsurge in republican violence in Northern Ireland, where analytical focus had been 
on other areas previously.  
 
IG further reported that there are known links between republican terrorism and 
organised crime groups which include drugs, weapons and the counterfeiting of DVD’s. 
Republican terrorists are known to frequent public houses in Scotland that are 




IA stated that terrorist connected SOCGs working in Scotland work for money and that 
they may well keep any terrorist associations and sympathies secret from Scottish based 
SOCGs they have connections with. IG and IH believed that out with the west coast of 
Scotland organised crime groups would not have strong opinions either way whether 
they dealt with loyalist or republican affiliated terrorist groups, as long as they were 
paid for material they supplied, such as arms.  
 
IA was of the opinion that members of SOCGs are so greedy when pursuing profit that 
if an association was found to have sympathies to a terrorist group it would be unlikely 
any moral conscience resulting in disassociation would occur. However, if the terrorist 
group were active in Scotland, IA thought that this ambivalence may well change.  
 
IA thought that if associates of SOCG were involved in terrorism in Scotland they may 
well alter their relationship with them but that this would be most likely after any 
incident had occurred.  
 
IA was definitive in the opinion that some SOCGs are using terrorists for their purposes, 
utilising individuals with established smuggling routes and inroads into corruption for 
their criminal purposes, probably without the SOCG knowing of their associates actual 
backgrounds, instead wrongly believing they are engaged with a similar SOCG. It is 
very much in SOCGs interests to maintain these relationships. IA stated that there were 
examples where SOCGs involved in such relationships are of significant standing, well 
connected and long established.  
 
IA suspects that non-indigenous SOCG linked to terrorism are the main threat, with no 
‘loyalty’ to Scotland and their only purpose being to make money. For IA, it is in this 
that their threat is greatest. 
 
IG and IH (senior detective in the Counter Terrorism environment) believed that more 
links between republican terrorists and organised crime will become apparent as 
investigations continue. Attention to this area declined after the Good Friday agreement 
and continued to decline after the attacks of September 11th 2001 and 7th July 2005. The 
increased activity now ongoing is due to the upsurge in RIRA and related groups 
attacks.  
 
IG and IH saw republican terrorists and some Scottish based organised criminals as 
being immersed in each other’s cultures and interlinked at various levels. Within an 
existent sub culture of republicanism that both function within, IG and IH stated that 
organised criminals raise their standing by having links to republican terrorism. 
 
In relation to the issue of deception, participants were asked to consider how they would 
see members of an organised crime group reacting if they learned they had been 
involved in facilitating terrorist activity. They again drew clear distinctions between 
international and Irish related terrorism. Was the facilitation to have been in relation to 
international terrorists participants thought that organised crime group members would 
tend to co-operate with the Police, with a good degree of self-preservation at work.  
 
IH made an analogy with an overarching perception amongst criminals of paedophilia 
simply being perceived as beyond the pale and an area where the most hardened 
criminals have co-operated with the Police in the past to bring offenders to justice, and 
to the treatment other criminals meet out to paedophiles whenever an opportunity 
presents itself. IH believed that the majority of organised crime group members he has 
encountered view international terrorist actions in a similar way, carrying some degree 
of ‘wrongness’ that cuts across established (if wholly unwritten and in no way tangible) 
criminal codes of behaviour.  
 
Both IG and IH were of the opinion that Irish related terrorism would engender a very 
different response; with it being unlikely that co-operation with the authorities would 
be forthcoming. They believed that in both camps associations that exist are largely 
parts of wider criminal networks, and would be treated as such in the event of the 




To provide depth to the Scottish information that was provided, an insight into how the 
‘initial nexus’ might function necessitated contact with individuals who could provide 
an insight into the operations of organised crime. Consequently, interviews and a focus 
group were organised with a number of detectives with a relevant background (35). 
 
To gather the relevant opinions from these police officers a questionnaire (36) was 
utilised that addressed the issues of how they understood organised criminals interacted 
with contacts; thereafter how they envisaged such interaction might function from 
initial meetings to the provision of specialist services; and, through to their opinions on 
the workings of an ongoing and mutually understood ‘initial nexus’ relationship 
including in the aftermath of a terrorist incident.  
 
Collectively the participants largely believed that with an a serious organised crime 
group (SOCG) the immediate group – the leader, his deputies and lieutenants would 
either be in the same family or live in the same geographical area. They would have 
bonds out with these areas, formed through shared experiences such as schooling and 
prison. For an organised criminal to have credibility they would need to expand beyond 
these confines and as they move up the ‘criminal ladder’ the geographical extent of 
their associations increasing with their increasing influence. The leadership of SOCG 
may travel to meet new associates, usually though with this being with individuals of 
similar standing in other known SOCGs. This may involve international travel. 
Participants also saw modern communication methods, such as social networking sites, 
as a central feature of how contact is now maintained between those involved in 
organised crime. 
 
The participants also thought that the frequency a SOCG would make new contacts to 
carry out business with would be dependent on the SOCGs overall growth strategy, 
although generally they would always be looking at opportunities for interactions that 
would maximise their profits. While some groups are content to remain small others 
would seek to expand. Participant ID (senior detective officer) highlighted that many 
SOCGs make new contacts through using the same suppliers of illicit commodity and 
the utilisation of the same specialist, such as accountants.  
 
Networking amongst SOCGs occurs laterally between organisations across the UK, 
largely on a peer to peer basis that would be facilitated if mutual benefits to established 
businesses were identified by associates. Mobile phone contact would occur initially, 
but typical venues including social locations such as restaurants, public houses, and 
gyms. All participants alluded to the importance of incarceration as a networking 
method, playing a huge part in bringing to together individuals who would not have 
otherwise met. Participants also pointed out that visitors to prison often also act as 
couriers of information. 
 
Trust, the essential element to any relationship involving persons taking part in 
organised crime activities and referred to by all participants, occurs through 
‘referencing’ by trusted and established individuals. It was expected that SOCG 
members would boast about past exploits and their wider connections, facts the listener 
would be able to ascertain the veracity of and thereby satisfy themselves as to the status 
of their new contact, prior to embarking on any involvement with the individual. This 
is particularly easy if the new relationship is built during a period of incarceration, 
where the details of the new contacts past are easily checked by research and discussion 
amongst the wider prison population. All participants thought it likely that an element 
of testing would be a feature of any new relationship between an SOCG and a contact, 
with ‘dummy’ runs of illegal commodity being likely. It was also thought that letting 
the new contact be party to information as a smokescreen to see if this feeds through 
law enforcement systems and perhaps results in action by police was a typical method 
of testing.  
 
Participants could see terrorists approaching organised criminals to support terrorist 
activity, through counterfeiting, money laundering, safe housing or smuggling of 
weapons.  
 
Participants thought that a likely possible point of interaction between a terrorist and 
SOCG would be a ‘lone wolf’ type such as the recent case in England of Nicky Reilly 
(37), however rather than constructing explosives such an individual may instead 
embark upon trying to purchase a firearm from an SOCG. 
 
Participants also pointed out the issue of ‘kudos’, where while the SOCG can support 
the terrorists, the terrorists can also support the SOCG, as the SOCGs reputation in 
criminal circles could be greatly enhanced through the association.  Participant FC 
(detective investigating serious and organised crime) thought that this type of 
arrangement would be most likely in relation to Irish Related Terrorism and unlikely 
with International Terrorism. Participant IF (senior detective officer) had a similar 
view, and thought that this ‘kudos’ would be of particular import were an SOCG 
member to be incarcerated and would benefit in such a situation during incarceration 
and thereafter in criminal circles from the notoriety of such an association. 
 
IB (senior detective officer) stated that the identification of criminal specialists was 
extremely difficult, which showed the level of secrecy maintained around such 
individuals. He referred to the case of Paul Alexander (38), an organised crime 
‘armourer’ and his detection being due to his commission of a road traffic offence 
resulting in DNA identification. Alexander was previously wholly unknown to the state 
in a criminal context. Such individuals are very closely guarded with an SOCG unlikely 
to allow facilitation, instead third or fourth stage removed contact being permitted. Such 
an individual would be regarded as a unique resource to the SOCG’s business.  
 
Any contact would require a very long process and high level of trust, perhaps indeed 
requiring association from childhood. Participants saw a mutual friend or mutual 
contact as essential in providing a middle point for a terrorist to access the specialist 
services available to an organised criminal, with ID (senior detective officer) believing, 
in agreement with IB above, that although an SOCG may be prepared to allow a contact 
to do business with their specialist they were unlikely in any circumstances, to allow 
actual access. 
 
Virtually all participants thought that without doubt if a specialist was being used 
extensively SOCG members would want to know what level of risk the activity was 
bringing to their SOCG.  
 
Thereafter in the interviews three key areas of note emerged: 
 
Firstly, all the participants were clear, that an approach by the authorities seeking 
engagement to thwart the activities of a terrorist group an SOCG were involved with 
would be most likely to succeed where the SOCG calculated it was in their best 
interests, be that through early stage intervention mitigating consequence to them or 
through a reduction in sanction against them. Although levels of established trust and 
mutually shared backgrounds or cultures would be influential, in co-operation with a 
terrorist group being exposed to an SOCG, its members, in the words of one participant 
would “be at their selfish best” and seek to minimise the consequences to themselves 
and their organisation. Few participants envisaged an SOCG making an approach to the 
authorities if they learned of a plotted terrorist action, even through an intermediary, 
unless the level of their own exposure in light of the action was significant. There were 
thought to be some clear distinctions in relation to the contacts preparation for terrorist 
activity. If the terrorism was Irish related and concerned activity to occur in Northern 
Ireland or England participants did not think a Scottish SOCG would object, however 
if the attacks were to take place in Scotland this would not be tolerated.  
 
This system of calculated risk was however tempered by the second key area of note to 
emerge, where a number of participants alluded to an intangible ‘criminal code’ that 
would have a bearing on a SOCG’s engagement with terrorists. Participants believed 
that radical views of an associate would be unlikely to affect the relationship, however 
did state that there is a moral code amongst criminals and made an analogy to sexual 
offences where what was perceived to be out with norms for criminals would be deemed 
unacceptable, that there are simply ‘unwritten rules’.  It was also felt that if the SOCG 
had been deceived about the true nature of the terrorist group (believing they were 
simply dealing with another SOCG) then their behaviour may significantly alter on 
discovering their true nature, particularly if this was through learning of a planned 
terrorist action, their objective typically being to make money, not generally to kill 
people. Specifically, participant IB believed that if a bombing occurred this might be 
the point when an approach from the authorities would succeed. He alluded to the case 
of an abduction in Edinburgh (39). In this case criminals who it was thought would not 
co-operate with the Police in fact did, with the ‘criminal code’ seeing this abduction 
and the anticipated murder of a boy unconnected to criminality proving to be a ‘step 
too far’.  
 
Thirdly, a number of participants believed that during any risk calculation undertaken 
by an SOCG the elimination of contacts within terrorist groups to minimise the SOCG 
exposure would occur, balanced against any financial loss that may result from such an 
action. It was not thought that the threat of retaliation from the terrorist group would be 









The factors necessary for the safe establishment of trust for a working relationship to 
develop between those involved in terrorism and organised crime, common lineage, 
schooling, culture and associations, all exist amongst the pro-Republican and pro-
Loyalist sub cultures in Scotland, echoing the views of Van Duyne(40), and the 
participants in this study. Police awareness of these interactions is also understandable. 
Although particularly the pro-Republicans were an immigrant community one would 
expect difficult to police this is no longer the case, with over a hundred years passing 
since first arrival and the overall immigrant community now largely being part of 
mainstream Scottish society.  
 
Interestingly the participants in the study largely drew clear lines of distinction between 
Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. They could perceive that the potential 
cultural and social links of the SOCG members may have an effect on their behaviour, 
from the ‘kudos’ association within these sub cultures that can be attained through their 
background, allied to the underlying sympathy they may hold with a cause. 
 
Within these ‘common cultures’ there was though a clear opinion from the participants 
that, echoing Stuart (41), in his observation that the Mafia will engage with anyone they 
will profit from, so too will Scottish SOCGs; but only where it is in the SOCGs 
continuing interests. Participants believe that whether an SOCG was pre disposed to 
either cause in Northern Ireland a faction associated to the other side would be 




A clear theme that emerged from the participants was distance: the further removed 
from the terrorist activity the SOCG was, the easier it would be to provide ongoing co-
operation. It was clear from the answers provided that the participants felt that whoever 
was involved in terrorism, including those connected to Irish related terrorism, while 
the activity was to have an impact somewhere out with the vicinity of the SOCG they 
would not be overly concerned but when the actions that were to be undertaken had a 
more direct impact on the closer societal structures around the SOCG they would be 
wholly uncomfortable.  
 
This lack of comfort did not, in the opinion of the participants, arise from any morality 
but instead from the view point that although driven by profit an SOCG would calculate 
its degree of exposure to law enforcement action and the closer terrorist activity came 




It emerged that terrorists currently engaging with SOCGs are likely keeping their true 
purposes a secret, with the SOCGs believing they are engaging with peers rather than 
those carrying out criminal activity for the funding of terrorism, this behaviour 
including SOCGs of significant standing. The participants had pointed out that the 
nature of the composition of SOCGs perhaps lent itself to such an occurrence. A number 
of the participants felt that were such deceptions to be discovered the murder of the 
SOCGs contact may well be carried out. Another clear feature that emerged that may 
explain the position that such action may be warranted, other than to minimise 
detection, was that although not well known for their moral code SOCG members 
typically, in line with other criminals, are known to have intangible lines of standards 
in relation to behaviour. A number of participants referred to this, with their citing the 
issue of paedophilia as an example of criminal behaviour that even for hardened 
criminals is seen as beyond the pale. A number of participants believed that terrorist 
atrocities would be perceived by SOCG members in a similar light. If, as appears to be 
the case, some are being duped regarding the true nature of their relationships with 
contacts who are involved in terrorism this becomes even more worthy of consideration 




As the participants related that SOCGs can gain new contacts through accessing the 
same specialists, it is worthy of note that such an intersection may well provide an 
interface with terrorism. Participants related that persons with known connections to 
terrorism in Scotland have access to corrupt officials, a relationship SOCGs would no 
doubt wish to benefit from if they were to learn of it. Whichever way this access to 
specialists was to function the views of the studies participants were clear that were 
such access to occur it would be controlled; perhaps many degrees removed and likely 






The participants were clear that if members of a SOCG were going to co-operate with 
the authorities such co-operation would be on their terms. Engagements with the 
authorities would perhaps be by proxy and would be an effort at self-preservation, 
where the SOCG attempted to gain a favourable position with the authorities, as directly 
observed by Albini (42) in his previous study of organised crime in Scotland. An 
approach by the authorities was seen as being most likely to succeed when the impact 
on the SOCG would be at its minimal. For this to be the case the relationship between 
the two groups would need to be at its early stages, with the level of connection and 
trust being low and the financial or other loss to the SOCG being minimal. Interestingly, 
very few of the participants had any reservations around whether the SOCG members 
would co-operate with the authorities. None put forward the position of the SOCG 
member adopting a position of ambivalence to the authorities, other than in relation to 
a likely lack of co-operation from SOCGs who were involved in a relationship with a 
terrorist connected to Irish related terrorism. Beyond this all thought that a calculated 
response from the SOCG member would be forthcoming, with their best interests being 
their sole concern. Of note, the solitary contrary opinion related to SOCGs and terrorist 
groups from the same sub culture, the implication of this being there may exist some 
degree of ‘loyalty’, or at least a stronger affinity, amongst SOCGs and terrorists from 
the same social background. These stronger ties might impact on the pragmatic desire 
to co-operate with the authorities when this would be in the immediate best interest of 
the SOCG. This ‘loyalty’ could be for a number of reasons, which might include a 
shared outlook but also equally may be due to a desire to maintain reputation within a 
common sub culture. Co-operation with the authorities to the detriment of fellow sub 
culture members would likely have significant negative impact on a SOCGs reputation 
within their social grouping.  
 
Threat from Non-Indigenous Groups 
 
It was put forward that non-indigenous SOCGs are the main threat in Scotland. This 
may seem at odds with the information provided to the effect that such groups have no 
known connections to terrorism and that those in Scotland known to be linked to 
terrorism have no known associations with such SOCGs. In fact, participants reported 
that even those with minor criminal convictions have completely disassociated 
themselves from such activity when becoming involved with terrorist causes. However, 
from the answers provided by the participants and the literature available the non-
indigenous threat argument is a strong one.  
 
Authors, including Perri et al.,(43) point to minority immigrant communities as being 
difficult to police and also their being fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist participants 
(44). It was contended that they are only interested in profit, a similar feature ascribed 
to all SOCGs by Dishman (45), and a number of participants in the study. Where this 
appears to be particularly insightful though is the illustration of such SOCGs lack of 
‘loyalty’ to Scotland. What this means is not a lack of an embracing of Scottish culture, 
but rather that with little or no cultural bonds to the country their activities in pursuit of 
profit could be far more extreme than those of SOCGs with connections to the pro-
Republicans and the pro-Loyalists groups. SOCGs members with ties to Irish related 
terrorism have typically grown up in Scotland and have wide social networks here while 
recent émigré groups have no such foundation. As the participants in the study alluded 
to a growing discomfort amongst SOCG members when their contact brought their 
activities ‘close to home’ one can see how such a feeling would certainly be in no way 
as relevant amongst a recent émigré SOCG. The consequences of a terrorist action in 
Scotland would have far less impact on their wider social group and their lack of 




All the participants believed that incarceration was a key point for new interactions to 
occur. As recent émigré SOCGs become known to law enforcement in their new 
country of operation, so they may become incarcerated. Through their incarceration 
they are likely to encounter individuals involved in terrorist causes, likely through work 
as ‘front’ funding criminal work. Such interaction may have disastrous consequences 
for Scotland, as a new type of ‘initial nexus’, far removed from that of the pro-
Republicans and the pro-Loyalists could be formed. 
 
‘Initial Nexus’ Relationships – A Potential Model 
 
The findings thus far suggest the following template of ‘initial nexus’ relationships: 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship A’ 
 
Within Relationship A the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from the same 
cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate 
social groupings. 
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated PIRA 
members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the 
Irish past émigré community. 
 
Such an association may have strong bonds: trust through common views, shared 
backgrounds and ease of ‘referencing’ through common associates or known past 
activities (criminal or otherwise) would be likely. The ‘kudos’ element that might occur 
from such a relationship within the shared sub culture would also be of relevance. 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship B’ 
 
Within Relationship B the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing 
cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their 
immediate social groupings. 
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated UVF 
members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the 
Irish past émigré community. 
 
There are obvious negative features of such a relationship, such as contrary viewpoints 
and detrimental opinions of the SOCG or Terrorist group might occur were the details 
of the relationship to become known in their sub cultures. However, ‘trust’ gained 
through known past activities (criminal or otherwise) and shared associations would be 
very likely. 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship C’ 
 
Within Relationship C the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing 
cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to 
their immediate social grouping. 
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is non-Scottish origin al 
Qaeda inspired terrorists and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub 
group within the Irish past émigré community. 
 




‘Initial Nexus Relationship D’ 
 
Within Relationship D the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing 
cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to 
their immediate social grouping. 
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criteria are non-Scottish origin al 
Qaeda inspired terrorists and non-Scottish origin SOCGs, such as Chinese origin 
Cannabis cultivation groups.  
 
As with Relationship C trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a 
relationship would likely be difficult. 
 
Discussion of ‘Initial Nexus’ Model 
 
Although one can in no way be definitive regarding how SOCGs will behave, as 
individuals with their own particular foibles and morality constitute each group 
differently, one can see how the argument that Initial Nexus Relationship D would be 
more dangerous is one worthy of consideration. The nature of SOCGs businesses, such 
as the example of Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups, inherently harm the 
communities in which they are based, through the illicit product they produce but also 
through the further criminal elements they attract to the business when it is a success 
and the risks their criminality brings both through disputes that may affect the wider 
public but also through their methods. The exemplar Chinese origin Cannabis 
cultivation groups typically jury rig electrical systems that are massive fire risks with 
no consideration of those who neighbour properties they are utilising for their 
businesses. When one takes the status quo elements of SOCG behaviours and couple 
them with a group whose members have a minimal past in a particular area the common 
tactics of law enforcement to track an individual are greatly reduced, which non-
indigenous SOCG members are very well aware of,  and align to this a lack of social 
connection through a ‘past’, I.E. a lack of family or friends in the host community 
provides an absence of impact of criminality of the non-indigenous SOCGs behaviour 
on persons they might feel restrained from allowing be harmed the dangers of ‘Initial 
Nexus Relationship D’ become all too apparent. It is the added disconnection from the 
society of operation that provides the increased danger. 
 
The ‘criminal code’ alluded to by a number of the studies participants may also be 
impactive regarding each of the ‘initial nexus relationships’ listed and understood better 
within these conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, such a code is, to a degree, in fact an 
innate link between the criminal and their wider community values, where although 
their criminality may cross the normal bounds of wider societal behaviour the ‘code’ 
constrains behaviour within their sub groups. If this were to be the case one can see 
how such a ‘code’ would impact on interactions with contacts out with the SOCG and 
have differing effects dependent on which of the relationships, from A to D, the SOCG 
were engaged in. Deception would also be key, and if the SOCG were to perceive their 
relationship to be simply a criminal relationship between differing origin SOCGs, while 
it was instead, through deception, a relationship with terrorists, type C, this could be 
significantly impactive on the continuing nature of their interactions. 
 
Deception could also be highly impactive on group D associations that might develop 
in prisons. Many terrorist groups have criminal ‘fronts’, for fundraising and other 
purposes. Individuals detected for such activity may well be incarcerated for criminal 
offences, with no detection of their terrorist links being uncovered by the authorities. 
Such individuals would then enter the prison system being perceived as serious 
criminals only. Any associations with other serious criminals that then occurred in the 
prison system would only be seen in this context and possible relationships would be 
thought of as criminal in nature, and may well appear as such even to the SOCG with 




Although this study has found there are clear links between terrorism and organised 
crime in Scotland, these are minimal in the overall context of terrorist and organised 
crime groups known to exist in Scotland. The links between Terrorist and SOCG in 
Scotland are largely criminal and social in nature. Where links occur they typically 
concern terrorist groups linked to Irish related terrorism.  
 
Scottish pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub cultures provide a very interesting insight 
into the potential nature of ‘initial nexus’ relationships between terrorists and organised 
criminals. The views of the participants, coupled with a review of the literature 
concerning the subject, suggest that there are four distinct types of relationship that 
might exist between persons involved in the two phenomena, and have consequent 
impact on their interactions. The background of SOCG and Terrorist group members 
appears to have an impact on the nature of any relationships they might become 
involved in and would, most probably, have an effect beyond bald calculations of risk 
versus reward that SOCG members would likely involve themselves in during such a 
relationship. Profit would remain the main driver for any SOCG; however the proximity 
of danger to the SOCGs area of operations a terrorist group poses would be a factor in 
their reasoning. 
 
SOCG members may well take executive action against terrorist groups they have been 
interacting with to preserve their own ends. It is likely SOCGs are being misled in some 
of their relationships with those they believe to be like groups, who in fact have terrorist 
related motivations. Discovery of these deceptions may well affect their continuing 
engagement, result in action against the deceivers, or assist any attempt by law 
enforcement to engage with the SOCG to solicit co-operation.  
 
Interactions in prisons may well not be what they might first seem, and there is a need 
for an open mind as to why non-indigenous SOCG members might be striking up 
associations, both with indigenous SOCGs and non-indigenous SOCGs from differing 
cultures. As this research has found, terrorist groups are using criminality as a cover for 
their actions and may well have members incarcerated through this cover, who would 
then conceivably continue to further their terrorists groups aims by increasing useful 
associations.  
 
Terrorists and organised crime groups with no cultural affinity to their area of operation 
have less restraint upon their actions as the direct impact of their activities will not be 
felt by persons from within their immediate cultures, sub cultures or own circle of 
interaction, such as friends or family. This an area of significant danger, that does not 
appear to have been considered previously as a standalone issue. Its immediacy as a 
matter for note results from the current changing population composition resulting from 
immigration, and the diaspora communities that are emerging as a consequence. 
 
Co-operation by an SOCG with the authorities may be forthcoming when an SOCG 
calculates it is in their interests to make a proactive approach. There are a myriad of 
factors that would affect such a decision however SOCGs are likely to be clinical in 
such calculations and may only be held back if they have a cultural affinity with the 
terrorist group. An approach by the authorities would appear to have most chance of 
successes, continuing the calculated argument, when the SOCG have the least ‘invested 
in the relationship’, both in terms of their position perhaps within their own sub culture 
but also in terms of monetary or criminal activity exposure.  
 
The natures of the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime make it very likely that 
participants in both will encounter one another, particularly when incarcerated. This 
study has found that although such interactions do not appear high in number in 
Scotland the potential harm to society that can arise from them is considerable. The 
area of greatest concern that has emerged from this study is that of interaction between 
non-indigenous terrorist and organised crime groups, whose co-operation may be 
largely unrestrained, difficult to detect and lead to increased capability for action 
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Organised criminals, in popular culture are often portrayed as über businessmen, 
working at the limit of entrepreneurial possibilities, pursuing lucrative illicit deals of 
which the masses can only dream. In these portrayals, perhaps best illustrated in film 
by Marlon Brando’s iconic portrayal of Don Vito Corleone in ‘The Godfather’, 
organised criminals possess a multitude of factors affecting their decision making 
processes. These range from the familial to the global.13 Beyond fiction, the decision 
making of those immersed in organised crime is no less complex and consequential. 
While those involved in organised crime may, as many believe, be amoral entrepreneurs 
in rampant pursuit of profit the ‘economy’ they work within is one with considerations 
far beyond those seeking licit gain.  
 
As organised criminals may be regarded as  über business men at the edge of 
entrepreneurial possibility, at the razors edge of this activity is the extreme of the 
entrepreneurial/ criminal nexus, specifically that of the ‘initial nexus’ between 
organised criminals and terrorists, where decisions in the pursuit of illicit profit may 
have the greatest consequences of all.  
 
Organised criminals amongst many pursuits, but perhaps most importantly, seek profit 
and look forward to utilising their ill-gotten gains, typically long into their old age. 
Terrorists on the other hand are in the main seen as pursuing profit when necessary to 
fund their cause, and as recent times have shown all too clearly, the modern jihadist 
often has their dotage as a far removed concern; particularly as they don a suicide vest. 
Although there are numerous nuances within both phenomena ultimately organised 
criminals and terrorists are pursuing very different goals with their activities. It is the 
intersections on the road to their destinations where mutual interests may lead to 
interaction. The potential of these cross-overs, their impact of the entrepreneurial 
desires of organised criminals, and the influences governing these relationships are 
dramatically under researched.  
 
                                                 
13 For Don Vito it is changing preferences of the age, the increasing availability of access to Heroin and 
whether to facilitate the trade, which sees a multi-faceted decision lead to personal disaster. His refusal 
precipitates a near successful attempted assassination and gives sharp focus, albeit fictional, to where 
the world of the organised criminal differs from the atypical boardroom. While the fictional Don Vito 
may have baulked at his ‘red line’ in becoming involved in the trade in heroin our modern and all too 
real organised criminals are faced with what might arguably be far higher tariff decisions. 
This chapter seeks to address a key research question concerning the organised crime 
and terrorist nexus. Taking into account contemporary entrepreneurial research into the 
behaviours of organised criminals the chapter seeks to explain how, in practical terms, 
such a relationship works; illustrating the factors that affect the decision making 
processes of the organised criminal, specifically when their endeavours are in support 
of terrorists. It is divided into four main sections, subdivided by focus on specific areas 
of note. The first, a ‘Literature Review’, provides insight into key research concerning 
organised crime and terrorism, illustrating striking similarities, but also key differences, 
between the phenomena. The second, ‘Entrepreneurial Considerations’, illustrates the 
interface between research into terrorism and organised crime with recent academic 
entrepreneurial thought. Section three, ‘A Potential Model’, draws the discussed 
research together into a decision making model highlighting, particularly from an 
entrepreneurial perspective, the issues facing those participating in the organised crime 
and terrorism interface. The model is an attempt to provide greater insight into the 
thought process behind the functioning of organised crime groups, and through this 
understanding perhaps devise an enhanced tactical basis to tackle those involved in 
‘initial nexus’ relationships. The chapter then closes on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the research to date, and illustrating potential high impact future work to 
enable progression in our understanding of the calculations of those working at this 




To understand the potential decisions of organised criminals in becoming involved in 
‘business’ relationships with terrorists necessitates gaining an understanding of those 
involved in organised crime, It is also necessary to gain an insight into work previously 
undertaken in relation to examine the nexus that exists between terrorists and organised 
criminals, also presented below.  
 
These previous works provide a developed picture of organised crime functionality, to 
which the entrepreneurial theories of Baumol (1990) and others in this specific field of 
research can be brought to bear, providing an overall synthesis of understanding of the 
phenomena of terrorism and organised crime interaction from an entrepreneurial 
perspective.  
 
Desroches provides a good starting point in furthering our understanding when he 
considers top end illegal drug suppliers, writing that ‘like business persons engaged in 
licit markets, dealers are rational actors who focus on profit, seek out economic 
opportunities, take into consideration the competition, are careful with their money, and 
attempt to minimise risk’ (Desroches, 2007, pp. 830). His position on these ‘illicit’ 
entrepreneurs may be equally applied to others involved in serious organised crime, the 
early definitions of which in the 1960’s focussed on the hierarchical known organised 
crime type, typified by the United States Mafia and studied in depth by Donald Cressey 
(1969).  
 
However, definitions quickly moved on, with Albini providing the alternative and 
particularly useful description only two years later: 
 
‘Rather than a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of a system of 
loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each participant is 
interested in furthering his own welfare’ 
      (Albini, 1971, pp. 288) 
 
Although controversial at the time, Albini’s definition now appears widely accepted in 
academic circles, particularly following the end of the cold war and the ‘globalisation’ 
accompanied by widespread insecurity the world has experienced since. Through this 
globalising effect, and reflecting Albini’s views, organised crime organisational 
dynamics are acknowledged as having changed dramatically, with the initially 
hierarchical identified groups, such as the Sicilian mafia, having transformed with 
‘most organised crime groups now operating as loose networked affiliations’ (Perri et 
al, 2009, pp. 27). Ridley notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led in Europe 
to the fundamental altering of old crime hierarchies as ‘smaller, equally ruthless 
organised crime groups have become apparent forming confederations of associations 
based upon ethnic and linguistic affinity…. (with) individual groups of criminals 
operating, either continuously or from time to time, in some form of loose association 
of neo-vertical criminal structures’ (Ridley, 2008, pp. 28). In agreeing Stanislawski and 
Herman note that organised crime groups have evolved from hierarchical structures 
with a small cadre of leaders to more network-based groups, with dispersed functions 
and activities (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004). In Northern Europe, in particular, 
‘legal and criminal business patterns develop pragmatically along trusted networks of 
friends and connections’ (Van Duyne, 1996, pp. 344). When one considers that the 
Mafia is believed to be Italy’s biggest business, with a suspect annual turnover of £116 
Billion (Squires, 2012) one begins to appreciate the sheer scale some of these criminal 
enterprises are functioning at.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union also ushered in a period of adjustment for many 
established terrorist organisations as their direct or indirect sources of funding 
disappeared, forcing them to adapt (Roth and Sever, 2007), as to continue functioning 
in any capacity for a terrorist group funding is a necessity (Bovenkerek and Chakra, 
2006; Clarke and Lee 2008; Stewart, 2010). Globalisation, with its loosening of state 
control, the end of established patterns of organised crime and terrorism structures, and 
the loss of conventional sources of terrorist finance has led to increasing opportunities 
for interaction between relevant illegal actors and groups that never occurred 
previously, with ever increasing ease of transportation and communication assisting 
this process (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004; Makarenko, 2004; Jamieson, 2005; 
Bratton, 2007). 
 
Terrorism’s reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals 
such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK14, who has stated that the 
organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of 
weapons (Roth and Sever, 2007). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear 
that the Continuity IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European 
sex traffickers, sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with 
their criminal enterprises (Byrne, 2010). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit 
commodity brokers to further their own ends, with ETA at one time ensuring the 
                                                 
14 The PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, is listed as a terrorist organisation operating primarily in the 
south east of Turkey. 
lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through 
contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania 
organised crime cartels (Saviano, 2007).  
 
Structural Similarities – Organised Crime Groups and Terrorists 
 
To further understand the basis of potential ‘business’ interaction one particularly needs 
to note the striking similarities of the operating structure of terrorists and organised 
criminals.  
 
Their style of co-operating and maintaining operating structures are noted by Robinson 
(2003), who found that in common with organised international drug traffickers, 
modern terrorist groups are highly compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to 
make quick necessary changes.  Sageman’s (2005) observations on the current jihadist 
terrorist structures directly correlate with the characteristics noted by Robinson.  
 
Perri et al. (2009) posit that organised crime has its strongest influence where the rule 
of law is at its weakest and where law enforcement performance is poor. They also note 
its particular prevalence where there are significant ethnic minority groups in a 
community that law enforcement have difficulty policing. Byrne notes that it is in 
‘regions with weakened social, political and economic controls’ (Byrne, 2009, pp. 11), 
that co-operation is often most obviously prevalent and that where it does exist it is very 
fluid in nature with the nature of the relationship between groups in no way formal. 
Although the co-operation may be most overt in weak states it does occur in more stable 
regions, but particularly in ‘parts of otherwise viable states where law and order is 
absent or compromised, including urban quarters populated by diaspora communities’ 
(Perri et al. 2009). In considering such environments it is not hard to identify these as 
‘places where the incentives aren’t very good for productive entrepreneurship, (where) 
people with the desire and talent to become entrepreneurs turn to crime’ (Shane, 2008).  
 
Of note, in relation to modern terrorism, expatriate communities are the recruiting 
ground of the current jihad against the west, the influence of friendship, kinship, shared 
isolation through expatriate experience has led to ‘seventy percent of the terrorists 
join(ing) the jihad as expatriates’ (Sageman, 2005, pp. 5). 
 
Forms of Co-operation between Terrorists and Organised Criminals 
 
In gaining an understanding of how any ‘business’ relationship function might work it 
is beneficial to consider known examples of organised criminal and terrorist 
relationships.  
 
Co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised 
criminals to terrorists. Examples of this are the Mexican drug cartels allowing 
Hezbollah to utilise its routes to smuggle persons and narcotics (Perri et al., 2009; 
Conery, 2009); Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company providing smuggling routes into India 
to Al-Qaeda (Clarke and Lee, 2008); the Naples based Camorra Mafia moving Al-
Qaeda throughout Europe (Chepesiuk, 2007); and, the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan utilising Afghan criminals to move Heroin into Russia (Makarenko, 2004). 
Attempts to establish further co-operative routes have also been subject to law 
enforcement interdiction as Mali origin Al-Qaeda operatives discovered when engaging 
with individuals they thought represented FARC15 but were in fact agents of the United 
States Drug Enforcement Agency (Sherwell, 2010).  
Further co-operation is likely, and evidence suggests ‘terrorists see it as logical and 
cost-effective to use the skills, contacts, communications and smuggling routes of 
established criminal networks rather than trying to gain the requisite experience and 
knowledge themselves’ (Shelley et al., 2005, pp. 62). Specialist services, including the 
provision of forged or falsified documents, such as passports (Botha, 2011); 
accountancy; legal advice (Robinson, 2003); access to corrupt officials (Shelley et al., 
2005); people trafficking/ smuggling (Wright, 2006); and, even arms may often be 
provided (Makarenko, 2004). This was recently illustrated through cases where it was 
suspected ‘dissident republicans succeeded in buying ‘heavy’ weapons from terrorist 
arms-dealing mobsters in south east Europe’ (McArdle, 2010) and an informant 
reporting, following the closure of the Reichstag in Berlin, that ‘two jihadists already 
located in Germany had sourced equipment they needed for an attack on the Reichstag 
from criminal groups in the Balkans’ (Swami, 2010). The well documented case of the 
Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings (Jamieson, 
2005) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-operation, while in 
Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to drug gangs is becoming 
an ever more common occurrence (Cusack, 2009). 
 
These co-operations can in fact lead to a form of metamorphosis, and to consider where 
a group stands we have the distinctions outlined by Jamieson thus: 
 
‘(A)  The self-financing of terrorist groups by typical ‘organised crime-type activities 
(B)  Pragmatic Collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for 
mutually beneficial ends 
(C) The use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes’ 
 
(Jamieson, 2005, pp. 165).  
 
  
                                                 
15 FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was formed in 1964 with a Marxist ideology 
and sought to overthrow the Columbian state through armed struggle, involving terrorist actions. They 
are a listed terrorist organisation. 
A sliding scale of metamorphosis is also referenced by Makarenko (2004), as illustrated 
below: 
 



















The phenomena of terrorism and organised crime are at opposite ends of a line, moving 
down this line when they form alliances or utilise the tactics of the other; enter a ‘black 
hole’, where they are no longer clearly organised criminals or a terrorist group but 
instead a confluence of the characteristics of both; and may ultimately mutate into a 
group categorised as being wholly transformed into one which fits the criteria of the 
other phenomena. Example of this are terrorist groups such as FARC and the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who have increasingly became involved in 
criminal activity, initially to fund their cause however as circumstances altered they 
mutated into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal 
organisations driven by profit (Byrne, 2009). These organisations have fallen into 
Makarenko’s ‘black hole’, becoming mutated organisations, no longer serving their 
original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. Excellent examples of 
organised crime’s move to the use of terror tactics for political are the earlier mentioned 
bombing tactics of the ELN, and the similar bombing tactics adopted by the Sicilian 
mafia (Jamieson, 2005). 
 
In considering the starting point of Makarenko’s scale, which would encompass 
Jamieson’s point B, Madsen (2009) looks at how terrorists would conceivably purchase 
forged documents while organised crime groups would in turn perhaps purchase 
explosives from terrorists. He sees advantages and disadvantages to both of such 
arrangements, the disadvantages perhaps leading to dissolution of the arrangement or a 
group moving on down Makarenko’s scale (A or C in Jamieson’s options) as expertise 




Although these similarities in structure and personnel antecedents are now 
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are very distinct, as Bovenkerek and Chakra (2006) caution when they accept that 
although structural similarities are obvious, the ever important distinctions of their 
criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of 
terrorism are important distinction to maintain.  
 
On an intellectual level terrorism and organised crime have little in common ‘since the 
former is based on ideological, religious or political principles, while the latter on profit 
motives’ (Madsen, 2009, pp. 64). Jamieson (2005) agrees that both phenomena need to 
be seen as distinct concepts, while both authors acknowledge that either phenomenon 
can utilise the methods and tactics of the other, and do. For Madsen in analysing groups 
it is important to remain focussed on motivation, as ‘the intent for specific acts 
committed by two groups might overlap, their motivations do not’ (Madsen, 2009, pp. 
78). As Dishman also observes, ‘simply put, drug barons and revolutionary leaders do 
not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings or extort local 
businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or alter the political landscape 
in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may also employ terrorism as a 
tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution and make money’ (Dishman, 




The similarities between terrorism and organised crime give an indication of two 
phenomena that have common features and pose interesting queries as to interaction on 
encounters, and what can happen when their operating models collide rather than 
compliment. For instance, just as there are many similarities this is not to say that co-
operation will in any way always be the norm. Byrne notes the rivalry that often exists 
between organised crime groups and terrorists when terrorist groups encroach onto 
established criminal activity, such as the PKK’s bloody participation in the Heroin trade 
in Turkey (Byrne, 2009) or PIRA’s murder of established criminals in its drive to 
establish hegemony over the Irish drugs market (Cusack, 2006). 
 
Rivalry may not be the only issue causing concern over co-operation to those involved 
in either phenomenon. An agenda of radical political change may well lead to 
significant altering of the norms of a state’s functioning, to the detriment of the profit 
of an organised crime enterprise (Jamieson, 2005; Byrne, 2009). Terrorist activity in a 
well-functioning state will bring with it considerable additional law enforcement 
attention, attention that could, through investigative endeavour, become focussed on 
those co-operating with the terrorist group. This is a considerable risk factor for any 
organised criminal embarking on co-operation (Chepesiuk, 2007). Organised crime in 
any society functions with some form of law enforcement consideration on the part of 
the criminals be that from carefully planned avoidance, as noted by Albini (1975) in 
relation to ‘successful’ Scottish organised criminals, to parasitic co-operative assistance 
achieved through corruption. Where an organised crime group functions away from 
protection provided through state corruption any contact with law enforcement can 
prove devastating. However, were the activities of the terrorist group likely to adversely 
affect law enforcement agencies abilities to function this may prove beneficial to the 
organised crime group both in hiding their involvement in the interaction but also in 
terms of assisting their core functioning. Similarly, knowledge of a terrorists groups 
activities may become a very useful bargaining tool with law enforcement should an 
organised crime group’s core functioning be compromised; a tactic of holding 
intelligence on confederates for ‘get out of jail’ purposes has been utilised by organised 
criminals for some time (Albini, 1975). In addition, many organised criminals can be 
quite ‘dull’ and despite the illicit nature of the commodity in which they trade may be 
otherwise very risk averse (Van Duyne, 1996), although conversely Fairlie suspects 
that ‘the nature of drug dealing makes it likely to be attractive to individuals who are 
less risk averse, have more entrepreneurial ability and have a preference for autonomy, 
all else equal’ (Fairlie, 1999, pp. 3). Whatever attitude to risk the organised criminal 
has the degree to which they might become involved in any way with terrorists is highly 
questionable. Just as no terrorist group is identical, neither is any organised crime 
group.  
 
Jamieson (2005) sees co-operative endeavours as inevitable given the specialisations 
available to both groups, but overall believes such co-operations would be wholly 
pragmatic and only likely to last as long as there is a tangible benefit outweighing risk 
to both sides in the arrangement. Clarke and Lee (2008) go further, seeing these 
partnerships as becoming indissoluble and insightfully question how long Makarenko’s 
scale will hold true, with the conflagration between what once would have been 
regarded as distinct groupings on such a scale becoming ever closer.  
 
An interesting quote in respect of the interaction, reported to have been made by a senior 
mafia figure in relation to what level of co-operation his organisation would provide to 
terrorists is that ‘the Mafia will help whoever can pay’ (Stuart, 2006). Also of 
substantial interest is the suggestion that ‘British criminal gangs … have admitted 
terrorist organisations (including PIRA), flushed with cash, into their substantial black 
markets’ (Kochan, 2005, pp. 83-84). 
 
Putting all matters outlined into a conceivable scale of potential co-operation is 
difficult; however, when one considers that Ridley (2008) quotes a UK Metropolitan 
Police Spokesman from the Counter Terrorist Command as saying that two thirds of 
the organised crime groups in the UK have an involvement with terrorism, this presents 






 The rules of the game that determine the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial 
activities do change dramatically from one time and place to another.’ 
 
(Baumol, 1990, pp. 899) 
 
When one considers that ‘resilience to the economic crisis, competent risk management 
and search for new markets (organised ‘business development’) are some of the 
distinctive features of organised crime groups in the last decade’ (Kolesikova, 2011, 
pp. 11) a belief could be formed that organised crime groups sound very like legitimate 
businesses. They aren’t. Just as they have to take account of the threat of law 
enforcement activity, suffer from an inability to advertise, and must constantly consider 
the prospect of robbery and violence from rivals (Desroches, 2007), so too they will 
reflect their member’s idiosyncratic circumstances. Criminal entrepreneurs do not exist 
in a vacuum, or in the traditional ‘free market’ per se. It is not only the obvious limiting 
factors of their illicit trade Desroches references that implicitly arise from its illegality 
that affect their decision making in differing ways to the licit merchant, but in addition 
subtle facets of their peculiar ‘criminal culture’. 
 
Baumol’s ‘Proposition One’ outlined above is an ideal starting point for the wider 
considerations that affect entrepreneurs. An excellent example he provides is of a poor 
but free individual in the Roman Republic, who may consciously make the decision to 
become a slave. Such a choice, to sacrifice virtually all of ones essence as an individual, 
intrinsically seems bizarre to a rational 21st century actor. However, in outlining the 
gains such an individual could potentially make through the patronage of a suitably 
well-disposed master that may lead to eventual financial security as a ‘freedman’, 
versus their precarious circumstances as Roman ‘citizen’,  Baumol captures the 
massively important issue of the particularity of culture in its impact on an entrepreneur 
and their decisions. 
 
Culture as a Facet of Criminal Entrepreneurship 
 
In his seminal work ‘Dark Market’ Misha Glenny (2011) considers the most modern 
typology of organised criminal, the hacker, a fitting historic counterbalance to 
Baumol’s hypothetical Roman freedman. The motivations of these most ultra-modern 
thieves are fascinating. JiLsi, a hacker of considerable renown and acknowledged 
master of the ‘dark web’ where criminality abounds and a ‘hit man’ can be hired at the 
click or two of a mouse, is frank in sharing with Glenny that much of his illegal activity 
was not solely profit focussed but was instead also targeted at the maintenance of his 
criminal reputation amongst his peers.  
 
In a similar vein, Smith (2009) notes that ‘entrepreneurial propensity appears to provide 
the criminal with an alternative legitimacy’ (Smith, 2009, pp. 163). The world in which 
the organised criminal operates is one with its own rules and conventions, perhaps as 
alien to the average 21st century citizen as that inhabited by Baumol’s Roman 
freedman.  
 
Recent crimes in Mexico have featured extreme violence, with the heads of rival cartel 
members often dumped in the most shocking of circumstances16. Grillo, when 
interviewing Mexican Serious and Organised Crime Group member Jose Antonio aka 
‘frijol’, an individual steeped in this activity (personally responsible for armed robbery, 
murders and drug dealing) gives us a starting point for understanding a mind-set very 
different to the norm. Frijol lives in a world parallel to most where ‘the gang becomes 
like your home, your family. It is where you find friendship and people to talk to. It is 
where you feel part of something’ (Grillo, 2012). 
 
A scary place for many, but for frijol this is his normality. Similarly the ‘dark 
marketeers’, the administrators of illicit web activity, have a very different concept of 
normality. While they kept an eye out for child porn, drugs and weapons it was not 
from any sense of moral outrage but instead to minimise law enforcement interest. 
However, even for these apparently amoral (to the eyes of most) individuals there were 
rules, with clear concepts of what constituted a ‘scumbag’ (in their world vision) or a 
                                                 
16 Details of the extreme and often bizarre violence and intimidation at play in the Mexican drug 
conflicts is well summarised by the BBC at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18063328  
‘ripper’, ‘criminals who refused to adhere to the rules of the underworld’ (Glenny, 
2011, pp. 158), these (apparently) bizarre rules relating to what was and wasn’t 
acceptable when stealing the credit card details of the law abiding.  
 
In my own previous research (Gallagher, 2014) where I interviewed a number of 
Detectives involved in the investigation of organised crime there was commonality in 
their opinion that there is a moral code amongst criminals. Many independently made 
an analogy to paedophilic offences, where such behaviour was perceived to be out with 
norms for criminals would be deemed unacceptable, that there are simply ‘unwritten 
rules’.  One participant alluded to the case of an abduction in Edinburgh17. In this case 
individuals heavily involved in organised crime that it was thought would not co-
operate with the Police in fact did, with the ‘criminal code’ seeing this abduction and 
the anticipated murder of a boy unconnected to criminality proving to be a ‘step too 
far’.  
 
These apparent ‘red lines’ of behaviour may appear to differ between criminal 
typologies, with those of my Detectives acquaintance taking a different attitude to 
paedophilia that JiLsi and his cohort. However individual behaviours aside another 
factor is at work here, that of distance.  It is not only an ‘alternative’ moral code, but 
instead other ‘culture specific’ factors that might affect the organised criminal’s 
decision making process. 
 
A Potential Model  
 
From the work outlined so far in this chapter it appears there are a number of specific 
considerations any organised criminal will take into account before entering into and 




In my study (Gallagher, 2014) participants thought there were clear distinctions in 
relation to contacts between terrorists and organised criminals regarding preparation for 
terrorist activity. If the terrorism was Irish related and concerned activity to occur in 
Northern Ireland or England participants did not think a Scottish Organised Crime 
Group would object, however if the attacks were to take place in Scotland this would 
not be tolerated.  
 
This has interesting parallels with a number of historic matters relating to commodities 
now considered illicit, perhaps most telling being the British Government’s attitude to 
the supply of Opium. When Opium was being manufactured in British territories for 
consumption within the confines of the rival empire of China the British Government 
was content to gain the revenue received and leave the social ills of the trade to the 
Chinese. However, when the trade spread to its own colonies and ultimately the shores 
                                                 
17 In the case alluded to a Liverpool based criminals were duped when supplying £250,000 worth of 
Heroin to an Edinburgh based crime group. To exact revenge they contacted Glasgow based criminals 
they had social contact with and thereafter both groups travelled to Edinburgh with the likely intention 
of abducting and murdering the members of the Edinburgh crime group. During their activities in 
Edinburgh they abducted an innocent party and subsequently attempted to extract a ransom for their 
safe return. 
 
of the mainland through the docks in Liverpool attitudes changed dramatically 
(Newark, 2011). 
 
The kudos for say Turkish diaspora organised criminals working in London may be 
very different if their network is operating in conjunction with the PKK as opposed to 
members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). While the PKK may have direct 
relevance to the members of the diaspora community they inhabit the UVF, whose 
‘cause’ in no way impacts upon their Turkish roots, would be unlikely to.  While both 
might be seen to be ‘risky business’, from the potential law enforcement focus that can 
be attracted, the relationship to the PKK might have significant cultural impact, while 
that with the UVF is simply profit based.  
 
For JiLsi the paedophiles of his encountering are anonymous web abusers, while for 
the organised criminals of my Detectives experience who lived in generally stagnant 
communities the paedophiles of their experience were exposed as being on their 
doorstep; or within their shared prison. JiLsi and his ilk have these abusers far from 
their area of operation, while those based in conventional rather than virtual 
communities do not. Action by these organised criminals will be heard of by those who 





Organised Criminals, such as frijol and JiLsi through their networks (or hierarchies) by 
necessity in pursuit of their illicit enterprises interact with other actors involved in 
organised crime. Just as there may be said to be certain rules within these interactions 
so too exists a highly prized and extremely valuable commodity – reputation. 
 
Baumol’s slave would not progress to become the well rewarded ‘freedman’ through 
polishing his master’s amphora alone. Baumol’s assertion is that if progression comes 
it will be through acknowledged hard work, and perhaps less savoury sexual favours 
performed at their master’s behest. In the world of the 21st century criminal reputation 
is obtained and maintained very differently, with violence, or the threat of violence, 
often present (Desroches, 2007).  
 
Establishing this reputation, which it is likely will be necessary to operate, in addition 
to being self-rewarding18 will not be easy. Individuals involved in organised crime 
activity often share common lineage, schooling, culture and associations; all the factors 
perceived as necessary for the safe establishment of trust for a working relationship to 
develop (Van Duyne, 1996).  
 
A further location where establishment of the bona fides of potential criminal partners 
presents is that of incarceration. Common confinement allows for details of any new 
contacts past to be easily checked by research and discussion amongst the wider prison 
population. Outside of prison, ‘referencing’ by trusted and established individuals is a 
common method enabling the establishment of new ties. It SOCG members boast about 
past exploits and their wider connections, the listener is able to ascertain the veracity of 
                                                 
18 As per Smith’s (2009) hypothesis. 
their tales and thereby satisfy themselves as to the status of their new contact, prior to 
embarking on any involvement with the individual. 
 
Verifying the details of associates, to avoid being ‘ripped off’ or arrested, are essential 
features of the organised criminals business model. When the associates are engaged in 
terrorism the risks, and ‘rewards’ within criminal culture, significantly multiply.  
 
Detectives in my study into the interactions between organised criminals and terrorists 
in Scotland (Gallagher, 2014) raised the issue of ‘kudos’, their perception being that 
while the organised criminals can support the terrorists logistically, the terrorists can 
also support the organised criminals, as the criminals reputation in the circles in which 
they move could be greatly enhanced through the association.  Participant FC (detective 
investigating serious and organised crime) thought that in Scotland this type of 
arrangement would be most likely in relation to Irish Related Terrorism and unlikely 
with International Terrorism. Participant IF (senior detective officer) had a similar 
view, and thought that this ‘kudos’ would be of particular import were an organised 
criminal with this known association be incarcerated. In such a situation during 
incarceration and thereafter in criminal circles the notoriety of such an association 
would significantly enhance their ‘criminal prestige’.  
 
It seems that such perceptions hold beyond criminals based in Scotland. Swaine (2013), 
when interviewing a criminal lieutenant of James “Whitey” Bulger, a notorious Boston 
Gangster who shipped weapons to PIRA, confirms the views of Smith (2009), stating 
that ‘Whitey loved being associated with the IRA and the cause of Irish freedom. I think 
he liked the legitimacy a political cause gave him’19 (Swaine, 2013).  
 
Returning to the distance differential for JiLsi and the ‘traditional’ organised criminals 
described above it could be rationally argued that action by the traditional organised 
criminals against a paedophile, a criminal seen to be operating outwith accepted 
parameters may well positively affect their standing within their criminal community, 




In my earlier study (Gallagher, 2014) all the participants were clear that an approach 
by the authorities seeking engagement to thwart the activities of a terrorist group an 
organised crime group were involved with would be most likely to succeed where the 
criminals calculated it was in their best interests, be that through early stage intervention 
mitigating consequence to them or through a reduction in sanction against them. 
Although levels of established trust and mutually shared backgrounds or cultures would 
be influential, in co-operation with a terrorist group being exposed to an organised 
crime group, its members, in the words of one participant would “be at their selfish 
best”, and seek to minimise the consequences to themselves and their organisation. Few 
participants envisaged organised criminals making an approach to the authorities if they 
learned of a plotted terrorist action, even through an intermediary, unless the level of 
their own exposure in light of the action was significant. 
                                                 
19 James ‘Whitey’ Bulger operated the White Hill Gang in South Boston for a number of decades, 
skilfully playing the local police off against the FBI while assisting PIRA through the large scale 
importation of weapons from the USA to Northern Ireland. He was on the run for 16 years, being 
ultimately tracked down and convicted of 11 murders in 2013. 
 
Participants also believed that during any risk calculation undertaken by an organised 
crime group the elimination of contacts within terrorist groups to minimise their 
exposure would occur, balanced against any financial loss that may result from such an 
action. It was not thought that the threat of retaliation from the terrorist group would be 
an immediate concern; rather that minimising potential exposure of the crime group 




A common feature of criminal relations is deception, with both parties often resorting 
to masking the true nature of their activities. This may be, for instance to maintain 
connections in a supply network unknown to competitors e.g. showing close links to 
one city giving the impression this is where commodity is sourced, while in fact it is 
(safely) obtained elsewhere. In a relationship with a terrorist group such a form of 
deception may be undertaken by the terrorists who could purport to simply be an 
organised crime group to minimise the concerns of partner criminals, operating a 
criminal fundraising ‘front’ while funnelling profit to their true terrorist purpose. 
Obviously, discovery of this deception may have significant affect upon any ongoing 
illicit business venture. 
 
Similarly, ‘discovery’ of a terrorist group through actions intended to induce fear, the 
purpose of terrorist action to drive political change will lead to increased media focus. 
A bombing campaign or such will draw international media attention on all parts of the 
operation, a likely feature of the terrorists intent and the very opposite typically of the 
organised criminals who while happy to operate in their own criminal communities 





Public revulsion at their participation in assisting terrorist action is not the only factor 
here that may arise from media attention, as the particular predilections of some 
organised criminals may enjoy this form of public dis-claim, particularly if it gains them 
kudos amongst their own criminal culture peers or sub culture, such as Bulger 
experienced through his links to PIRA discussed above. What will likely follow from 
increased media attention and public revulsion will be political and law enforcement 
interest, which in a well-functioning society may well prove fatal to the organised crime 
group, with members arrested and receiving significant periods of incarceration, and 
legislation enacted to particularly tackle their behaviours.  
 
Finally, while the relationship between the organised criminal and terrorist may play 
out in the background to their mutual benefit external factors can prove to have seismic 
consequences. The 1990’s President Bush initiated ‘War on Drugs’ led to the targeting 
of Colombian drug cartels by that state, with the assistance of the US. As the United 
States House Committee on Foreign Affairs (2014) recently heard this resulted 
ultimately in their significant disruption but had the unintended consequence of the 
FARC who provided the cartels with security filling the void and themselves becoming 
drug suppliers; the Shining Path group in Peru20 seeing a similar gap in the market and 
being resuscitated from a then apparent terminal decline; and also unfortunately the 
establishment of the Mexican drug cartels represented above by Grillo’s exemplar 
frijol. 
 
Illustrating the Potential Model  
 
As stated above, all organised criminals are individuals, and their particular 
peccadilloes will affect this decision making process. However, the model below 
outlines the potential considerations they will have to make, taking Baumol’s 









                                                 
20 The Shining Path are listed as a terrorist group. They commenced operations in Peru in 1980 and had 
almost disappeared following the capture of their leader in 1992. 
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While it would be impossible to capture all idiosyncrasies of an organised criminals decision 
making process this model seeks to illustrate the main internal and external factors that will 





The main External Factors that will affect the ongoing ‘initial nexus’ relationship are: 
 
 Increased/ Decreased Law Enforcement Interest – The level of law enforcement activity 
will be directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the initial nexus can 
undertake without potential and/or actual interdiction or arrest. 
 Media Interest – The amount of media interest will impact on the ability of the initial 
nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public knowledge. 
 Deception – The degree to which either party have been misled in an initial nexus 
relationship will have a bearing on the degree to which they co-operate and discovery 
of the deception will have a direct impact on continuing trust. 
 Changing World Events – From the man made to the natural (such as earthquakes, 
tsunamis and disease) calamitous world events may prove disastrous or advantageous 
to any initial nexus relationship. 
 
These external factors will combine to affect the decision making process of the organised 
criminal. 
 
For the organised crime group themselves the following Internal Factors are of relevance: 
 
 Individual – The psychological makeup of the participants in the organised crime group 
or in a strictly controlled group, its leader, will have a direct bearing on the relationship. 
The attitude to risk, personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any 
controlling ‘red lines’ on behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or 
widespread notoriety (or perceived adulation) will all be determining factors. 
 Reputation – The degree to which knowledge of the initial nexus relationship has a 
positive or negative affect on the Organised Crime Groups standing amongst criminal 
peers and ‘relevant wider society’. 
 Distance – How closely the terrorist group acts to the location of the organised crime 
group and their wider ‘society’ will be of direct relevance to all relationship 
calculations. 
 Profit – The degree to which the organised crime group is dependent on the initial nexus 
relationship to continue its funding and any alternative revenue streams that are 
available as a contingency if the relationship is discontinued will be relevant.  
 Co-operation: The extent to which the initial nexus relationship impacts upon the 
organised crime groups operations, through for instance security of commodity routes 
or expert knowledge of explosives will require to be considered. 
 
Combined these internal and external factors form a balance sheet of competing considerations 
from which the organised criminal contemplating entering or maintaining an initial nexus 
relationship with a terrorist group will consider. This model is not exhaustive but shows from 
the research to date that contemplation of such a relationship does not amount to a purely profit 
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based calculation. For the organised criminal monetary gain may indeed be the driving factor, 




Understanding the ‘Initial Nexus’ from an entrepreneurial perspective 
 
The factors that affect the decision making process of any individual are many. It is the 
decisions that have the greatest implications that become the hardest. For an organised criminal 
considering working with terrorists, an ‘initial nexus’ relationship, the tariff is exceptionally 
high. Accepting that the organised criminals main pursuit is ‘profit’, in its widest sense, and 
acknowledging the nuances of their relationships with their peers and society, as large scale 
contributing factors to the manner of their operations, the potential impact of working with 
those seeking an entirely different purpose (that of political change engendered through 
extreme behaviour) it is not difficult to imagine the mental grind of the calculation to participate 
in such a relationship or not. 
 
The calculation process of the organised criminal in such a situation will involve many factors, 
including those out with their control, as the proposed model above illustrates. It is not single 
entries in this ledger of decision making activity that matter alone, their effect is cumulative 
and individual circumstance dependent. No two organised criminals or groups will operate the 
same way in an initial nexus relationship, just as their operational methods will vary widely. 
However they will all be faced with the same calculation process when considering working 
with terrorists, to which they will bring their particular circumstances to bear.  
 
Exploiting the detail of this decision making process is perhaps where policy should be 
focussed by the state, in pursuit of law enforcement gain. The referenced recent hearings by 
the United States Congress Foreign Affairs Committee illustrate the high level of interest in 
these relationships, of which little is really substantially known.  
 
Accepting the dangers of the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime interacting, to sway 
organised criminals away from participating in initial nexus relationships will involve making 
them wholly unattractive propositions. To do this will necessitate bringing sufficient external 
pressure onto the illustrated decisions making process. This could be achieved by: ensuring 
such relationships were reputationally toxic, whatever the circumstances of the criminals 
particular social groupings; identifying and punishing initial nexus relationships in a draconian 
manner through targeted legislation; focussing law enforcement intelligence gathering and 
interdiction efforts on such relationships; and through a targeted focus on the spoils such a 
relationship brings ensure that any profit resulting from the relationship is squeezed, actively 
targeted and appropriately seized. If an organised criminal does not profit operationally, 
reputationally or monetarily from an initial nexus relationship it will follow that he will be most 
unlikely to pursue one.  
 
Potential for Further Research 
 
Direct interaction with organised crime group members would provide excellent information 
as to how any ‘initial nexus’ relationship might function. Ideally, criminals with known cultural 
affinity to terrorist causes and those without could be identified, in the UK context ideally both 
in relation to Irish related and international terrorism. Further organised crime group members 
with no known cultural affinities could also be identified. The views of these individuals could 
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then be gathered in relation to specific issues around an ‘initial nexus’ relationship, to test the 
theory of the model posited above. From this greater insight not only into how relationships 
might occur would be forthcoming, but also a greater understanding of where the substantial 
risk of such relationships do indeed lie. Access to such subjects would possibly be best 
achieved through interaction with those incarcerated or undertaking probationary work, which 
would give the added benefit of the potential to explore the significance of the criminal justice 
system, and specifically prisons, to enabling potential terrorist and organised criminal 
relationships. 
 
An exploration of any ‘criminal code’ amongst organised crime group members and 
commonality of standards that might exist would be very interesting; in additional to exploring 
their entrepreneurial outlook and the bearing these standards might have upon it. Exploring 
such ‘codes’ and what effect they might have on association to terrorism and association to 







4.4 “Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and 
Organised Crime”, ICCT Perspectives Series  
Exploring the Nuanced Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime 
 
In this Perspective, I aim to illustrate that although the crime-terror nexus has attracted 
significant attention of late, it is not a new phenomenon and it has past iterations that offer 
useful lessons for its present form. I reference my own experience as a police officer in Scotland 
and draw parallels to far older diaspora communities than the populations currently facing 
scrutiny. Over the following pages, a number of factors are outlined that I believe are crucial 
to a nexus relationship. The perspective concludes with a look to the future and offers some 
suggestions for practitioners and policy makers working on this complex topic.  
 
Research in Scotland, Links to Northern Ireland 
 
As a serving police officer with 24 years’ experience, my journey into undertaking research on 
the nexus between terrorism and organised crime began when I read this quote attributed to an 
American mobster: ‘The Mafia will help whoever can pay’. I came across it while undertaking 
a Master’s Degree at St. Andrews, and it felt so at odds with my own experience of 
investigating organised criminals and the reality of their multi-faceted personalities. Given this, 
I was moved to look into the matter further, and assess whether the quote stood scrutiny or was 
problematic as my intuition indicated.  
 
Initially, this interest led me to look at my native Scotland and the nexus that existed between 
terrorism and organised crime there. What I found, through research, interviews and focus 
groups, was that a factor of particular importance to understanding potential cooperation 
between organised criminals and terrorists, were the nation’s various diaspora communities. 
However, these were not communities that had arrived in relatively recent travel from less 
developed nations, but instead those that had come into existence some hundreds of years 
previously and which were, and still are, closely linked to Ireland.  
 
Scottish emigration to Ireland took place through the ‘plantations’ in Ulster of the 1600s, while 
Irish immigration to Scotland largely occurred in the aftermath of the potato famine of the 
1840s, although there has been continuing movement between the islands since. Within these 
movements there was emigration of some with strong ‘loyalist’ sentiments, and immigration 
of others with ‘republican’ beliefs. For generations, through organisations that span both 
islands such as the Loyalist ‘Orange Order’, contact and strong bonds have consistently been 
maintained. With the onset of Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ in the 1960s, Scotland became a 
support hub for both communities involved in the struggle. Although arrests were made of 
individuals connected to the conflict who were using safe houses in Scotland, no terrorist action 
related to the Troubles ever occurred within Scottish borders. 
  
As the Troubles wore on, both the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA), along with their adversaries in the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA), became more heavily involved in criminality as a funding stream. Commencing with 
the establishment of illegal drinking dens in the areas under their control from 1968 onwards, 
these groups’ fundraising grew increasingly sophisticated, with ‘security firms’, which were in 
fact a front for extorting the business community, and controlled illegal gambling becoming 
the norm. Conversely, however, this immersion in criminality also seeped into both sides’ 
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Scottish support bases, who began to undertake actions for both profit as well as for funding 
terrorist activities. 
 
With the apparent arrival of peace in Northern Ireland following 1998’s Good Friday 
Agreement, many assumed that these organisations and their support bases would wither and 
die, but this has been far from the case. Attacks on security forces in Northern Ireland from 
dissident factions continue, with some speculating much of this is to retain a form of legitimacy 
for burgeoning crime enterprises. Similar motives appear to be at play among both groups’ 
Scottish support bases. For example, 2012’s ‘Operation Hairsplitter’ was mounted by the 
Scottish police as a response to dissident republicans’ plans to murder dissident Loyalists. The 
operation aimed to remove firearms from organised criminals in Glasgow and demonstrated 
that the relationship between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland was still very much 
alive. 
 
This brief overview illustrates that the ‘crime-terror nexus’, which has drawn so much attention 
recently, is certainly not a new phenomenon. Neither is it a connection which can be easily 
accounted for. In the remainder of this op-ed, I draw upon both my professional background 
and academic work to present some key things to consider for both researchers and those in the 
counterterrorism policymaker or practitioner communities. 
 
For money and honour 
 
Organised criminals operate in a risky environment. They have the constant threat of discovery 
by law enforcement, coupled to their lack of a ‘regulatory body’. When deals go bad, or they 
are ripped off, organised criminals must maintain their reputation or risk others taking 
advantage of them. For the police officers I spoke with during my research into this matter, and 
from my own experience, reputation rather than cash is the key commodity for an organised 
criminal. To operate in the murky world of organised crime, you must be trusted not to be an 
informant or an undercover agent. You must have sufficient kudos to be taken seriously, and 
not seem like an easy target for those you are dealing with to take advantage of. The threat of 
potential violence is never far from the surface of interactions in order to retain legitimacy. 
Additionally, you must be conscious of the level of attention you are drawing to your activities 
and have sufficient cover to explain the profits you are making. 
 
In short, what my own experience, the opinions of my colleagues, and other authors on the 
subject highlight, is that those immersed in organised crime (and terrorism for that matter) hold 
particular ‘value sets’. While they may be far-removed from those of the general public who 
obey the rule of law, they are values and associated norms of expected behaviour nonetheless. 
This is a point with particular relevance for understanding the crime-terror nexus. 
 
On a number of occasions during my research into organised criminals’ relationships with 
terrorists, the analogy of paedophilia was made. Paedophilia is seen as a wholly unacceptable 
behaviour in most societies, a crime beyond the pale, and this is a ‘value’ on which both law-
abiding citizens and criminals appear to agree. Prison is an excellent setting to see in action the 
opinions of other criminals regarding this behaviour. Those convicted of paedophilia are 
segregated, and during rioting are always targeted for extreme punishment by their fellow 
inmates. Why? Because they are seen as breaching the societal norms of criminal society, as 
having broken a form of ‘taboo’. Criminals, like anyone else, have governing operating 
parameters on behaviour, and it seems that this one form of criminality is simply unacceptable 
to the vast majority, drawing considerable opprobrium. Also, attacking these individuals 
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positively affects the social standing of those undertaking the attack, providing an uplift in their 
‘reputation’. 
 
Until approximately 2011, my colleagues in the Scottish police viewed the likeliness of 
Scottish criminals assisting those involved in international jihadist terrorism akin to criminals 
assisting a paedophile; in other words, as a ‘deal too far’. The cultural distance between Scottish 
organized criminals and groups such as al-Qaeda meant that, were such a relationship to be 
discovered, the former would likely suffer catastrophic reputational damage amongst their 
peers and wider society. All the more so if the terrorists’ actions affected those socially 
connected to the criminals in question. Conversely, however, if the relationship were to involve 
criminals and terrorists from a shared background, the former’s ‘stock’ might actually rise 
through benefit of association with ‘the cause’. An excellent example of this in relation to the 
Troubles is James ‘Whitey’ Bulger, a Boston-based organised criminal whose arms smuggling 
on behalf of the PIRA made him a feared and respected criminal, and directly impacted on his 
ability to have an advantageous and manipulative relationship with law enforcement agencies 
for decades.  
 
Determining factors for a crime-terror nexus 
 
Reputational considerations, therefore, appear to be a key element governing potential crime-
terror relationships. But, based on both my own research on this topic and relevant professional 
experience, both my own and that of my colleagues, several other factors stand out as relevant 
for determining whether a ‘crime-terrorism nexus’ can come into being. Although previous 
examples have focused on terrorism related to the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’, these observations 
are partly drawn from, and believed to be relevant to, the contemporary threat posed by groups 
like the Islamic State (IS) as well. 
 
First of all, there is the individual dimension to consider. The psychological makeup of the 
participants in an organised crime group and the personality and standing of its leader(s) will 
have a direct bearing on any potential crime-terrorism relationship. Criminals’ attitude to risk, 
their personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any controlling ‘red lines’ on 
behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or widespread notoriety (or perceived 
adulation) will all be determining factors. Closely related are considerations of reputation, or 
the degree to which knowledge of the nexus relationship is perceived as having a positive or 
negative affect on the organized criminals’ standing amongst criminal peers and relevant 
elements within wider society. 
 
Of similar weight is the consideration of distance. How close a potential terrorist partner may 
operate in relation to the organised criminal group’s own society will be of direct relevance to 
all relationship calculations. We then come to the consideration that started this investigation, 
namely that of profit. A crucial consideration here is the degree to which the organised crime 
group is dependent on the nexus relationship to continue its funding and whether any 
alternative revenue streams may be available as a contingency if the relationship is 
discontinued. Moreover, in maintaining any nexus relationship, the participants need to 
consider their degree of co-operation. Simply put, if the relationship falls apart will this change 
impact significantly on other elements of criminal operations. For example, will the availability 
of ‘expertise’ in relation to explosives or access to a smuggling route be lost? 
 
As with all parties involved in nefarious enterprises, actual or perceived deception by one of 
the nexus partners will have a bearing on the degree to which cooperation is established and 
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deemed worthwhile. External factors that will impact any nexus relationship include increased 
or decreased law enforcement interest as the level of law enforcement activity will be 
directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the nexus can undertake without 
potential or actual interdiction or arrest. Similarly, the amount of media interest will impact 
on the ability of the nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public 
knowledge.  
 
Every terrorist and organised crime group is different, and the weight that each participant in a 
crime-terror nexus places on these factors will differ. However, in determining the risk of 




We have an increasing number of diaspora communities emerging across Europe, and this 
diversity can, of course, be a fantastic addition to our societies. However, it has to be 
acknowledged that some elements within these communities have incubated significant 
terrorist threats. Just as the organised criminals of Glasgow went to the same schools, gyms 
and social hangouts as some of those involved in Northern Irish terrorism, so too have some 
criminal individuals within the more recent diaspora communities interacted with extremist 
elements. The finding that many Western citizens who joined IS as foreign fighters were 
previously engaged in criminality is well documented. Clearly, the potential ways in which 
criminal pasts do and do not lead on to terrorism need to be better understood. 
 
In Scotland, the police are making concerted efforts to work closely with and on behalf of all 
of our communities, for instance by establishing bespoke recruitment assistance programs to 
encourage diversity within the force. There are also efforts such as the Grey Space21 
Community Tension Monitoring Group, which I established and initially chaired in 
Renfrewshire and Inverclyde. Its purpose is to bring all of our communities, established and 
emerging, together and gain trust and understanding amongst community leaders. A Catholic 
Bishop, Mosque Chairman, LGBT representatives and community leaders from our Polish, 
African and our more recent refugee populations sit together, forming new bonds and 
discussing shared concerns. The diversity and cultural influences diaspora communities bring 
should be harnessed for the betterment of all, while remaining cognizant of the fact that some 
elements within these communities could harbour dangerous links with extremist elements 
both domestically and internationally. It is through mutual understanding, trust and cooperation 
that important first steps towards identifying such potential threats can be made.  
 
Looking ahead 
                                                 
21 In his book ‘The New Threat from Islamic Militancy’ Jason Burke discusses Islamic State’s desire to 
annihilate the ‘grey zone’ that exists between communities, with them espousing a binary world view of ‘with 
us or against us’. I took this concept and met with all the community leaders outlined individually, where they 
agreed the meeting of minds was what made the pluralist West function well. After we had become a  group, and 
adopted the name I suggested members arrived collectively at the following definition: 
‘Grey Space exists to foster a community of healthy relationships through mutual collaboration of all its 
stakeholders and it is noted by the Grey Space Group that community tension is partly natural and not 
intrinsically bad, since justice is constantly being refined in dynamic societies – and we should expect some 
tension in healthy communities. For example, community activism and public protest are legitima te and 
potentially creative activities, though they may cause tensions. People have the right to express opinions and to 
‘peaceful assembly’, providing they are not stirring up hatred. These can often be positive means of promoting 





So, what of the future? Although the demise of the Islamic State as a territorial entity appears 
to be well underway, the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq is likely to remain a primary 
concern. Over the past several years, somewhere between 5000 and 7000 individuals from the 
West are believed to have travelled to participate in the jihad as foreign fighters. In the UK 
alone, 400 are thought to have returned, with only 40 prosecuted so far. 
 
Those who travelled to fight in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, whether for jihadist factions or 
those opposed to them, have likely acquired a skill set uniquely suited to participation in 
organised crime. They have functioned within organisations with rules far removed from the 
societal norms of the West, and many will have acquired expertise in the use of firearms and 
explosives. Their exposure to extreme violence, and to trafficking networks will no doubt be 
of benefit to potential careers as criminals, while the cachet of having fought for or in 
opposition to jihadist groups like IS will most probably impact criminal reputations. 
 
The likeliness of these returning foreign fighters using their newfound skill sets for criminal 
purposes is tied not just to ideological rationales, but the simple need to make a living. Those 
who remain loyal to the cause are likely to leverage their criminal contacts for terrorist 
purposes, just as PIRA veterans did. But we should also remain aware of the likelihood that 
many will become less involved with the cause and instead use their skill set and reputation for 
criminal purposes. A process seen not just among some PIRA veterans, but also, for instance, 
among the French paramilitary Secret Army Organisation (OAS) and the Mexican military 
veterans who went on to found the Los Zetas cartel. 
 
We must be alert to the communities in Europe we now host, and their complicated 
relationships to the nations from which they emerged. The émigré and immigrant communities 
of Scotland are now hundreds of years old, and I myself am the product of this immigration. 
As the Orange Walks and Republican marches continue on Scotland’s streets, often 
commemorating battles in what are now foreign countries over 300 years ago, I can assure you 
that the diaspora issues that are present today across the West may be with us for some time to 
come. However, I hope to have shown that whether issues will include cooperation between 
criminal and terrorist elements depends on a complicated and nuanced calculation. 
 
The development of a crime-terror nexus, or the ‘evolution’ of terrorists into criminals and vice 
versa, has been an element in numerous recent intrastate conflicts. However, I do not believe 
that its development is inevitable. It is perhaps incumbent on policymakers and practitioners to 
look to history to further research the factors which have contributed to a nexus’ emergence 
and seek to identify and introduce mitigation measures. In addition, the variety of factors at 
play in determining whether a crime-terror nexus may emerge, discussed in brief above, need 
further investigation and refinement.  
 
Finally, while the IS-related crime and terror nexus is not in itself unique, the degree of previous 
criminal history amongst the Western foreign fighter who travelled to join this group, is. This 
propensity to crime amongst participants causes me, as a policeman and researcher, significant 
concern and should in my opinion act as a ‘red flag’ to all involved in organised crime 
interdiction of potential dangers ahead. Many who travelled to fight for Islamic State were 
young men. If they ultimately return to a life of organised criminal activity they may cause 




4.5 “Terrorism, Organised Crime and Necessity”, ICCT 
Perspectives Series 
Over time there has been much debate over the role organised criminality plays in the 
commission of Terrorism, and vice versa. In this op-ed I explore the dichotomy that appears to 
exist between the contention that Organised Criminals and Terrorists are exceptionally similar, 
against the counter argument that their strategic aims, profit versus political change, making 
them wholly distinct. I believe that the qualia that certainly evidences their interdependence 
when under pressure, necessity, demonstrates that we should conceptualise both phenomena in 
far more similar terms than is perhaps currently the case and look to exploit the weaknesses 
such a close relationship might expose.  
 
Recent work has demonstrated that Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups function as entities 
in almost identical fashions and draw members from the same social groups. Some authors 
have also contended that the use of organised crime goes far beyond a mere tactical deployment 
by a group to achieve funds to further its cause, but is indicative of a metamorphic scale that 
exists between the two phenomena, while others have been keen to point out a ‘hard’ 
philosophical gulf that exists between the two, with the Terrorist seeking political change 
through violence, or the threat of violence while the Criminal, simply put, seeks to make 
money. 
 
Definitional issues bedevil the field of Terrorism and its associated study, with there being no 
internationally accepted definition, however that of the United Nations at least comes close, 
and is of the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, which condemned 
terrorist acts as: 
 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.” 
 
Organised Crime does not attract the same degree of debate, with the widely accepted modern 
definition that arose in the 1970’s through the work of Albini being that  
 
“a criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning 
primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare.” 
 
The gulf between the two may at first glance seem obvious, but it is my contention that this is 
actually far from the truth, and that you cannot in fact have Terrorism on any scale almost 
beyond the level of the individual without a dependency, to varying degrees, on some form of 
organised crime. 
 
The United States of America’s Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
proves to be a good spring board to explore this contention. This contains the names of the 67 
listed and 12 delisted foreign organisations listed by the US Secretary of State as Terrorist 
Organisations since 1997. The views of the United States on this designation aside, the 
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organisations listed in their selves have an interesting commonality. Although their causes are 
wide and disparate, from the territorial, the political and the religious, they have one common 
factor. They all functioned through illegally sourced funding, be that from the provision of 
money by a state acting against the interests of that in which the group is based, to out and out 
criminality, such as drug dealing or extortion. 
 
The period from the 1960’s to the 1980’s is referenced in Rapoport’s Terrorism wave theory 
as that of the New Left, where many leftist terrorist groups operating across the world received 
support from the Soviet Union and its client states in a ‘proxy war’ against the West.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and consequently its interdependent satellites saw this funding 
collapse, and many groups disappear. However, many survived and in a perverse sense thrived, 
such as the FARC.  They achieved this through expansion into the burgeoning trade in cocaine, 
which in parallel saw the parallel drug cartels embrace terrorist tactics in an attempt to subvert 
government and retain their evolving position of influence over government. These twin 
developments saw the coining of the term ‘Narco Terrorism’, and much of the debate that led 
to the initial philosophical reasoning mentioned above on the nature or organised crime and 
terrorism.  It is in fact estimated that by the first decade of the 21st Century nearly 60% of all 
cocaine and 90% of the world’s opium originated from areas controlled by insurgent groups.  
What we need to consider though is not just the fact that groups such as FARC turned to drug 
trafficking to fund their struggle, but also the why? It is my contention that this is the element 
we often miss. The ‘why?’ is, simply put, necessity, the mother of all invention. 
 
This reflection on Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)  perhaps captures every facet of this underpinning 
but infrequently asked question, where “Through a large network of front organizations kept 
in operation by affiliates and supporters, LeT has raised funds from a range of private 
financiers, Islamic nongovernmental organizations, regional and international businesses (both 
licit and illicit), and organized crime—in addition to the resources secured from the Pakistani 
state—to sustain both terrorist and welfare activities simultaneously.”  
 
Accepting this as accurate, the description of Let captures factors affecting all the Groups on 
the US State Department’s list, to varying degrees, and that change and alter over time and 
circumstance often at a Geo political level. 
 
The morality of many aspects of organised crime, from people trafficking to drug dealing, may 
affect the individual groups’ particular focus but without (illegal) outside state sponsorship or 
internal support fund raising for a group they quite simply cannot continue to operate. 
 
Necessity is a two way proposition in respect of Terrorism in this respect though. Just as it is 
necessary for perhaps initially ‘idealistic’ Terrorists, such as the ELN, to get their hands dirty 
through engagement with crime, so is it necessary to retain engagement with Terrorism to 
ensure some form of legitimacy with their support base when a group has essentially 
metamorphosed into a crime gang, as appears to be the case with the New IRA. 
When one considers members recent responses to the journalist John Mooney following the 
murder of the journalist Lyra McKee during rioting in Northern Ireland, this appears to actually 
be unintentionally articulated in the following statement: 
 
“You ask why we organise armed actions. They are symbolic. Our actions serve one purpose.  




When a Terrorist Group such as this have senior members being jailed for extorting money 
from the owners of chip shops and drug dealers with the attendant negative publicity this brings 
to retain any form of cause legitimacy action directly related to the pro-generating conflict 
providing the group’s (supposed) purpose becomes essential. 
 
In Ireland, “the criminals (are) now not only as well armed but also as ruthless as the dissidents. 
In the post ceasefire-era the IRA no longer commanded the previous levels of respect and 
obedience. The word IRA no longer engendered the same levels of fear amongst those at the 
higher levels of criminality.” 
 
This ‘reputational gap’ necessitates a counter balance, achieved through perceived continuance 
of Terrorist acts, no matter where a group’s true focus may be. Reputation must be maintained, 
as without it, just as within the murky world of organised crime per se where no court of 
arbitration exists, you cannot operate. 
 
Just as it is necessary to maintain funding and reputation, it is similarly necessary to retain a 
sufficient degree of legitimacy to ensure support from the base within which the group derives 
its wider ability to operate. If this is lost safe housing and movement become increasingly 
difficult, as a falloff in overall legitimacy will no doubt lead many previous supporters to 
greater ambivalence or indeed co-operation with the previously perceived common foe. In 
considering Terrorist groups who have cultivated social legitimacy, through service provision, 
it has been noted that they are significantly less likely to participate in crimes such as 
kidnapping and robbery than those who have not. This research assists in crystallising the 
argument that where engaging in crime that might harm a group’s reputation, achieved through 
their cultivation of a façade of providing a social good, it is necessary to avoid this or be seen 
to ‘punish’ transgressors, as strongly appears to be the case in Northern Ireland. The emphasis 
here is also on seen.  
 
The public illustration of self-reward rather than the furtherance of the cause is likely to be an 
Achilles heel for any organisation that does not benefit from direct state sponsorship. Time and 
again Terrorist group members have been identified with their ‘hand in the till’. Here there are 
innumerable examples from history, with Amir Khan’s Maratha resistance to the British East 
India Company in the 19th Century where the loss of legitimate income led to the ‘collections’ 
(i.e. extortion) made from the local population coming to be the norm and with the actions of 
the insurgency being largely directed by the actions of its members in attempting to enrich 
themselves despite their initial principled cause.   
 
Whether this will be the case for the successor organisations that arise from Islamic State’s 
demise remains to be seen, but it is well known that Radical Islamist (Caliphite) groups are 
immersed in criminality and continue to be, with funds actually flowing from operatives 
undertaking criminality in Europe to the bolster the Terrorist’s core activities in the Middle 
East. 
 
As investigations into such develop a focus on this potential exposure of mis-deeds across 
enforcement agencies would seem wise. Terrorists seeks to win a propaganda battle against the 
state or force they oppose. The exposure of links to criminality and any identified self-reward 
will always go a long way to reduce a Terrorists standing in any established or prospective 
support community with a strong value system tied to any utopian outcome so many Terrorist 
actors espouse they seek. In my research I have yet to find any Terrorist groups articulated goal 
of a state where criminality linked to self-enrichment is the desired outcome. The more those 
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who engage in such are exposed, the more their supporters might question what it really is they 
are supporting. Were the misappropriation of funds raised in Europe sent to the Middle East to 
be identified the potential disillusionment and opportunities presented by this are obvious. 
In a new way we once again need to ‘follow the money’, and make sure people (including 
support networks and those sympathetic to the Terrorist cause) know where and on what it is 
actually being spent. Terrorism’s fundamental necessity to secure funding, and retain 
legitimacy while it does so, may prove a largely untapped means of counter narrative available 




Chapter 5: Modelling Relationships ‘At the 
Edge of Terror’ 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the case studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 to consider the main research 
question, are there commonalities between ‘Lone Wolf Terrorists’ with participants in crime/ 
terror nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on 
contemporary terrorism? 
 
In light of the discussion in these chapters, there is significant evidence to suggest that there 
are commonalities now evident across the phenomena; and that these developments that have 
brought these changes about result in a degradation of previous understanding and commitment 
to ‘causes’ across various terrorist actors. These commonalities combine to demonstrate that 
there may be a conceptual shift in the current understanding of the motivations of terrorist 
actors.  As demonstrated in the previous chapters, a primary focus in the literature to date has 
been on explaining the motivations of terrorists by examining their religious affiliations and 
ideologies.  It is contended that this focus has failed to appreciate that there appears to be 
considerable evidence (as explained in chapters 2, 3 and 4) to support a conceptual shift in 
terrorist motivations where religious affiliation and ideology appears to be increasingly 
replaced with similar motivations to those actors engaged in organised crime.  This fixation on 
motivation as being associated with religious affiliation and ideology fails to appreciate the 
changing nature of the motivations of contemporary terrorist actors. 
 
This chapter adopts a ‘modelling’ approach in order to support the contention that there has 
been at minimum a partial shift in the motivations of some terrorist actors.  This modelling, as 
explained below, examines the ‘edge’ phenomena of lone wolf terrorists and terrorist group 
members engaging with or in criminality, as the basis to prove to a reasonably high standard 
of probability that the motivations of terrorists are increasingly similar in nature to those actors 
engaged in criminality.  This modelling helps to not only identify the motivations of 
contemporary terrorism, but can form an important basis to help inform law and policy on 
counter-terrorism.  
 
It is contended that this conceptual shift, to focus more on the terrorist actor than the cause they 
espouse to be part of, is necessary as to understand and counter terrorism. We need to 
understand the drivers affecting its participants. Only in addressing these can you hope to 
mitigate against terrorist activity. Consequently, a core argument advanced in this chapter is 
that a model must be applied to understand the changing nature of contemporary terrorism so 
that factors affecting a nexus relationship can be distilled.  This theme can be explained by 
relying on an iteration of a model initially developed by Markarenko (2004).  It can be recalled 
from chapter one, Markarenko (2004) developed a model that conceptualised the movement of 
groups through a continuum of terrorist and criminal behaviours. A key strength in this model 
is identified by Rollins and Wyler (2013) as being its conceptualisation of the fluid nature of 
this crime/ terror nexus. Jamieson (2005) and Madsen (2009) suggests that Markarenko’s 
(2004) model is limited because the distinctions between the ultimate motivations of terrorists 
and organised criminals driving their activities remain distinct, that is the political versus 
‘profit’. However, in the context of this chapter this limitation can be addressed to help draw 
together the case studies in the previous chapters by accepting a far wider definition of ‘profit’ 
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for these actors, as the modelling below demonstrates. The chapter suggests that when 
modelling is applied on an individual basis, rather than the previous scholarly focus on group 
dynamics, a more nuanced picture emerges in relation to contemporary terrorism with a variety 
of potential contributory elements.  
 
The application of this model to the results from chapters two to four help demonstrate at least 
two significant points.  Firstly, there are at least eight factors that may affect a nexus 
relationship, namely: 
 









Secondly, there are four potential make-up of initial nexus relationship: 
 
 Relationship A - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural 
background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social 
groupings. 
 Relationship B - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social 
groupings.  
 Relationship C - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their 
immediate social grouping.  
 Relationship D - The OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their 
immediate social grouping. 
 
That is, through seeing the pathway to terrorism more as a personal journey, the factors that 
may influence individual participants, such as Nexus relationships A to D, become far clearer. 
Through conceptualising the step into terrorism in this manner the apparent alterations to the 
characteristics of actors when considered within the framework of Rapoport’s (2003) wave 
theory become ever more striking, as does the posited shift towards ‘identity terrorism’ as a 
potential fifth wave.  
 
The chapter achieves this illustrative ‘journey’ through an ‘expanding model’ presented in a 
series of five figures to illustrate the arguments made.  ‘Expanding modelling’ in this thesis 
takes the form of an initial presentation of societal influences on individuals, and extrapolates 
this to represent the influences and possibilities that exist in respect of the actors we have 
considered in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Makarenko’s (2004) model is an illustration of the 
metamorphosis that can occur when a terrorist group changes its focus, moving from being 
focussed on political goals, through carrying out criminal activity to support these goals, then 
ultimately to full scale immersion in criminality. However, the modelling as presented in this 
chapter starts from the premise that the individual rather than group processes as being of most 
importance in respect of contemporary terrorism. As the previous chapters have shown, when 
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we consider the motivations and circumstances of the individual actors rather than the groups 
and causes they purport to be aligned to a more nuanced picture, often at odds with their claims, 
emerges.   It is contended that any assessment of terrorist motivation should start from the 
premise of the individual actor and their particular circumstances. This modelling supports the 
central thesis argument by visually demonstrating that when we consider actors as individuals 
the commonalities between lone wolf terrorists and participants in a crime/ terror nexus 
relationship become striking, clearly demonstrating how the factors identified impact on 
contemporary terrorism. This approach provides a means by which to understand contemporary 
terrorist actors by being able to discern their motivations, and considered the factors 
influencing terrorist actors today.    
 
The modelling works through a series of figures and supporting texts. It commences by 
considering an individual within society and any sub societies (e.g. diaspora communities) they 
may inhabit. Building from here it next looks at the influence of criminality and organised 
crime on an individual. It then moves into considering the impact of terrorism on the illustration 
so far. The modelling then takes this layered approach to provide insight into the trajectory an 
individual might experience through a shift into terrorist activity and post terrorist activity. 
Finally, the modelling provides a comprehensive signposting of at least six core factors that 
may affect a relationship between those involved in organised criminality and terrorism, and 
four variant forms such a relationship may take based on sub societal determinants. The factors 
discerned appear a sound basis to help explain the motivations that may influence the actions 
of a terrorist or terrorist group and give a means of insight into understanding those engaged in 
‘identity terrorism’.  
 
It is accepted that this proposition draws on the three case studies contained within this thesis, 
and consequently may not be viewed as having universal application. However, the case studies 
identified are international in nature and indicative of the most contentious and impactive areas 
in contemporary terrorism and consequently it is suggested that the observations made are valid 
for consideration.  
 
This chapter draws on the following publications: Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-
operative Endeavours in Scotland? (Gallagher, 2014); Modelling Entrepreneurial Endeavour 
in the Nexus between Terrorism and Organised Crime: Does Supporting Terrorism Present a 
Red Line in Organised Criminals Pursuit of Profit? (Gallagher, 2015); ‘Criminalised’ Islamic 
State Veterans – A Future Major Threat in Organised Crime Development? (Gallagher, 2016); 
and “The Lone Wolf Tsunami: Is Rapoport’s Religious Wave Ending?” (Gallagher, 2017) 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections that draw together what has been discerned in the 
thesis so far. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 outline a compelling case illustrating that recent activity within 
the two edge phenomena of lone wolf terrorism and the relationship between terrorism and 
organised crime combine to demonstrate there is a conceptual gap in the understanding of 
contemporary terrorism.   
 
This chapter provides evidence to explain the conceptual gap that has emerged from a fixed 
way of thinking about terrorism that tends to characterise the occurrence of terrorism as being 
primarily motivated by religion. Instead, through consideration in the model outlined evidence 
of a change in the characteristics of contemporary terrorism indicative of at least a degradation 
of Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave becomes clear; or indeed the possibility of the emergence 
of a new wave, capturing the current circumstances in respect of contemporary terrorism 




Throughout this chapter the evidence gathered is considered and aggregates towards common 
identifiable behaviours amongst apparently unconnected actors engaged in contemporary 
‘identity terrorism’.  
 
Section 5.2 examines the place of a terrorist within ‘wide’ society and their particular ‘sub 
societies’ (the multitude of differing social groups and agencies an actor is part of or engages 
with), demonstrating the influencing factors that come to bear upon them before we consider 
their role as ‘terrorists’, and providing a baseline for considering them as people per se, not 
simply defined by their role in extreme activities.  Figure 4.1 demonstrates the rings of 
influence on our actors. This section provides further evidence concerning whether the actions 
of lone wolf terrorists are meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity, 
demonstrating that although they may appear to act alone their activities are in fact linked to 
and influenced by the society in which they function. The chapter achieves this while 
considering the influencing factors on all fourth wave terrorists, demonstrating the similarities 
that exist amongst group participants and lone actors. 
 
Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 turn to examine the role of criminality in participation in contemporary 
terrorism, both pre and post conflict, and assesses the factors that may influence an individual’s 
participation in or a crime/terror nexus relationship. These sections illustrate changes in this 
phenomena that appear wholly meaningful in terrorism’s wider context, and indeed are perhaps 
indicative of a global shift across contemporary terrorist behaviours, with degradation of 
actor’s motives through increased self-enrichment via criminality being a common factor.  
 
Section 5.3 continues the consideration of individual participation in a crime/ terror nexus 
relationship, drawing together the research in the thesis to identify common factors of bearing. 
The evidence that emerges points to a previously unacknowledged commonality of degradation 
of commitment to terrorist cause amongst group participants, and with this weakening an 
increasing propensity amongst actors to self-advancement and enrichment, both in financial 
terms but also in terms of social capital and reputation amongst their sub societies of relevance.  
This finding significantly advances the evidence of cross cutting factors common to a variety 
of terrorist campaigns, as many of the groups considered were previously seen as outliers to 
Rapoport’s (2003) wave theory, but instead perhaps appear indicative of a move beyond 
Rapoport’s (2003) fourth wave, and their members appear far more closely aligned in terms of 
motivation and aspiration to participants in IS than ever acknowledged elsewhere.   
 
Section 5.4 draws the chapter to a conclusion that is does indeed appear that the findings 
reached are indicative of a wider unacknowledged shift in terrorist behaviour, necessitating a 
reappraisal of Rapoport’s four wave theory. 
5.2 Individuals, Society and Sub Societies 
5.2.1 Terrorist Actors – Individuals in a Group or Individuals 
 
Firstly, we have to consider the individual terrorist actor, be they a lone wolf terrorist or an 
individual who is part of a terrorist group. By examining the individual actor, and the influences 
upon them in a wide social context we begin to see what factors really drive their behaviours, 
and this helps isolate their motivations in terms of terrorism. This consideration falls within 
social movement theory, as described in chapter 2, where protest movements coalesce around 
political ideas that allow individuals to express or act on their moral intuitions and principles 
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(Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009). As discussed in chapter 2, utilising Becker’s (2014) 
definition allows for the inclusion of lone wolf terrorists in such considerations. 
 
An individual within a democratic country resides within a nation state. This state and its 
society are composed, to varying degrees, of a multitude of differing social groups and agencies 
(such as health services, social work, political parties, pressure groups, the police) who interact 
for the state to function. Each individual has inevitable ties to some social groups that are 
exclusive to their personal circumstances, be they a descendant of the Irish immigrants to 
Scotland described in chapter 4, or the South East Asian descendants of the post Second World 
War migration described in chapter 3. In addition to this status, for immigrant communities 
their diaspora, there are ties to various religions and additional social groupings such as 
charities, neighbourhoods and sports clubs. All of these factors, and these ‘Sub Societies,’ make 
up the ‘identity’ of an individual as they operate within this wider ‘society’, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 below. 
 


















This model may be one applied throughout modernity, however as we discussed in chapter 2 
significant change has been afoot, illustrated by Naim (2013) through his concepts of the ‘More 
and Mobility’ revolutions have had the effect of  
 
“vastly broaden(ing) the cognitive, even emotional impact of more access to resources 
and the ability to move, learn, connect and communicate more broadly and 
inexpensively than ever before” (Naim, 2013, pp. 65)  
 
Individuals are simply put less of an ‘individual’ than in times past. They have access to 
worldwide news and information in a manner wholly exceptional to previous generations, and 
through social media the ability to connect with actors on this global stage with ease. This 
appears to be of striking significance when we consider the possibility of an explanation for 
the actions of the individuals, we considered in the lone wolf terrorists of the 2016 case study 
in Chapter 2. It is through this prism that we must view the contemporary individual to get a 
clear picture of their place in our globalised world, and through this can distil a new way to 







The status of the ‘majority’ from our 2016 sample highlighting recent immigration to a 
democratic country or membership of a diaspora can be considered significant.  This is due to 
the fact that the connections and the bonds to the society may be weak, or they may have 
significant loyalties to another culture or milieu. However, this will be considered in more 
detail later in this chapter when analysing social connectedness, or the lack thereof, and the 
impact of this.  
 
However, there was little in the case study on lone wolf terrorists in chapter 2 to indicate that 
those who were the subject of the study had much contact with criminal elements in the 
societies they function within, certainly not in the preparation of their acts other than our 
individual example we considered in detail, that of Ali Sonboly.  
 
Even with Sonboly his contact with criminality to source his firearm was at ‘arm’s length’, via 
the dark web and apparently not through any long-standing friendship or association. 
 
As Gardner (2016) pointed out, utilising the observations of members of the UK Security 
Service, only some individuals are capable of working with groups in a collaborative manner. 
Their motivations and goals though may be similar, or even identical, but the degree to which 
they can be considered understood remains a matter of continuing enquiry as we discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3.  
 
What is clear from all of the cases presented is that their conception of ‘their society’, and their 
need to act to ‘defend’ it, is far removed from their fellows. Although there have been a high 
number of cases of lone wolf terrorist activity when compared to previous years lone wolf 
attacks are not common-place per se. We appear to be seeing an indicator of change through 
these individuals, as opposed to a mass phenomenon affecting swathes of the general 
population. The volume of lone wolf attacks appears to herald a move for those with the 
necessary attributes and triggers to become involved in individualised terrorist activity.  
 
An interesting quote from a Coptic Christian in respect of a resurgence in numbers of their 
congregation in Egypt despite state oppression during which returning members have been 
injured perhaps presents an interesting means to consider this, in that “as long as you feel 
threatened by others your identity will be strong” (Russell, 2014, pp. 243).  For the Copts, the 
tie to a common identity was their association to a religion, as practising members or not. For 
the lone wolf terrorists as we described in chapter 2, it appears to be something else that is more 
closely related with, through the evidence available to us, an ‘ethereal’ identity rather than one 
rooted in place or physical relationships. Crenshaw (1985) previously wrote of the enhanced 
‘social status’ membership of a cause provides, especially when the terrorists are from ethnic 
communities with a long history of struggle. Although ‘membership’ for the lone wolf terrorist 
sample may be no more than in their own minds that they are part of an ‘ongoing struggle’. 
When you combine this with the above described observations of Naim (2013) and the 
concerns that it has been posited that increased media coverage and the naming of actors assists 
in perpetuating acts of terror (White, 2020) it is not much of an intellectual leap to grasp the 
factors at play. 
 
Media coverage of IS during 2016 was certainly extensive, as was messaging as to why its 
members were carrying out this activity. The increasing use of ‘Allah Akhbar’ amongst the 
Caliphite attackers detailed in chapter 2, appears to be no coincidence, although the degree to 
which they felt alienated within the ‘societies’ in which they resided may well have had its 




can be seen as a form of backlash, however counter intuitive his ‘identity selection’ with the 
far right may seem.  
 
Kaplan and Costa (2015) consider the pull of IS in terms of their notion of ‘New Tribalism’, 
an undertow within Rapoport’s (2013) fourth wave, where adherents of terrorist groups 
members have common bonds of kinship or shared history/ideals and aim to establish a lost (or 
mythical) ‘Golden Age’. For Kaplan and Costa (2015), IS are exemplars of this phenomena, 
with their drive to re-establish the Caliphate. The bonds of kinship here and shared 
history/ideals do not need to be physical, as Speckhard (2012) illustrates with her interviews 
of ‘jihadists’ showing a shared fictive kinship in defence of a global population of those 
ascribing to the Muslim faith. 
 
They appear to have reached a ‘breakpoint’ where the threat to their ‘identity’ in the society 
they operate within has reached a stage where they perceive they have to act. How rational that 
breakpoint is to a reasonable individual is actually immaterial, it is the perception of the actor 
that is most telling as it drives them to carry out their action in support of their chosen form of 
‘identity terrorism’.  
 
It is very difficult from the information available to consider their motivating factors of lone 
wolf terrorists beyond those we can discern from their overt acts, such as manifestos, chants 
and social media activity. However, in this thesis we have considered research on terrorist 
groups and organised criminals which may provide some useful parallel and relevant 
supporting considerations in pursuit of addressing the research question. 
 
5.2.2 Connections to Criminality 
 
For many of the ‘travellers’ described in chapter 3, who left a democracy to join IS in Syria 
and Iraq, there is an additional factor in their antecedents that differs from their lone wolf 
compatriots, their significant contact with criminality. Our model is consequently updated to 
reflect this for them, as illustrated at Figure .2 below: 
 


























For some, such as the IS participants discussed in chapter 3, Aine Davis (Mendick, 2014), 
Nathan Cuffey and Nyall Hamlett (Bassey, 2014), this contact no doubt puts them, through 
drug dealing and such, in contact with organised criminality. Others, such as the fraudster 
Mashdur Choudhury (Mendick and Gardham, 2014) may indeed have network connections, 
however loosely, to an OCG. 
 
These illustrations could also be used to describe the connections of those we encountered in 
chapter 4 who are in Scotland and involved in activity in connection with organised criminality 
linked to a terrorist endeavour. We have to consider the interactions of both the organised 
criminals and terrorists in terms within wider ‘society’, and their own ‘sub societies’ of 
supporters and detractors, such as those who act as supporters of causes through fund 
contributions and the like. Many individuals in wider society will be quite unaware these sub 
strata even exist. This is illustrated at Figure 4.3 below.  
 
The sub society membership, in terms of diaspora communities and such, may equally be 
applied to the lone wolf terrorists of Chapter 2.  
 




















5.2.3 From Criminal to Terrorist (and back again) 
 
Figure 4.4 below further expands on this modelling, illustrating the potential journeys of 
individuals becoming involved in terrorist activities, in particular those with a background in 
serious crime, however it could equally apply to those who have no such previous history. At 
the top left, where the cycle commences, the figure includes our modelling so far, with the 
individual as a potential participant in organised crime activity, and with potential criminal 
association’s pre ‘radicalisation’.  
 
The move to point A demonstrates the path of radicalisation, as the individual moves from their 









From this juncture the individual potentially moves to point B, criminal activities in support of 
terrorism. This is with the organisational process of engagement in criminality in support of 
terrorism from Makarenko’s (2004) scale illustrated at the earlier Figure 1, chapter 1. Here we 
illustrate how the individual similarly moves. Given their previous bent towards criminality (as 
discussed earlier) there is a strong possibility that a previous skill set will result in associations 
with actors of similar history (as per Gill et al. (2014), see chapter 3).  
 
To illustrate this movement perhaps think of a criminal with pre terrorist participation 
experience of extortion. Following the theories outlined above, there is every likelihood that 
post radicalisation and arrival with the terrorist group they will strike up, or be driven towards, 
association with similar characters involved in this activity in support of their terrorist group 
and find themselves as participants.  
 
There is every likelihood some will remain at either point A or point B, willing participants in 
terrorist activities, and remain in their territories undertaking these had they travelled to 
participate. 
 
However, for the disillusioned, and those able to negotiate their exit from (or perhaps escape) 
from a conflict zone there is point C, with three apparent potential outcomes. The first, 
wholesale disengagement (and if having travelled a return from where they had travelled); with 
this disengagement being both from terrorism and their previous life of crime. The second 
possibility is that of incarceration. Although significant prison sentences await in any 
democracy those returning from having participated in terrorism, essentially coming home and 
being caught, these prison terms will end. At this juncture the individual will either become 
wholly disengaged, or instead move into option 3, that of re-engagement in organised crime. 
 
Option 3 may be considered as being particularly concerning. It suggests a return to previous 
activity; with the experience and reputation enhancement resulting from terrorist participation 
that may carry massive negative connotations in general society, but kudos of exceptional 
worth and operational value in the world of organised crime, and their particular ‘sub societies’ 
of relevance. One can also easily imagine those finding themselves incarcerated seeing a return 
to crime as a positive option on release, their criminal reputation enhanced through terrorist 
participation likely carrying significant reputational advantage while incarcerated that they can 
then capitalise on when they move back into external criminal society. 
 
One can also easily see that for those without prior organised crime connections their 
experience of terrorist activity will likely have provided them with this. From their trafficking 
into the conflict onwards, and if it is not their enhanced skill base that draws them to this field 
on their return it may well be a period of incarceration with its likely consequence of a 
realisation through association with their fellow prisoners that they have a valuable skill set 
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5.2.4 Thesis Case Studies as Part of the Modelling of Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation 
 
The model presented in Figure 4.4 appears to apply to both the Caliphites considered in chapter 
3, and the dissident terrorists considered in chapter 4.  
 
In relation to the Caliphites, we have a move from contact with criminality in their home in a 
democratic state, radicalisation, and then travel to a conflict zone where they engage in terrorist 
behaviour. Withdrawal may be through disillusionment, through an operational need to flee 
coalition activity or an instruction to return to the democratic states received from the IS 
hierarchy.  
 
Any of these three may lead to disengagement, incarceration or a return to ‘home’ territory and 
re-engagement with previously known networks. The re-integration with enhanced criminal 
skill set, reputation and contacts appears an entirely reasonable possibility, and initial early 
evidence (Neve et. al., 2020) indicates that this has occurred. It is accepted that this is only one 
study so far, however this initial evidence does support the premise of this route to re-
criminalisation as a tenable possibility.  
 
When we consider the model in terms of our longer-term terrorists in Scotland, whose activities 
are connected to the Northern Ireland conflict, more evidence presents. 
 
Although these individuals have not undertaken journeys commensurate in terms of geography 
with the Caliphites, they have in an ideological sense. Many, such as the murdered alleged 
terrorist turned self-enricher Alan Ryan (BBC, 04/09/2012), were part of a terrorist group who 
have leveraged the kudos of this, and the skills acquired, to undertake organised criminality. 
 
In terms of the enhanced reputation terrorist acts provide consider William Campbell of this 
milieu, the UVF bomber discussed in chapter 4 who was heavily involved in organised crime 
profiting both himself and his confederates (McKay, 2008). Campbell emerged from prison to 
a position of some status in the Scottish Loyalist community, with his funeral being attended 
by thousands, and a mural and plaque being erected in respect of his life in Belfast. 
 
The modelling in Figure 4.4 seems equally applicable to the veterans of FARC (Byrne, 2009), 
AUC (McDermott, 2013), and the Shining Path (United States House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2014), all of whom undertook actions of organised criminality no doubt assisted 
by their enhanced skill set acquired through their role in terrorist activity. 
 
This degradation from the terrorist cause to criminality, if we can express it as such is not 
unique to recent conflicts. It was the case with the terrorists of the ‘Organisation Armee 
Secrete’ (OAS), who committed many acts of terror during the Algerian civil war (Horne, 
1977) and after its conclusion had members who engaged in bank robberies and high profile 
thefts (Cummins, 2011). However, as we discussed in chapter 3 in respect of Al Qaeda, it is 
not the case that terrorists have not engaged in criminality previously. Nor, as with the OAS, 
is it the case that post conflict for some terrorist participants organised criminality with an 
enhanced skill set is unique. 
 
What we have at present is simply a completely different scale, through a collision of factors. 
In relation to the terrorism we have learned of in Scotland, as described by Byrne (2009) and 
research participant’s views described in chapter 4, it has been wholly immersed in criminality 
145 
 
for support purposes. This has continued for so long that as the macro conflict waned the need 
to maintain a veneer of respectability with support groups has grown. However, the self-
enrichment activities of a number of participants have allowed the ‘cover’ to slip. The scale of 
the criminality a terrorist group engaged in prior to the end of a conflict, such as the multi-
million enterprise of FARC (Olaya, 2019), appears to have a direct bearing on its continuance 
now. FARC continues to dominate ‘no go’ areas within Colombia, where it remains involved 
in drug dealing and kidnappings for ransom (di Salvo, 2020).  
 
This ‘criminal continuance’ at scale has happened during the dissipation of no other terrorist 
wave, is in no way connected to religion, and is clearly indicative that in contemporary terms 
the crime terror nexus and our modelling above is indicative of there being change afoot. It 
may not be certain that a new wave, be that ‘identity terrorism’, or a phenomena with a differing 
moniker is upon us but there does appear clear evidence of a paradigm shift occurring which 
should at least inform the development and enforcement of counterterrorism policy. 
 
The participants in the fourth religious sub wave, discussed in chapter 3, demonstrate a clear 
degradation of cause alignment and increasing connection to criminality. When considered 
against what has happened to the participants in the Northern Ireland conflict, and more widely 
their fellow wave participants who went down the criminality route such as FARC (Byrne, 
2009), the Shining Path (United States House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014) and the AUC 
(McDermott, 2013), makes similar engagement in post conflict criminality very likely, as 
observed by participant QA.  
 
As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, the participants in these terrorist groups have, as individuals, 
moved from a starting point of contact with criminality, via a brutalising conflict where they 
have engaged in further criminality, and back into their original milieu. As discussed at chapter 
1, section 1.4, history indicates the likely result of actors (re)involvement in organised crime. 
With this approach we arguably have arrived at a model demonstrating developments that show 
the factors capable of influencing an individual participation in or a crime/terror nexus 
relationship, and that we can see changes in this phenomena meaningful in terrorism’s wider 
context. 
 
Our modelling needs to consider the circumstantial determinants of such a relationship as this 
helps understand why some, such as ‘Hamza’, have indeed become involved in organised 
criminality on return from the conflict zone, while some have wholly disengaged (Neve et al., 
2020). 
5.3 Factors Affecting a Nexus Relationship  
Having established the framework in which these terrorist pathways to criminality are 
emerging, it is now worthwhile to consider, based on the evidence obtained, the factors 
influencing how an ‘Initial Nexus’ relationship might be established and maintained, where 
terrorists work with organised criminals. This has direct bearing on the future that may be 
encountered through the potential waning of Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave we have 









The factors necessary for the safe establishment of trust enabling a working relationship to 
develop between those involved in terrorism and organised crime, such as common lineage, 
schooling, culture and associations, all exist amongst the pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub 
cultures in Scotland, echoing the views of Van Duyne (1996), and the participants in the study 
outlined in chapter 4. They are present in many of the Caliphite groups who had multiple 
members from the same neighbourhoods depart to take part in the recent conflict in the Middle 
East (Higgins, 2015; Coolsaet, 2016; Neve et al., 2020). Police awareness of these interactions, 
particularly when they involved past criminality, is also understandable.  
 
Interestingly, the participants in the study discussed in chapter 4 largely drew clear lines of 
distinction between Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. They could perceive that 
the potential cultural and social links of the OCG members may have an effect on their 
behaviour, from the ‘kudos’ association within these sub cultures that can be attained through 
their background, allied to the underlying sympathy they may hold with a cause. 
 
Within these ‘common cultures’ there was though a clear opinion from the participants that, 
echoing Stuart (2006) in that the Mafia will engage with anyone they will profit from, so too 
will Scottish OCGs; but only where it is in the OCGs continuing interests. Participants believed 
that whether an OCG was pre disposed to either cause in Northern Ireland a faction associated 
to the other side would be acceptable, as long as payment was forthcoming. This appears 
equally applicable to an OCG with associations to any factions involved in the recent Middle 
East conflict in terms of the Caliphites. Extrapolation for this as a consideration in respect of 




A clear theme that emerged from the participant study outlined in chapter 4 is ‘distance’; the 
further removed from the terrorist activity the OCG was, the easier it would be to provide 
ongoing co-operation. It was clear from the answers provided that the participants felt that 
when criminals were working with terrorists, including those connected to Irish related 
terrorism, while their activity was to have an impact somewhere out with the vicinity of the 
OCG they would not be overly concerned. However, when the actions that were to be 
undertaken had a more direct impact on the closer societal structures around the OCG they 
would be wholly uncomfortable.  
 
This lack of comfort did not, in the opinion of the participants, arise from any morality but 
instead from the view point that although driven by profit an OCG would calculate its degree 
of exposure to law enforcement action and the closer terrorist activity came to the operations 
of the OCG the more exposed they would become. Business with Caliphite contacts while an 
OCG is based back in a democracy may be far easier than if Caliphites intend carrying out 
terrorist activities in the OCG’s own sphere of influence and operation. Again, it seems 
reasonable that extrapolation of this situation to any OCG relationship may be reasonable, and 




It emerged in the research conducted that terrorists currently engaging with OCGs are likely 
keeping their true purposes a secret, with the OCGs believing they are engaging with peers 
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rather than those carrying out criminal activity for the funding of terrorism, this behaviour 
including OCGs of significant standing. The participants had pointed out that the nature of the 
composition of OCGs perhaps lent itself to such an occurrence. A number of the participants 
felt that were such deceptions to be discovered the murder of the OCGs contact may well be 
carried out. Another clear feature that emerged that may explain the position that such action 
may be warranted, other than to minimise detection, was that although not well known for their 
moral code OCG members typically, in line with other criminals, are known to have intangible 
lines of standards in relation to behaviour. A number of participants referred to this, with their 
citing the issue of paedophilia as an example of criminal behaviour that even for hardened 
criminals is seen as beyond the pale.  
 
A number of participants believed that terrorist atrocities would be perceived by OCG members 
in a similar light. If, as appears to be the case, some are being duped regarding the true nature 
of their relationships with contacts who are involved in terrorism this becomes even more 




As the participants related that OCGs can gain new contacts through accessing the same 
specialists, it is worthy of note that such an intersection may well provide an interface with 
terrorism. Participants related that persons with known connections to terrorism in Scotland 
have access to corrupt officials, a relationship OCGs would no doubt wish to benefit from if 
they were to learn of it. Whichever way this access to specialists was to function the views of 
the studies participants were clear that were such access to occur it would be controlled; 
perhaps many degrees removed and likely be well known in terms of purpose by the actor 
providing access. 
 
5.3.5 Authority Engagement 
 
The participants were clear that if members of an OCG were going to co-operate with the 
authorities such co-operation would be on their terms. Engagements with the authorities would 
perhaps be by proxy and would be an effort at self-preservation, where the OCG attempted to 
gain a favourable position with the authorities, as directly observed by Albini (1975) in his 
previous study of organised crime in Scotland. An approach by the authorities was seen as 
being most likely to succeed when the impact on the OCG would be at its minimal. For this to 
be the case the relationship between the two groups would need to be at its early stages, with 
the level of connection and trust being low and the financial or other loss to the OCG being 
minimal. Interestingly, very few of the participants had any reservations around whether the 
OCG members would co-operate with the authorities. None put forward the position of the 
OCG member adopting a position of ambivalence to the authorities, other than in relation to a 
likely lack of co-operation from OCGs who were involved in a relationship with a terrorist 
connected to Irish related terrorism. Beyond this all thought that a calculated response from the 
OCG member would be forthcoming, with their best interests being their sole concern.  
 
Of note, the solitary contrary opinion related to OCGs and terrorist groups from the same sub 
culture, the implication of this being there may exist some degree of ‘loyalty’, or at least a 
stronger affinity, amongst OCGs and terrorists from the same social background. These 
stronger ties might impact on the pragmatic desire to co-operate with the authorities when this 
would be in the immediate best interest of the OCG. This ‘loyalty’ could be for a number of 
reasons, which might include a shared outlook but also equally may be due to a desire to 
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maintain reputation within a common sub culture. Co-operation with the authorities to the 
detriment of fellow sub culture members would likely have a significant negative impact on a 
OCGs reputation within their social grouping. This may have future significant bearing as 
fourth sub wave participant’s re-engage with their networks and social groups in democracies. 
This ‘loyalty’ may prove particularly dangerous, and see OCGs in the returned terrorists circles 
prepared to carry out activities that in the past they would have baulked at. This appears a 
potential alteration of significant import if we are indeed moving past Rapoport’s (2003) fourth 
wave, and the degradation of previous participant’s increases. 
 
5.3.6 Threat from Non-Indigenous Groups 
 
It was put forward that non-indigenous OCGs are the main threat in Scotland. This may seem 
at odds with the information provided to the effect that such groups have no known connections 
to terrorism and that those in Scotland known to be linked to terrorism have no known 
associations with such OCGs. The answers provided by the participants and the literature 
available the non-indigenous threat argument is a strong one.  
 
Authors, including Perri et al (2009) point to minority immigrant communities as being 
difficult to police and also their being fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist participants 
(Sageman, 2005). It was contended that organised criminals are only interested in profit, a 
similar feature ascribed to all OCGs by Dishman (2001), and a number of participants in the 
study. 
 
Where this appears to be particularly insightful though is the illustration of such OCGs in 
chapter 4 is lack of ‘loyalty’ to Scotland. What this means is not a lack of an embracing of 
Scottish culture, but rather that with little or no cultural bonds to the country their activities in 
pursuit of profit could be far more extreme than those of OCGs with connections to the pro-
Republicans and the pro-Loyalists groups. OCGs members with ties to Irish related terrorism 
have typically grown up in Scotland and have wide social networks here while recent émigré 
groups have no such foundation. As the participants in the chapter 4 study alluded to a growing 
discomfort amongst OCG members when their contact brought their activities ‘close to home’ 
one can see how such a feeling would certainly be in no way as relevant amongst a recent 
émigré OCG. The consequences of a terrorist action in Scotland would have far less impact on 
their wider social group and their lack of background within the community would make their 
detection all the more unlikely. 
 
When we consider the sheer volume of immigrant and diaspora actors amongst the lone wolf 
terrorists identified in 2016 discussed in chapter 2, and the fourth sub wave Caliphites of 
chapter 3 this lack of ‘social connectedness’ has increasing resonance.  
 
This is of course in no way to cast diaspora and refugee communities as symptomatic 
generators of terrorists. These communities around the world number in the hundreds of 
millions while the number of terrorists remain in the thousands. However, as we have seen in 
chapter 2 and 3 terrorism appears to be changing, and we cannot ignore these connections; 
particularly when they have resonance with circumstances hundreds of years old in the shape 








All the participants believed that incarceration was a key point for new interactions to occur. 
As recent émigré OCGs become known to law enforcement in their new country of operation, 
so they may become incarcerated. Through their incarceration they are likely to encounter 
individuals involved in terrorist causes, likely through work as ‘front’ funding criminal work. 
Such interaction may have disastrous consequences for Scotland, as a new type of ‘initial 
nexus’, far removed from that of the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists could be formed.  
The Caliphites who return from the conflict zone and do not manage to escape detection are 
likely to also be incarcerated in their home democracy, where interaction with OCG members 
is almost inevitable. Again, we have a new factor to consider as we assess the impact of the 
degradation we see occurring within Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave, and the changes it may 
be bringing about.  
 
These factors, and those discussed throughout the thesis so far, combine to make the model at 
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5.3.8 Factors affecting the ‘Initial Nexus’ - Model Discussion 
 
While it would be impossible to capture all idiosyncrasies of an organised criminal’s decision 
making process, this model seeks to illustrate the main internal and external factors that will 





The main External Factors that will affect the ongoing ‘initial nexus’ relationship are: 
 
 Increased/ Decreased Law Enforcement Interest – The level of law enforcement activity 
will be directly commensurate to the actions those participating in the initial nexus can 
undertake without potential and/or actual interdiction or arrest. 
 Media Interest – The amount of media interest will impact on the ability of the initial 
nexus participants to carry out mutually beneficial activities without public knowledge. 
 Deception – The degree to which either party have been misled in an initial nexus 
relationship will have a bearing on the degree to which they co-operate and discovery 
of the deception will have a direct impact on continuing trust. 
 Changing World Events – From the man made to the natural (such as earthquakes, 
tsunamis and disease) calamitous world events may prove disastrous or advantageous 
to any initial nexus relationship. 
 
These external factors will combine to affect the decision-making process of the organised 
criminal. 
 
For the organised crime group themselves the following Internal Factors are of relevance: 
 
 Individual – The psychological makeup of the participants in the organised crime group 
or in a strictly controlled group, its leader, will have a direct bearing on the relationship. 
The attitude to risk, personal identification with the particular terrorist cause, any 
controlling ‘red lines’ on behaviour and an individual desire for cultural and/or 
widespread notoriety (or perceived adulation) will all be determining factors. 
 Reputation – The degree to which knowledge of the initial nexus relationship has a 
positive or negative affect on the Organised Crime Groups standing amongst criminal 
peers and ‘relevant wider society’. 
 Distance – How closely the terrorist group acts to the location of the organised crime 
group and their wider ‘society’ will be of direct relevance to all relationship 
calculations. 
 Profit – The degree to which the organised crime group is dependent on the initial nexus 
relationship to continue its funding and any alternative revenue streams that are 
available as a contingency if the relationship is discontinued will be relevant.  
 Co-operation - The extent to which the initial nexus relationship impacts upon the 
organised crime groups operations, through for instance security of commodity routes 
or expert knowledge of explosives will require to be considered. 
 Incarceration – the positive (or negative) impact of interactions occurring through 
shared incarceration, or the impact on the relationship arising through the incarceration 




Combined these internal and external factors form a balance sheet of competing considerations 
from which the organised criminal contemplating entering or maintaining an initial nexus 
relationship with a terrorist group will consider.  
 
This model is not exhaustive but shows from the research to date that contemplation of such a 
relationship does not amount to a purely profit based calculation. For the organised criminal 
monetary gain may indeed be the driving factor, but it is far from the only consideration. 
 
5.3.9 ‘Initial Nexus’ Relationships – Additional Considerations 
 
There are particular nuances to this relationship, this ‘initial nexus’ between those involved in 
terrorism and organised crime, which can be drawn out further. These are indicated in Figure 
4.5 below. 
 
In this model the following potential make up of these relationships is considered in turn: 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship A’ 
 
Within Relationship A the OCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural 
background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings. 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated PIRA 
members and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past 
émigré community. 
 
Such an association may have strong bonds: trust through common views, shared backgrounds 
and ease of ‘referencing’ through common associates or known past activities (criminal or 
otherwise) would be likely. The ‘kudos’ element that might occur from such a relationship 
within the shared sub culture would also be of relevance. 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship B’ 
 
Within Relationship B the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social 
groupings.  
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated UVF members 
and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré 
community. 
 
There are obvious negative features of such a relationship, such as contrary viewpoints and 
detrimental opinions of the OCG or Terrorist group might occur were the details of the 
relationship to become known in their sub cultures. However, ‘trust’ gained through known 
past activities (criminal or otherwise) and shared associations would be very likely. 
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship C’ 
 
Within Relationship C the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate 
social grouping. An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is non-Scottish 
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origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and Scottish origin OCGs from the pro-Republican sub group 
within the Irish past émigré community. 
 
Trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.  
 
‘Initial Nexus Relationship D’ 
 
Within Relationship D the OCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural 
backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate 
social grouping. 
 
An example of a confluence that would meet this criteria are non-Scottish origin al Qaeda 
inspired terrorists and non-Scottish origin OCGs, such as Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation 
groups.  
 
As with Relationship C trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would 
likely be difficult. 
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5.3.10 Variant Initial Nexus Relationship Constructions – Discussion 
 
Although one can in no way be definitive regarding how OCGs will behave, as individuals 
with their own particular foibles and morality constitute each group differently, one can see 
how the argument that Initial Nexus Relationship D would be more dangerous is one worthy 
of consideration.  
 
The nature of OCGs businesses, such as the example of Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation 
groups, inherently harm the communities in which they are based, through the illicit commodity 
they produce but also through the further criminal elements they attract to the business when it 
is a success and the risks their criminality brings both through disputes that may affect the 
wider public but also through their methods. The exemplar Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation 
groups typically jury rig electrical systems that are massive fire risks with no consideration of 
those who neighbour properties they are utilising for their businesses. When one takes the status 
quo elements of OCG behaviours and couple them with a group whose members have a 
minimal past in a particular area the common tactics of law enforcement to track an individual 
are greatly reduced, which non-indigenous OCG members are very well aware of, and align to 
this a lack of social connection through a ‘past’, i.e. a lack of family or friends in the host 
community provides an absence of impact of criminality of the non-indigenous OCGs 
behaviour on persons they might feel restrained from allowing be harmed the dangers of ‘Initial 
Nexus Relationship D’ become all too apparent. It is the added disconnection from the society 
of operation that provides the increased danger.  
 
This ‘disconnection from society’ appears to pervade the degraded terrorists from the conflict 
related to Northern Ireland, the Caliphites and the lone wolf terrorists subject of consideration 
in chapter 2. It appears a common thread of change that links them all, indicative of the changes 
to the religious wave that appear manifest.  
 
The ‘criminal code’ alluded to by a number of the research participants may also have an impact 
regarding each of the ‘initial nexus relationships’ listed and understood better within these 
conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, such a code is, to a degree, in fact an innate link between the 
criminal and their wider community values, where although their criminality may cross the 
normal bounds of wider societal behaviour the ‘code’ constrains behaviour within their sub 
groups. If this were to be the case one can see how such a ‘code’ would impact on interactions 
with contacts out with the OCG and have differing effects dependent on which of the 
relationships, from A to D, the OCG were engaged in. Deception would also be key, and if the 
OCG were to perceive their relationship to be simply a criminal relationship between differing 
origin OCGs, while it was instead, through deception, a relationship with terrorists, type C, this 
could be significantly impactive on the continuing nature of their interactions.  
 
Deception could also be highly impactive on group D associations that might develop in 
prisons. Many terrorist groups have criminal ‘fronts’, for fundraising and other purposes. 
Individuals detected for such activity may well be incarcerated for criminal offences, with no 
indication of their terrorist links being uncovered by the authorities. Such individuals would 
then enter the prison system being perceived as serious criminals only. Any associations with 
other serious criminals that then occurred in the prison system would only be seen in this 
context and possible relationships would be thought of as criminal in nature. They may well 





The views of participant QI discussed in Chapter 3 seem to be very logical, in that it is likely 
it will be OCG ‘foot soldiers’ who have been seduced by the lure of IS. This is supported by 
the study conducted by Neve et al. (2020). However, this in no way mitigates the potential risk 
these individuals may pose in future. If one accepts that it is the young OCG members travelling 
(and returning) these individuals will likely have long criminal careers ahead, careers very 
different in terms of reach and capability from those of the fellow OCG members they left 
behind. These individuals will be returning with enhanced reputations in criminal circles, 
knowledge of international illicit distribution networks and tradecraft tested in the crucible of 
intense conflict. It may well be the case as participant QG points out that other indigenous 
OCGs may be wary of these returnees. From the research presented they likely would have 
good cause to be so, but this may well not be enough to avoid ‘doing business’.  
 
As discussed above Naim’s (2013) ‘more and mobility’ revolution has already shown us how 
an increasing number of malevolent actors are interfacing and interacting. The (albeit perverse) 
‘stability’ of relationship types A and B, may be giving way to a future where relationships C 
and D become increasingly common place. The dangers of this appear considerable, and further 
indication of the changes wrought as we move beyond Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave in 
terms of terrorist behaviour.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn together the case studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 to consider the main 
research question, are there commonalities between ‘Lone Wolf Terrorists’ with participants 
in crime/ terror nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on 
any classification of contemporary terrorism?  
 
The five-part expanding model illustrated throughout this chapter in Figures 4.1 to 4.5 draws 
together the factors found through consideration of the available literature in the field and the 
evidence obtained in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Terrorism does not take place in a vacuum, socially or politically, and current research 
acknowledges this, but through the lens of the actions and activities of groups rather than the 
individuals who compose these groups. The modelling within this chapter takes significant 
steps to rectify this, by taking Makarenko’s (2004) considerations and applying them in a wider 
and more nuanced fashion to individuals as opposed to previous academic consideration of 
groups.  
 
The central argument advanced in this thesis is that terrorism cannot be understood without 
first appreciating the place of a terrorist within society as a whole and their particular ‘sub 
societies’.   This chapter goes beyond previous works, such Kaplan and Costa (2015) who saw 
an undertow emerging, by adding a new layer of analysis casting a wider scope for evidence 
from the ‘periphery ‘of terrorism research, combining consideration of lone wolf terrorists with 
other contemporary terrorist actors in tandem rather than in contrast. It does so by arguing that 
the actions of lone wolf terrorists, which have been extensive and after Kaplan and Costa’s 
work (2015), are meaningful in a wider context in a manner similar to those engaged in terrorist 
groups. Through recognising the failure to acknowledge this possibility we may have identified 
at least one reason in the field to accept the changes in Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave, and 
that may be indicative of wider change. Exclude a significant group of actors from 




This chapter has clearly demonstrated the role of criminality in contemporary terrorism, and 
consequently the need for its influence to be considered in terms of change to Rapoport’s 
(2003) religious wave. The scale of the global degradation of cause in the interests of self- 
enrichment amongst contemporary terrorists, and their similarities to members of the fourth 
religious sub wave, is striking and appears indicative that some form of alteration is at play. 
Individual interests appear key, and the identified core factors influencing the individual actors 
in the terrorism milieu provide a means to understand motivations. The increasingly persuasive 
potential role of ‘identity terrorism’ appears one worthy of consideration in terms of these 
seismic changes. It is suggested by this thesis that these factors help uncover what is ‘Identity 
Terrorism’ is, and this in turn needs to be taken into account by law enforcement officers 
countering terrorism in the field as well as those in Parliaments enacting laws aimed at 
countering terrorism. 
 
In terms of the role of criminality and its ongoing impact, it is of particular note that the experts 
contacted for opinion on the issue of IS returnees discussed in chapter 3 were unanimous in 
respect of the danger of these individuals in terms of participation in organised crime. The 
potential impact on conventional organised crime in democracies of IS returnees should not be 







Chapter 6: Conclusions 
6.1 Answering the Research Question 
The primary research question this thesis set out to addresses was: 
 
 Are there commonalities between ‘Lone Wolf Terrorists’ with participants in Crime/ 
Terror Nexus relationships, and, if so, what impact do these commonalities have on any 
classification of contemporary terrorism?  
 
To answer the research question we need to consider each of the research sub questions in turn, 
as outlined below. 
 
6.1.1 Answering the Research Sub Questions 
 
This research question was broken down into the following sub-questions: 
 
 What factors and/or motivations influence individual participation in a ‘lone wolf’ 
terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context than that of their 
own activity? 
 What factors and/ or motivations influence individual participation in a Crime/ Terror 
nexus relationship, and are the actions of participants meaningful in a wider context 
than their own activity? 
 When the factors/motivations are examined together, are recent changes in ‘lone wolf 
terrorist’ attacks and Crime/ Terror Nexus relationships, sufficient to support the 
argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport’s religious wave?  
 
To address this first sub-question “what factors and/or motivations influence individual 
participation in a ‘lone wolf’ terrorist attack, and are their actions meaningful in a wider context 
than that of their own activity?” one must examine both parts of the sub-question in turn. 
 
The thesis has identified significant factors that may influence a lone wolf terrorist and 
discerned a number of motivational contributions that appear to have previously either been 
overlooked or their significance may be undervalued. Apparent social exclusion of the lone 
wolf terrorist actors within their immediate societies and sub societies is a cross cutting factor. 
This thesis has demonstrated these actors overcome this exclusion and undertake action against 
their societies through intellectual alignment to a counter philosophy, however nonsensical this 
alignment may seem to a rational individual.  
 
Mental health materialises as a clear factor in driving contemporary lone wolf terrorism, and 
that the actions of those who are ill need to be seen as those of a terrorist when appropriate 
utilising the definitions outlined. In chapter 2 it was illustrated that dismissal of lone wolf 
terrorists as outliners, one offs, or exceptions to the established understanding of terrorism as 
being religiously motivated tended to rely significantly on mental health as a factor to explain 
the occurrence of the acts perpetrated by lone wolf terrorists.  Whilst mental health has a 
relevance, to rely on it exclusively as the means to explain or rationalise the actions of lone 
wolf terrorists adopts a shallow understanding of terrorist motivations.  This follows the same 
‘shallow’ pattern evident in the existing literature which fails to appreciate the changing nature 
of terrorist motivations which is only exposed or best exposed by the intersection between 
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organised crime and the terror nexus this thesis utilises. The examples provided in the thesis, 
and particularly that studied in depth of Ali Sonboly (who had mental health difficulties but 
interacted with criminal actors to obtain a firearm prior to his attack), demonstrate that many 
interested parties, academic and in law enforcement, are quick to dismiss lone actor’s actions 
as having no meaning, particularly when mental health factors are sighted as contributory.  
 
Sonboly’s actions in conjunction with the 17 year old Welsh non-Muslim IS adherent are 
archetypal of the lone wolf terrorists attaching themselves to causes, however bizarre the 
attachment may seem to a rational actor. In the studies conducted on lone wolf terrorists, it was 
revealed that there was an overwhelming indicator of a motivational desire amongst terrorists 
to matter, to achieve notoriety and a connection to events bigger than themselves. The chilling 
statistic that deaths to lone wolf terrorist actions were greater in 2016 than in the preceding 
thirty four years is a stark indicator of the significance of this problem.  
 
There will always be difficulties in describing or putting a label to draw significance to those 
suffering mental health difficulties. In addition there will equally be difficulties in 
understanding the significance of mental health problems in motivating terrorist actors.  This 
thesis contends that by using the crime/ terror nexus as a prism to understand terrorist 
motivations in a holistic manner one can begin to unravel these dual difficulties by considering 
the impact of mental health on the individual and their motivations across all aspects of their 
particular drivers rather than calling out mental health as a ‘catch all’ pseudo explanation. 
Through examining terrorist actors antecedents and the manner in which they align themselves 
with a cause, however well understood by them that cause might actually be, we gain a far 
better understanding of terrorism’s ‘pull’ factors on potential participants. To simply dismiss 
these actors with varying degrees of mental health difficulties, as has occurred in the past, is 
extremely dangerous. Without understanding the actors to the best degree we can (accepting 
their mental health condition will limit our full understanding) means that mitigation measures 
cannot be enacted and we are in danger of these actors numbers continuing to grow.  
 
A core argument advanced in this thesis has been that the motivations of terrorist actors has 
tended to be overshadowed by a fixation on religion as a primary motivation to explain the 
occurrence of modern terrorism.  It is contended that this fixation on religion as a motivating 
factor may be contributing towards scholars and counter terrorism professionals not 
acknowledging the significance of changes in relevant actor’s characteristics. This fixation on 
religion, coupled with a long-time dismissal of lone wolf terrorist activity as meaningful in 
terrorism’s wider context, has resulted in a failure to appreciate that when lone wolf terrorists 
antecedents and actions are reconsidered it appears that the validity of their part in Rapoport’s 
religious wave is in significant doubt. The sheer volume and lethality of lone wolf terrorist 
attacks, coupled with the links to terrorist group activities, be that shared espoused motivations 
(however apparently odd and misplaced), or  the strikingly similar antecedents of actors be they 
lone wolf terrorists or terrorist group members challenges the previous notion that these 
activities are not meaningful in a wider context. This thesis contends, from the evidence 
obtained and analysis conducted, that current lone wolf terrorist activity, when looked at in its 
totality, provides powerful indicators of the factors driving contemporary terrorism; and that 
commonalities across terrorist actors, if acknowledged, would assist in moving forward 
understanding of how terrorism is changing, assisting in re-framing considerations of how to 
mitigate against the phenomena’s impact.   
 
In chapter 2 the nuance of the causes driving the contemporary lone wolves is made clear, as 
is the general lack of religious ‘credentials’ amongst these actors, which is counter intuitive to 
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their actions fitting a religious wave. It has been argued in the past that lone wolf terrorists are 
exception to social movement theory, which would perhaps explain this anomaly.  However 
the actors and their actions as considered in this thesis are clearly linked to national and 
international conflicts, with actors often demonstrating their connection to ‘struggles’ through 
forms of signalling, such as altered social media profiles, manifestos and even commentary on 
international conflicts during live streaming of attacks. It is accepted that the focus of this study 
is on one calendar year (2016) and based on information available through ‘open source’ 
techniques. That said, given the examples provided in the thesis post the 2016 study, attackers 
continue to demonstrate factors common to those of actors from the case study. There is no 
known evidence that undermines the assertion of the relevance and meaning of contemporary 
lone wolf terrorists activities. However, this thesis acknowledges, as Rapoport (2003) asserted, 
that terrorism changes and although the activities of lone wolf terrorists may be of striking 
relevance to the period studied this will likely alter over time. In respect of the use of ‘open 
source’ research this is a limitation all scholars of terrorism face, acknowledged at the 
commencement of this thesis. Given the breadth of the examples provided in the case study 
there is no likely predictable motivational factor that would be common to the actors identified 
that would undermine their actions perceived relevance and consequently the use of this 
technique to gather information appears wholly valid.  
 
Returning to the second part of the sub-question, whether lone wolf terrorist actions are 
meaningful in a wider context than that of their own activity, on the conceptual scale the actors 
identified in the 2016 data set of lone wolf terrorists have much in common with those of 
Rapoport’s (2003) first wave, the anarchists. Although this is acknowledged by other authors 
its significance has arguably been missed or its importance underestimated. This contention 
rests on the basis of an anomaly between contemporary terrorist actors and those actors in 
Rapoport’s first wave, the anarchists.  It can be recalled from chapter 2 where it was explained 
that the actions and motivations of independently acting (lone wolf terrorist) anarchists 
constituted Rapoport’s ‘first wave’.  It is contended that there is no logical explanation as to 
why the actions and motivations of contemporary independent actors cannot be viewed in 
similar terms to Rapoport’s anarchists, or at least viewed as being indicative of significant 
change being afoot.   
 
Actors with extreme social agendas are emerging for whom it has not, as yet, been possible to 
properly frame or fully appreciate the geo political context of their actions and motivations. 
This is in fact what Rapoport (2003) himself envisaged would occur at the conclusion of the 
religious wave, but remains largely unacknowledged in current academic discourse. The lone 
wolves, through their rhetoric and actions, clearly perceive themselves as influencing world 
events and the examples of their post action embrace as fellow travellers by terrorist groups 
such as IS and National Action clearly shows their actions are indeed meaningful in a wider 
context than that of their own activity 
 
From here we have the second sub question to consider, “what factors and/ or motivations 
influence individual participation in a crime/ terror nexus relationship, and are the actions of 
participants meaningful in a wider context than their own activity?”  
 
The pervasive commonality found in participants in the crime/ terror nexus was evidence of 
the influence of the impact the relationship had on an individual actors pursuit of profit, be that 
financial, or as is often the case through enhancement of their ‘reputation and/or notoriety’.  In 
addition the research has shown further impactive factors that affect the relationship between 
nexus actors. These are: the individual’s characteristics; the influence of culture and sub-
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cultures; the distance from operations of activity; whether participants have employed 
deception; the degree to which the withdrawal of co-operation will impact ongoing activities; 
and whether actors have experienced incarceration. This factor identification is not presented 
as exhaustive, however it may be considered at minimum as being a significant achievement 
by increasing the understanding of the influences on nexus actors.  
  
When set within Rapoport’s framework these behaviours are very useful in framing the 
influences that exist around the wider unacknowledged shift in terrorist behaviour this thesis 
contends have occurred. The identification of these behaviours makes the modelling of chapter 
5 possible, allowing an illustrative approach that increases understanding of nexus interactions. 
The thesis makes these assertions from its case studies and examples from scholarly work on 
other contemporary conflicts. These ‘commonalities across conflicts’ the modelling draws 
together appear unacknowledged, perhaps due to actors never previously being compared in 
this manner, but are indicative of the potential wider changes in terrorist behaviour similar to 
the lone wolf terrorists considered above.  
 
This leads directly into the third sub question, “when the factors/motivations are examined 
together, are recent changes in ‘lone wolf terrorist’ attacks and crime/ terror nexus 
relationships, sufficient to support the argument that there has been a shift beyond Rapoport’s 
religious wave?”  
 
The thesis shows there are indeed commonalities between ‘Lone Wolf Terrorists’ and 
participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships, such as a desire for reputational enhancement 
(be that in specific sub societies or in wider society); a lack of antecedent history indicative of 
long term attachment to/ understanding of their cause or adherence to previously acknowledged 
principles; but, set against this a continuing need for actions to be tied to matters of very 
significant national and international import (such as Northern Irish related terrorists retaining 
‘legitimacy’ by carrying out conflict related actions while there main focus is on organised 
criminal activity, or lone wolf terrorists who are isolated refugees and adopt IS related rhetoric 
when undertaking their terrorist actions). There is no previous scholarly endeavour where the 
two phenomena have been considered together in this manner.  It is contended that when these 
two phenomena are considered together they combine to form an analytical lens which can be 
used to identify changes in terrorist motivations.  This change in terrorist motivation may be 
considered as being symptomatic of a more significant change within terrorism and supports 
the need to re-evaluate Rapoport’s religious wave. 
 
The discussion in chapters 2, 3 and 5 demonstrates that previous work on exploring the 
motivations of terrorist actors remains fixated on ‘religion’ as being a primary motivation.   
 
This continued fixation has occurred despite the general literature on terrorism advocating the 
phenomena’s ever changing nature, with Rapoport’s (2003) whole thesis being that terrorism 
is changing over time yet this change in terrorist motivations clearly identified in this thesis 
appears to have been missed. By considering the individual and their motivational drivers in 
more detail, a clear picture of the potential new wave of terrorism, ‘identity terrorism’ emerges.  
 
The thesis does not in any way contend that all terrorism should be understood solely through 
the prism of individual motivation and influencing factors. Instead, it argues that these should 
be taken into account in the same manner as macro considerations on group action and drivers. 
Only through giving due account to the individuals who participate in any wave of terrorism 




The thesis is not suggesting that we have moved into some new form of terrorism but rather 
that the current change may have occurred unnoticed by the majority despite a considerable 
round of literature accepting terrorism changes all the time. The explanation for this oversight 
may lie in the sheer magnitude of the 9/11 attacks and the religious motivations of their 
perpetrators. Through the 2 decades of subsequent terrorist attacks that have occurred this may 
have resulted in a continuing and ongoing focus on ‘religiosity’ as a motivational explanation, 
and a widespread belief that we remain within the confines of Rapoport’s (2003) fourth wave 
of Religious Terrorism, with a label of ‘exceptionalism’ applied to attackers who do not fit the 
mould of the accepted paradigm This belief appears to run contrary to the evidence presented 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4, which is indicative of potentially widespread changes to terrorist actor 
motivations. In addition, while the academic community remain persuaded we are in an 
ongoing phase of religiously motivated terrorism it also largely considers terrorism in terms of 
groups, rather than the individuals who constitute these group’s memberships, or not as the 
case may be, yet nonetheless commit acts that fit widely accepted definitions of terrorism.22 
6.2 Summary of Contribution to Knowledge 
Although both the concepts of lone wolf terrorism and the nexus between terrorism and 
organised crime have been studied at length, the originality of this thesis is the lack of 
comparative studies of the phenomena and the modelling it provides to assist in understanding 
the factors driving contemporary terrorist motivation. Doing so provides a unique perspective 
on modern terrorism.  This in turn provides a way to analyse the occurrence of terrorism that 
can be utilised not only in analysing counterterrorism law and policy but also can help inform 
its development.    
 
This thesis does so through a focus on the individual motivations towards terrorist activity, 
while acknowledging the role groups play but seeing them as a collection of the individuals 
that constitute the cadre rather than a homogeneous body. Much of the current literature 
focusses on groups, not their participants. Much of the literature on organised crime considers 
‘profit’ purely in monetary terms, not in a wider sense. It is the individualised approach this 
thesis adopts and illustrates in chapter 5 that unlocks the ability to understand the immersion 
or alliance with organised criminality that occurs for so many terrorist actors. In turn this new 
conceptualisation provides a new perspective on the widespread degradation of cause amongst 
terrorist actors; a worldwide phenomenon that receives scant acknowledgement at the macro 
level.  
 
Ironically, by focussing on individual actors we are able to see these widespread changes, and 
understand their significance within Rapoport’s (2003) framework. Through this the modelling 
in the thesis is possible, and provides the reader with a unique means by which to understand 
contemporary terrorism developments, and its influencing factors.  
6.3 Key Conclusions 
The key conclusions of this thesis are: 
 
 The antecedents, actions and attributes of contemporary lone wolf terrorists and 
participants in crime/ terror nexus relationships have significant similarities. This thesis 
                                                 
22 As discussed in detail at Section 1.4, Chapter 1.  
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uniquely examined edge phenomena of the crime/terror nexus and lone wolves set 
within Rapoport’s wave theory. In doing so it draws out previously unacknowledged 
common factors across what, until now, appear wholly disparate terrorist campaigns.  
From IS, the Real IRA, the far right and FARC common factors amongst the individual 
participants become clear, particularly when considered set within the modelling this 
thesis presents in chapter 5. These commonalities present new opportunities for counter 
terrorism professionals to reconsider the partitioned approach to dealing with adherents 
to what appear radically different ideologies and instead focus on the individuals 
espousing their allegiance; perhaps looking for more macro counter measures targeted 
on the prevalent characteristics amongst participants rather than tackling the apparently 
all important group narrative of each contemporary terrorist campaign. Tackling 
individual common circumstances rather than splitting resource and effort across 
disparate ideologies may prove fruitful.  
 Far greater attention to the individualised drivers of terrorist behaviours is required. 
Only through accepting a wider understanding of ‘profit’, beyond simply financial gain 
but also in terms on individualised benefits to those engaged in the activities studied 
can we gain a true understanding of motivations. Throughout the research contributing 
to this thesis time and again the issue of ‘reputation’ and its value in the criminal and 
terrorist realm were clear. To function in either milieu an appropriate reputation is a 
necessity as with no formal governance structures all ongoing actions and activity are 
dictated by culture. The enhancement of ‘reputation’ in a manner the actor seeks, be 
that as a lone wolf terrorist seeking some form of media based notoriety and influence, 
or a arms dealer from within the Irish Republican sub society, is a form of profit. This 
concept that applies across the two phenomena studies is one that appears to have 
escaped previous academic consideration to any significant degree. It contains obvious 
weaknesses within it too, where an actor’s reputational degradation by law enforcement 
through targeted tactics may be a future avenue for research and operational 
exploitation, accepting the accompanying likely ethical dilemmas that may result. 
 The significant changes that appear to have been identified through this research 
warrant appropriate consideration as to whether Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave is 
indeed still the existent driver for terrorist behaviour, or if instead we have moved 
beyond this into the age of ‘identity terrorism’. While the nomenclature of terrorist 
organisations such as Islamic State may imply the groups ‘raison d’etre’ closer analysis 
of individual members, their actions, apparent motivations and behaviour post conflict 
necessitate a far more nuanced understanding of their drivers. This reappraisal 
undertaken in this thesis, placing a variety of actors under scrutiny from a new 
perspective, clearly shows that the crest of Rapoport’s (2003) religious wave has passed 
and terrorism appears to have moved into new uncharted waters. Counterterrorism law 
and policy need to adapt to combat the occurrence of contemporary terrorism. If those 
framing law and policy remain fixated on a religious understanding of terrorism, as this 
thesis contends is the case for the reasons described above, it is likely that the 
development of counterterrorism law and policy will not be truly effective in managing 
the threat contemporary terrorism represents.  To analyse contemporary terrorism 
scholars similarly need to take into account the changes this thesis highlights. The 
academic study of terrorism can only be accurate if it has a full appreciation of its 






6.4 The Future and Impact of this Research 
The consequence of the research in this thesis has been to develop a framework and agenda for 
future research analysis in the understanding of contemporary terrorist actor’s motivations. 
 
6.4.1 The Crime/Terror Nexus as a Framework for Future Research 
 
The main impact of this research should be to engender a reappraisal of contemporary terrorist 
motivations. A phenomena can really only be understood when the factors and motivations that 
drive individual actors within that phenomena are begun to be appreciated.  Rapport’s (2003) 
central arguments is that terrorism changes over time, but there has been a reluctance in the 
literature to acknowledge change and perhaps this reluctance has compromised our 
understanding of terrorist actor motivations and in turn terrorism. 
 
This thesis has utilised the crime/terror nexus as its foundation to gain a better understanding 
of contemporary terrorist behaviours. It has proved to be a very useful conceptualisation, and 
it appears wholly appropriate that the nexus is utilised as a framework for future research in 
this area.  In essence, the crime/terror nexus becomes the starting point for future research on 
understanding and appreciating the significance of terrorist motivations. 
 
The model that has been provided at Figure 4.4 (Radicalisation to Re-Criminalisation), 
individualises the path from criminal to terrorist, enhancing the previous work of Makarenko 
(2004) and is indicative of the potential utilisation of the crime/ terror nexus to drive the 
understanding of changes in modern terrorism. The model illustrates the key points in this 
journey and that there is the obvious potential for disengagement. If organised criminals who 
participate in IS are allowed to return unchecked, and un-shepherded, it is difficult to imagine 
a situation where they would not slip into their past associations and utilise their new skill sets 
and contacts for nefarious purposes, as appears to be happening already (Neve et al., 2020). 
 
Through expanding the nexus continuum model from group considerations to focus on 
individual actors this thesis has demonstrated that terrorists and organised criminals with no 
cultural affinity to their area of operation have less restraint upon their actions as the direct 
impact of their activities will not be felt by persons from within their immediate cultures, sub 
cultures or own circle of interaction, such as friends or family. Co-operation may be largely 
unrestrained, difficult to detect and lead to increased capability for action resulting from the 
co-operation by both parties. Appreciation of this risk, not previously highlighted in the 
literature, may be of significant benefit to law enforcement when considering group targeting 
with finite resource.  
 
6.4.2 An Agenda of Being Alert to Changes in Motivations to Influence Law and Policy  
 
Given the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks, resulting in the largest loss of life to terrorism so far 
in a single attack, it is understandable that the focus was on understanding the perpetrators of 
the atrocity and seeking to counter future attacks by such individuals. However, these attacks 
were twenty years ago. In the intervening years terrorist behaviours have changed significantly, 
and as shown in this thesis motivations appear to have clearly moved beyond the religious into 
a new sphere. The focus on the religiosity may have been appropriate, but there is no denying 




The focus on Islam, a religion with 1.9 Billion adherents, as a motivator for terrorist action 
when it has been a tiny proportion23 of those claiming membership of the religion has 
unquestionably been counterproductive. In reframing these oft described ‘Radical Islamists’ as 
the Caliphites this thesis contends they are, a significant step away from the previous polarising 
arguments is possible and may prove of significant benefit to community relations and political 
debate in addition to academia and law enforcement. This is not a ‘rebranding’ for any 
superficial reasons; instead it is a retitling of the threat as it actually stands today. As discussed 
above, reappraising contemporary motivations of terrorist actors informs law and policy so that 
counterterrorism becomes better at helping with managing the threat. If we can move thinking 
beyond the (understandable) fixation on 9/11 and its aftermath it should in future not only be 
easier to accept the apparent arrival of the phase of ‘identity terrorism’ we now face but also 
emphasise the need for watching and preparing for changes in terrorism over time so that we 
are on the alert for developments and their impacts, both potential (where early mitigation 
measures can be applied) and actual (where counter measures can be identified and 
implemented).  The modelling illustrated in this thesis should help in this endeavour, but only 
if it as seen as being a moment in time. The factors it outlines will ultimately change, and with 
this so to should the model.  
 
A refocussing may well ultimately identify other tangential factors influencing contemporary 
terrorist actors beyond those posited in this thesis.  As this thesis has shown the current 
weaknesses that exist in understanding of terrorist actor motivation, it surely opens the prospect 
for new ways of understanding other factors beyond the crime/terror nexus as a basis to begin 
to really understand motivation over time and its changing nature as well as its impact on 
terrorism more broadly. This is to the greater good, and far more aligned to Rapoport’s (2003) 
original position on the ever changing nature of terrorism that, as discussed, seems to have been 
largely neglected over the last 2 decades. 
 
Although it would be nigh on impossible to influence terrorist actors who are returning from 
conflict zones undetected the same cannot be said of those who are detected and incarcerated. 
For them there are two areas that must be addressed. Ensuring they do not slip back into their 
IS ideology and inflict attacks on their country of origin is one, and that which is rightly 
receiving significant attention. However, of equal import is ensuring that they do not leave 
prison with their burnished credentials and enhanced skill set to return to the world of crime to 
cause significantly greater misery and despair than before they left. Impact can be made on this 
potential outcome, and it would appear incumbent on law enforcement and penal agencies to 
ensure such concerns are taken into account.  
 
Where safety and ethical concerns could be met further primary research through engagement 
with organised criminals in respect of their thoughts on co-operation with terrorists and the 
potential impact of IS veterans would likely prove extremely illuminating in gauging their 
potential impact in this area; this engagement should of course be accompanied by monitoring 
of organised crime development in the years ahead to ascertain if IS veterans do indeed become 
(re)involved in serious criminality. Consideration of other terrorist campaigns would also be 
very useful in considering the modellings wider relevance. This thesis has demonstrated the 
utility of using the crime/ terror nexus as a foundation for framing such research that could be 
undertaken.  
 
                                                 
23 The CIA estimated for instance IS, by far the largest ever terrorist group claiming to represent the Muslim 
faith, at its height had 31,500 members (0.000017%) with 2,000 of these being travellers from out with Syria 
and Iraq. (Nicks, 2014) 
166 
 
This thesis contends there has to be acceptance that mental health is a factor in influencing 
contemporary terrorism, and that the actions of those who are deemed ‘ill’ need to be seen as 
those of a terrorist when appropriate. Only through this acceptance will a true picture of the 
terrorist threat that is faced be possible, and will there be the possibility for international 
progress in identifying treatment and preventative measures for those who are ill. If not, we 
may well face a descent into the spiral identified by Bhui et al. (2014), which will see the 
actions of lone wolf terrorists grow exponentially. The author accepts that such a change in 
tack will require a considerable refocusing of resource in a number of disciplines, including 
but not limited to, social work, mental health, counterterrorism, and criminal justice. However, 
the prevalence of mental health issues amongst terrorist participants cannot be ignored, and 
moving this dialogue into a more mainstream acceptance of the issue is the only way progress 
can be made.  
 
There has to be some soul searching over the place of the criminal in society where we had the 
situation that embarking on an apocalyptic mission in Syria was a more attractive option to 
many than seeking reformation, inclusion and legitimisation is one’s home state. The potential 
ongoing triumvirate of Terror, (Organised) Crime and Mental Health is of particular concern 
given the potential spiralling dire consequences of such a combination.  
 
As stated above, terrorism functions at the political zeitgeists razor edge. Identity is the topic 
that undoubtedly currently sits astride this keenest of positions in the democracies. Unless we 
face this, and look to mitigate against extreme positions across the political spectrum the focus 
on identity is creating the relatively small number ‘Identity Terrorists’ may soon pose far more 
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